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Backdoor attacks have been shown to be a serious threat against deep learning systems such as biometric authentication and autonomous driving. An effective backdoor attack could enforce the model misbehave under certain predefined conditions, i.e., triggers, but behave normally otherwise. However, the triggers of existing attacks are directly injected in the pixel space, which tend to be detectable by existing defenses and visually identifiable at both training and inference stages. In this paper, we propose a new backdoor attack FTROJAN through trojaning the frequency domain. The key intuition is that triggering perturbations in the frequency domain correspond to small pixel-wise perturbations dispersed across the entire image, breaking the underlying assumptions of existing defenses and making the poisoning images visually indistinguishable from clean ones. We evaluate FTROJAN in several datasets and tasks showing that it achieves a high attack success rate without significantly degrading the prediction accuracy on benign inputs. Moreover, the poisoning images are nearly invisible and retain high perceptual quality. We also evaluate FTROJAN against state-of-the-art defenses as well as several adaptive defenses that are designed on the frequency domain. The results show that FTROJAN can robustly elude or significantly degenerate the performance of these defenses.

One major goal of the AI security community is to securely and reliably produce and deploy deep learning models for real-world applications. To this end, data poisoning based backdoor attacks on deep neural networks (DNNs) in the production stage (or training stage) and corresponding defenses are extensively explored in recent years. Ironically, backdoor attacks in the deployment stage, which can often happen in unprofessional users' devices and are thus arguably far more threatening in real-world scenarios, draw much less attention of the community. We attribute this imbalance of vigilance to the weak practicality of existing deployment-stage backdoor attack algorithms and the insufficiency of real-world attack demonstrations. To fill the blank, in this work, we study the realistic threat of deployment-stage backdoor attacks on DNNs. We base our study on a commonly used deployment-stage attack paradigm -- adversarial weight attack, where adversaries selectively modify model weights to embed backdoor into deployed DNNs. To approach realistic practicality, we propose the first gray-box and physically realizable weights attack algorithm for backdoor injection, namely subnet replacement attack (SRA), which only requires architecture information of the victim model and can support physical triggers in the real world. Extensive experimental simulations and system-level real-world attack demonstrations are conducted. Our results not only suggest the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed attack algorithm, but also reveal the practical risk of a novel type of computer virus that may widely spread and stealthily inject backdoor into DNN models in user devices. By our study, we call for more attention to the vulnerability of DNNs in the deployment stage.

We evaluate the effectiveness of semi-supervised learning (SSL) on a realistic benchmark where data exhibits considerable class imbalance and contains images from novel classes. Our benchmark consists of two fine-grained classification datasets obtained by sampling classes from the Aves and Fungi taxonomy. We find that recently proposed SSL methods provide significant benefits, and can effectively use out-of-class data to improve performance when deep networks are trained from scratch. Yet their performance pales in comparison to a transfer learning baseline, an alternative approach for learning from a few examples. Furthermore, in the transfer setting, while existing SSL methods provide improvements, the presence of out-of-class is often detrimental. In this setting, standard fine-tuning followed by distillation-based self-training is the most robust. Our work suggests that semi-supervised learning with experts on realistic datasets may require different strategies than those currently prevalent in the literature.

Ever since Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) emerges as a viable business that utilizes deep learning models to generate lucrative revenue, Intellectual Property Right (IPR) has become a major concern because these deep learning models can easily be replicated, shared, and re-distributed by any unauthorized third parties. To the best of our knowledge, one of the prominent deep learning models - Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) which has been widely used to create photorealistic image are totally unprotected despite the existence of pioneering IPR protection methodology for Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). This paper therefore presents a complete protection framework in both black-box and white-box settings to enforce IPR protection on GANs. Empirically, we show that the proposed method does not compromise the original GANs performance (i.e. image generation, image super-resolution, style transfer), and at the same time, it is able to withstand both removal and ambiguity attacks against embedded watermarks.

Zero-shot Learning (ZSL), which aims to predict for those classes that have never appeared in the training data, has arisen hot research interests. The key of implementing ZSL is to leverage the prior knowledge of classes which builds the semantic relationship between classes and enables the transfer of the learned models (e.g., features) from training classes (i.e., seen classes) to unseen classes. However, the priors adopted by the existing methods are relatively limited with incomplete semantics. In this paper, we explore richer and more competitive prior knowledge to model the inter-class relationship for ZSL via ontology-based knowledge representation and semantic embedding. Meanwhile, to address the data imbalance between seen classes and unseen classes, we developed a generative ZSL framework with Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). Our main findings include: (i) an ontology-enhanced ZSL framework that can be applied to different domains, such as image classification (IMGC) and knowledge graph completion (KGC); (ii) a comprehensive evaluation with multiple zero-shot datasets from different domains, where our method often achieves better performance than the state-of-the-art models. In particular, on four representative ZSL baselines of IMGC, the ontology-based class semantics outperform the previous priors e.g., the word embeddings of classes by an average of 12.4 accuracy points in the standard ZSL across two example datasets (see Figure 4).

