This paper studies an instance of zero-sum games in which one player (the leader) commits to its opponent (the follower) to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy). The actions of the leader are observed by the follower as the output of an arbitrary channel. In response to that, the follower chooses its action based on its current information, that is, the leader's commitment and the corresponding noisy observation of its action. Within this context, the equilibrium of the game with noisy action observability is shown to always exist and the necessary conditions for its uniqueness are identified. Interestingly, the noisy observations have important impact on the cardinality of the follower's set of best responses. Under particular conditions, such a set of best responses is proved to be a singleton almost surely. The proposed model captures any channel noise with a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure. As an example, the case in which the channel is described by a Gaussian probability measure is investigated.
相關內容
Exploring and mining subtle yet distinctive features between sub-categories with similar appearances is crucial for fine-grained visual categorization (FGVC). However, less effort has been devoted to assessing the quality of extracted visual representations. Intuitively, the network may struggle to capture discriminative features from low-quality samples, which leads to a significant decline in FGVC performance. To tackle this challenge, we propose a weakly supervised Context-Semantic Quality Awareness Network (CSQA-Net) for FGVC. In this network, to model the spatial contextual relationship between rich part descriptors and global semantics for capturing more discriminative details within the object, we design a novel multi-part and multi-scale cross-attention (MPMSCA) module. Before feeding to the MPMSCA module, the part navigator is developed to address the scale confusion problems and accurately identify the local distinctive regions. Furthermore, we propose a generic multi-level semantic quality evaluation module (MLSQE) to progressively supervise and enhance hierarchical semantics from different levels of the backbone network. Finally, context-aware features from MPMSCA and semantically enhanced features from MLSQE are fed into the corresponding quality probing classifiers to evaluate their quality in real-time, thus boosting the discriminability of feature representations. Comprehensive experiments on four popular and highly competitive FGVC datasets demonstrate the superiority of the proposed CSQA-Net in comparison with the state-of-the-art methods.
We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.
Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action that affects the utilities of both players, the sender can design information (or modify beliefs) of the receiver through signal commitment, hence posing a Stackelberg game. However, obtaining a Stackelberg equilibrium for this game traditionally requires the sender to have access to the receiver's objective. In this work, we consider an online version of information design where a sender interacts with a receiver of an unknown type who is adversarially chosen at each round. Restricting attention to Gaussian prior and quadratic costs for the sender and the receiver, we show that $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret is achievable with full information feedback, where $T$ is the total number of interactions between the sender and the receiver. Further, we propose a novel parametrization that allows the sender to achieve $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret for a general convex utility function. We then consider the Bayesian Persuasion problem with an additional cost term in the objective function, which penalizes signaling policies that are more informative and obtain $\mathcal{O}(\log(T))$ regret. Finally, we establish a sublinear regret bound for the partial information feedback setting and provide simulations to support our theoretical results.
We study distributed algorithms for finding a Nash equilibrium (NE) in a class of non-cooperative convex games under partial information. Specifically, each agent has access only to its own smooth local cost function and can receive information from its neighbors in a time-varying directed communication network. To this end, we propose a distributed gradient play algorithm to compute a NE by utilizing local information exchange among the players. In this algorithm, every agent performs a gradient step to minimize its own cost function while sharing and retrieving information locally among its neighbors. The existing methods impose strong assumptions such as balancedness of the mixing matrices and global knowledge of the network communication structure, including Perron-Frobenius eigenvector of the adjacency matrix and other graph connectivity constants. In contrast, our approach relies only on a reasonable and widely-used assumption of row-stochasticity of the mixing matrices. We analyze the algorithm for time-varying directed graphs and prove its convergence to the NE, when the agents' cost functions are strongly convex and have Lipschitz continuous gradients. Numerical simulations are performed for a Nash-Cournot game to illustrate the efficacy of the proposed algorithm.
