How much does a given trained model leak about each individual data record in its training set? Membership inference attacks are used as an auditing tool to quantify the private information that a model leaks about the individual data points in its training set. Membership inference attacks are influenced by different uncertainties that an attacker has to resolve about training data, the training algorithm, and the underlying data distribution. Thus attack success rates, of many attacks in the literature, do not precisely capture the information leakage of models about their data, as they also reflect other uncertainties that the attack algorithm has. In this paper, we explain the implicit assumptions and also the simplifications made in prior work using the framework of hypothesis testing. We also derive new attack algorithms from the framework that can achieve a high AUC score while also highlighting the different factors that affect their performance. Our algorithms capture a very precise approximation of privacy loss in models, and can be used as a tool to perform an accurate and informed estimation of privacy risk in machine learning models. We provide a thorough empirical evaluation of our attack strategies on various machine learning tasks and benchmark datasets.
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The landscape of adversarial attacks against text classifiers continues to grow, with new attacks developed every year and many of them available in standard toolkits, such as TextAttack and OpenAttack. In response, there is a growing body of work on robust learning, which reduces vulnerability to these attacks, though sometimes at a high cost in compute time or accuracy. In this paper, we take an alternate approach -- we attempt to understand the attacker by analyzing adversarial text to determine which methods were used to create it. Our first contribution is an extensive dataset for attack detection and labeling: 1.5~million attack instances, generated by twelve adversarial attacks targeting three classifiers trained on six source datasets for sentiment analysis and abuse detection in English. As our second contribution, we use this dataset to develop and benchmark a number of classifiers for attack identification -- determining if a given text has been adversarially manipulated and by which attack. As a third contribution, we demonstrate the effectiveness of three classes of features for these tasks: text properties, capturing content and presentation of text; language model properties, determining which tokens are more or less probable throughout the input; and target model properties, representing how the text classifier is influenced by the attack, including internal node activations. Overall, this represents a first step towards forensics for adversarial attacks against text classifiers.
The exponential growth of collected, processed, and shared microdata has given rise to concerns about individuals' privacy. As a result, laws and regulations have emerged to control what organisations do with microdata and how they protect it. Statistical Disclosure Control seeks to reduce the risk of confidential information disclosure by de-identifying them. Such de-identification is guaranteed through privacy-preserving techniques. However, de-identified data usually results in loss of information, with a possible impact on data analysis precision and model predictive performance. The main goal is to protect the individuals' privacy while maintaining the interpretability of the data, i.e. its usefulness. Statistical Disclosure Control is an area that is expanding and needs to be explored since there is still no solution that guarantees optimal privacy and utility. This survey focuses on all steps of the de-identification process. We present existing privacy-preserving techniques used in microdata de-identification, privacy measures suitable for several disclosure types and, information loss and predictive performance measures. In this survey, we discuss the main challenges raised by privacy constraints, describe the main approaches to handle these obstacles, review taxonomies of privacy-preserving techniques, provide a theoretical analysis of existing comparative studies, and raise multiple open issues.
Deep generative models have gained much attention given their ability to generate data for applications as varied as healthcare to financial technology to surveillance, and many more - the most popular models being generative adversarial networks and variational auto-encoders. Yet, as with all machine learning models, ever is the concern over security breaches and privacy leaks and deep generative models are no exception. These models have advanced so rapidly in recent years that work on their security is still in its infancy. In an attempt to audit the current and future threats against these models, and to provide a roadmap for defense preparations in the short term, we prepared this comprehensive and specialized survey on the security and privacy preservation of GANs and VAEs. Our focus is on the inner connection between attacks and model architectures and, more specifically, on five components of deep generative models: the training data, the latent code, the generators/decoders of GANs/ VAEs, the discriminators/encoders of GANs/ VAEs, and the generated data. For each model, component and attack, we review the current research progress and identify the key challenges. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible future attacks and research directions in the field.
A key challenge of big data analytics is how to collect a large volume of (labeled) data. Crowdsourcing aims to address this challenge via aggregating and estimating high-quality data (e.g., sentiment label for text) from pervasive clients/users. Existing studies on crowdsourcing focus on designing new methods to improve the aggregated data quality from unreliable/noisy clients. However, the security aspects of such crowdsourcing systems remain under-explored to date. We aim to bridge this gap in this work. Specifically, we show that crowdsourcing is vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, in which malicious clients provide carefully crafted data to corrupt the aggregated data. We formulate our proposed data poisoning attacks as an optimization problem that maximizes the error of the aggregated data. Our evaluation results on one synthetic and two real-world benchmark datasets demonstrate that the proposed attacks can substantially increase the estimation errors of the aggregated data. We also propose two defenses to reduce the impact of malicious clients. Our empirical results show that the proposed defenses can substantially reduce the estimation errors of the data poisoning attacks.
As data are increasingly being stored in different silos and societies becoming more aware of data privacy issues, the traditional centralized training of artificial intelligence (AI) models is facing efficiency and privacy challenges. Recently, federated learning (FL) has emerged as an alternative solution and continue to thrive in this new reality. Existing FL protocol design has been shown to be vulnerable to adversaries within or outside of the system, compromising data privacy and system robustness. Besides training powerful global models, it is of paramount importance to design FL systems that have privacy guarantees and are resistant to different types of adversaries. In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive survey on this topic. Through a concise introduction to the concept of FL, and a unique taxonomy covering: 1) threat models; 2) poisoning attacks and defenses against robustness; 3) inference attacks and defenses against privacy, we provide an accessible review of this important topic. We highlight the intuitions, key techniques as well as fundamental assumptions adopted by various attacks and defenses. Finally, we discuss promising future research directions towards robust and privacy-preserving federated learning.