As data are increasingly being stored in different silos and societies becoming more aware of data privacy issues, the traditional centralized training of artificial intelligence (AI) models is facing efficiency and privacy challenges. Recently, federated learning (FL) has emerged as an alternative solution and continue to thrive in this new reality. Existing FL protocol design has been shown to be vulnerable to adversaries within or outside of the system, compromising data privacy and system robustness. Besides training powerful global models, it is of paramount importance to design FL systems that have privacy guarantees and are resistant to different types of adversaries. In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive survey on this topic. Through a concise introduction to the concept of FL, and a unique taxonomy covering: 1) threat models; 2) poisoning attacks and defenses against robustness; 3) inference attacks and defenses against privacy, we provide an accessible review of this important topic. We highlight the intuitions, key techniques as well as fundamental assumptions adopted by various attacks and defenses. Finally, we discuss promising future research directions towards robust and privacy-preserving federated learning.

There has been an ongoing cycle where stronger defenses against adversarial attacks are subsequently broken by a more advanced defense-aware attack. We present a new approach towards ending this cycle where we "deflect'' adversarial attacks by causing the attacker to produce an input that semantically resembles the attack's target class. To this end, we first propose a stronger defense based on Capsule Networks that combines three detection mechanisms to achieve state-of-the-art detection performance on both standard and defense-aware attacks. We then show that undetected attacks against our defense often perceptually resemble the adversarial target class by performing a human study where participants are asked to label images produced by the attack. These attack images can no longer be called "adversarial'' because our network classifies them the same way as humans do.

Graph neural networks (GNNs) are widely used in many applications. However, their robustness against adversarial attacks is criticized. Prior studies show that using unnoticeable modifications on graph topology or nodal features can significantly reduce the performances of GNNs. It is very challenging to design robust graph neural networks against poisoning attack and several efforts have been taken. Existing work aims at reducing the negative impact from adversarial edges only with the poisoned graph, which is sub-optimal since they fail to discriminate adversarial edges from normal ones. On the other hand, clean graphs from similar domains as the target poisoned graph are usually available in the real world. By perturbing these clean graphs, we create supervised knowledge to train the ability to detect adversarial edges so that the robustness of GNNs is elevated. However, such potential for clean graphs is neglected by existing work. To this end, we investigate a novel problem of improving the robustness of GNNs against poisoning attacks by exploring clean graphs. Specifically, we propose PA-GNN, which relies on a penalized aggregation mechanism that directly restrict the negative impact of adversarial edges by assigning them lower attention coefficients. To optimize PA-GNN for a poisoned graph, we design a meta-optimization algorithm that trains PA-GNN to penalize perturbations using clean graphs and their adversarial counterparts, and transfers such ability to improve the robustness of PA-GNN on the poisoned graph. Experimental results on four real-world datasets demonstrate the robustness of PA-GNN against poisoning attacks on graphs.

Person re-identification (re-ID) has attracted much attention recently due to its great importance in video surveillance. In general, distance metrics used to identify two person images are expected to be robust under various appearance changes. However, our work observes the extreme vulnerability of existing distance metrics to adversarial examples, generated by simply adding human-imperceptible perturbations to person images. Hence, the security danger is dramatically increased when deploying commercial re-ID systems in video surveillance, especially considering the highly strict requirement of public safety. Although adversarial examples have been extensively applied for classification analysis, it is rarely studied in metric analysis like person re-identification. The most likely reason is the natural gap between the training and testing of re-ID networks, that is, the predictions of a re-ID network cannot be directly used during testing without an effective metric. In this work, we bridge the gap by proposing Adversarial Metric Attack, a parallel methodology to adversarial classification attacks, which can effectively generate adversarial examples for re-ID. Comprehensive experiments clearly reveal the adversarial effects in re-ID systems. Moreover, by benchmarking various adversarial settings, we expect that our work can facilitate the development of robust feature learning with the experimental conclusions we have drawn.