Conventional text-to-SQL parsers are not good at synthesizing complex SQL queries that involve multiple tables or columns, due to the challenges inherent in identifying the correct schema items and performing accurate alignment between question and schema items. To address the above issue, we present a schema-aware multi-task learning framework (named MTSQL) for complicated SQL queries. Specifically, we design a schema linking discriminator module to distinguish the valid question-schema linkings, which explicitly instructs the encoder by distinctive linking relations to enhance the alignment quality. On the decoder side, we define 6-type relationships to describe the connections between tables and columns (e.g., WHERE_TC), and introduce an operator-centric triple extractor to recognize those associated schema items with the predefined relationship. Also, we establish a rule set of grammar constraints via the predicted triples to filter the proper SQL operators and schema items during the SQL generation. On Spider, a cross-domain challenging text-to-SQL benchmark, experimental results indicate that MTSQL is more effective than baselines, especially in extremely hard scenarios. Moreover, further analyses verify that our approach leads to promising improvements for complicated SQL queries.
Promoting behavioural diversity is critical for solving games with non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). Yet, there is a lack of rigorous treatment for defining diversity and constructing diversity-aware learning dynamics. In this work, we offer a geometric interpretation of behavioural diversity in games and introduce a novel diversity metric based on \emph{determinantal point processes} (DPP). By incorporating the diversity metric into best-response dynamics, we develop \emph{diverse fictitious play} and \emph{diverse policy-space response oracle} for solving normal-form games and open-ended games. We prove the uniqueness of the diverse best response and the convergence of our algorithms on two-player games. Importantly, we show that maximising the DPP-based diversity metric guarantees to enlarge the \emph{gamescape} -- convex polytopes spanned by agents' mixtures of strategies. To validate our diversity-aware solvers, we test on tens of games that show strong non-transitivity. Results suggest that our methods achieve much lower exploitability than state-of-the-art solvers by finding effective and diverse strategies.
Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) are a popular form of graphical model that, for certain classes of games, have been shown to offer key complexity and explainability advantages over traditional extensive form game (EFG) representations. In this paper, we extend previous work on MAIDs by introducing the concept of a MAID subgame, as well as subgame perfect and trembling hand perfect equilibrium refinements. We then prove several equivalence results between MAIDs and EFGs. Finally, we describe an open source implementation for reasoning about MAIDs and computing their equilibria.
Machine learning plays a role in many deployed decision systems, often in ways that are difficult or impossible to understand by human stakeholders. Explaining, in a human-understandable way, the relationship between the input and output of machine learning models is essential to the development of trustworthy machine-learning-based systems. A burgeoning body of research seeks to define the goals and methods of explainability in machine learning. In this paper, we seek to review and categorize research on counterfactual explanations, a specific class of explanation that provides a link between what could have happened had input to a model been changed in a particular way. Modern approaches to counterfactual explainability in machine learning draw connections to the established legal doctrine in many countries, making them appealing to fielded systems in high-impact areas such as finance and healthcare. Thus, we design a rubric with desirable properties of counterfactual explanation algorithms and comprehensively evaluate all currently-proposed algorithms against that rubric. Our rubric provides easy comparison and comprehension of the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches and serves as an introduction to major research themes in this field. We also identify gaps and discuss promising research directions in the space of counterfactual explainability.
Learning with limited data is a key challenge for visual recognition. Few-shot learning methods address this challenge by learning an instance embedding function from seen classes and apply the function to instances from unseen classes with limited labels. This style of transfer learning is task-agnostic: the embedding function is not learned optimally discriminative with respect to the unseen classes, where discerning among them is the target task. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to adapt the embedding model to the target classification task, yielding embeddings that are task-specific and are discriminative. To this end, we employ a type of self-attention mechanism called Transformer to transform the embeddings from task-agnostic to task-specific by focusing on relating instances from the test instances to the training instances in both seen and unseen classes. Our approach also extends to both transductive and generalized few-shot classification, two important settings that have essential use cases. We verify the effectiveness of our model on two standard benchmark few-shot classification datasets --- MiniImageNet and CUB, where our approach demonstrates state-of-the-art empirical performance.
Policy gradient methods are often applied to reinforcement learning in continuous multiagent games. These methods perform local search in the joint-action space, and as we show, they are susceptable to a game-theoretic pathology known as relative overgeneralization. To resolve this issue, we propose Multiagent Soft Q-learning, which can be seen as the analogue of applying Q-learning to continuous controls. We compare our method to MADDPG, a state-of-the-art approach, and show that our method achieves better coordination in multiagent cooperative tasks, converging to better local optima in the joint action space.
注冊地址： 北京市海淀區羊坊店路18號2幢3層301-191