While existing work in robust deep learning has focused on small pixel-level $\ell_p$ norm-based perturbations, this may not account for perturbations encountered in several real world settings. In many such cases although test data might not be available, broad specifications about the types of perturbations (such as an unknown degree of rotation) may be known. We consider a setup where robustness is expected over an unseen test domain that is not i.i.d. but deviates from the training domain. While this deviation may not be exactly known, its broad characterization is specified a priori, in terms of attributes. We propose an adversarial training approach which learns to generate new samples so as to maximize exposure of the classifier to the attributes-space, without having access to the data from the test domain. Our adversarial training solves a min-max optimization problem, with the inner maximization generating adversarial perturbations, and the outer minimization finding model parameters by optimizing the loss on adversarial perturbations generated from the inner maximization. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach on three types of naturally occurring perturbations -- object-related shifts, geometric transformations, and common image corruptions. Our approach enables deep neural networks to be robust against a wide range of naturally occurring perturbations. We demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed approach by showing the robustness gains of deep neural networks trained using our adversarial training on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and a new variant of the CLEVR dataset.
In federated learning, multiple client devices jointly learn a machine learning model: each client device maintains a local model for its local training dataset, while a master device maintains a global model via aggregating the local models from the client devices. The machine learning community recently proposed several federated learning methods that were claimed to be robust against Byzantine failures (e.g., system failures, adversarial manipulations) of certain client devices. In this work, we perform the first systematic study on local model poisoning attacks to federated learning. We assume an attacker has compromised some client devices, and the attacker manipulates the local model parameters on the compromised client devices during the learning process such that the global model has a large testing error rate. We formulate our attacks as optimization problems and apply our attacks to four recent Byzantine-robust federated learning methods. Our empirical results on four real-world datasets show that our attacks can substantially increase the error rates of the models learnt by the federated learning methods that were claimed to be robust against Byzantine failures of some client devices. We generalize two defenses for data poisoning attacks to defend against our local model poisoning attacks. Our evaluation results show that one defense can effectively defend against our attacks in some cases, but the defenses are not effective enough in other cases, highlighting the need for new defenses against our local model poisoning attacks to federated learning.
User behavior data in recommender systems are driven by the complex interactions of many latent factors behind the users' decision making processes. The factors are highly entangled, and may range from high-level ones that govern user intentions, to low-level ones that characterize a user's preference when executing an intention. Learning representations that uncover and disentangle these latent factors can bring enhanced robustness, interpretability, and controllability. However, learning such disentangled representations from user behavior is challenging, and remains largely neglected by the existing literature. In this paper, we present the MACRo-mIcro Disentangled Variational Auto-Encoder (MacridVAE) for learning disentangled representations from user behavior. Our approach achieves macro disentanglement by inferring the high-level concepts associated with user intentions (e.g., to buy a shirt or a cellphone), while capturing the preference of a user regarding the different concepts separately. A micro-disentanglement regularizer, stemming from an information-theoretic interpretation of VAEs, then forces each dimension of the representations to independently reflect an isolated low-level factor (e.g., the size or the color of a shirt). Empirical results show that our approach can achieve substantial improvement over the state-of-the-art baselines. We further demonstrate that the learned representations are interpretable and controllable, which can potentially lead to a new paradigm for recommendation where users are given fine-grained control over targeted aspects of the recommendation lists.
Graph neural networks (GNNs) are widely used in many applications. However, their robustness against adversarial attacks is criticized. Prior studies show that using unnoticeable modifications on graph topology or nodal features can significantly reduce the performances of GNNs. It is very challenging to design robust graph neural networks against poisoning attack and several efforts have been taken. Existing work aims at reducing the negative impact from adversarial edges only with the poisoned graph, which is sub-optimal since they fail to discriminate adversarial edges from normal ones. On the other hand, clean graphs from similar domains as the target poisoned graph are usually available in the real world. By perturbing these clean graphs, we create supervised knowledge to train the ability to detect adversarial edges so that the robustness of GNNs is elevated. However, such potential for clean graphs is neglected by existing work. To this end, we investigate a novel problem of improving the robustness of GNNs against poisoning attacks by exploring clean graphs. Specifically, we propose PA-GNN, which relies on a penalized aggregation mechanism that directly restrict the negative impact of adversarial edges by assigning them lower attention coefficients. To optimize PA-GNN for a poisoned graph, we design a meta-optimization algorithm that trains PA-GNN to penalize perturbations using clean graphs and their adversarial counterparts, and transfers such ability to improve the robustness of PA-GNN on the poisoned graph. Experimental results on four real-world datasets demonstrate the robustness of PA-GNN against poisoning attacks on graphs.
Machine Learning is a widely-used method for prediction generation. These predictions are more accurate when the model is trained on a larger dataset. On the other hand, the data is usually divided amongst different entities. For privacy reasons, the training can be done locally and then the model can be safely aggregated amongst the participants. However, if there are only two participants in \textit{Collaborative Learning}, the safe aggregation loses its power since the output of the training already contains much information about the participants. To resolve this issue, they must employ privacy-preserving mechanisms, which inevitably affect the accuracy of the model. In this paper, we model the training process as a two-player game where each player aims to achieve a higher accuracy while preserving its privacy. We introduce the notion of \textit{Price of Privacy}, a novel approach to measure the effect of privacy protection on the accuracy of the model. We develop a theoretical model for different player types, and we either find or prove the existence of a Nash Equilibrium with some assumptions. Moreover, we confirm these assumptions via a Recommendation Systems use case: for a specific learning algorithm, we apply three privacy-preserving mechanisms on two real-world datasets. Finally, as a complementary work for the designed game, we interpolate the relationship between privacy and accuracy for this use case and present three other methods to approximate it in a real-world scenario.
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