The recent advancements in machine learning have led to a wave of interest in adopting online learning-based approaches for long-standing attack mitigation issues. In particular, DDoS attacks remain a significant threat to network service availability even after more than two decades. These attacks have been well studied under the assumption that malicious traffic originates from a single attack profile. Based on this premise, malicious traffic characteristics are assumed to be considerably different from legitimate traffic. Consequently, online filtering methods are designed to learn network traffic distributions adaptively and rank requests according to their attack likelihood. During an attack, requests rated as malicious are precipitously dropped by the filters. In this paper, we conduct the first systematic study on the effects of data poisoning attacks on online DDoS filtering; introduce one such attack method, and propose practical protective countermeasures for these attacks. We investigate an adverse scenario where the attacker is "crafty", switching profiles during attacks and generating erratic attack traffic that is ever-shifting. This elusive attacker generates malicious requests by manipulating and shifting traffic distribution to poison the training data and corrupt the filters. To this end, we present a generative model MimicShift, capable of controlling traffic generation while retaining the originating traffic's intrinsic properties. Comprehensive experiments show that online learning filters are highly susceptible to poisoning attacks, sometimes performing much worse than a random filtering strategy in this attack scenario. At the same time, our proposed protective countermeasure diminishes the attack impact.
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A growing body of work has shown that deep neural networks are susceptible to adversarial examples. These take the form of small perturbations applied to the model's input which lead to incorrect predictions. Unfortunately, most literature focuses on visually imperceivable perturbations to be applied to digital images that often are, by design, impossible to be deployed to physical targets. We present Adversarial Scratches: a novel L0 black-box attack, which takes the form of scratches in images, and which possesses much greater deployability than other state-of-the-art attacks. Adversarial Scratches leverage B\'ezier Curves to reduce the dimension of the search space and possibly constrain the attack to a specific location. We test Adversarial Scratches in several scenarios, including a publicly available API and images of traffic signs. Results show that, often, our attack achieves higher fooling rate than other deployable state-of-the-art methods, while requiring significantly fewer queries and modifying very few pixels.
The widespread dependency on open-source software makes it a fruitful target for malicious actors, as demonstrated by recurring attacks. The complexity of today's open-source supply chains results in a significant attack surface, giving attackers numerous opportunities to reach the goal of injecting malicious code into open-source artifacts that is then downloaded and executed by victims. This work proposes a general taxonomy for attacks on open-source supply chains, independent of specific programming languages or ecosystems, and covering all supply chain stages from code contributions to package distribution. Taking the form of an attack tree, it covers 107 unique vectors, linked to 94 real-world incidents, and mapped to 33 mitigating safeguards. User surveys conducted with 17 domain experts and 134 software developers positively validated the correctness, comprehensiveness and comprehensibility of the taxonomy, as well as its suitability for various use-cases. Survey participants also assessed the utility and costs of the identified safeguards, and whether they are used.
Data poisoning attacks, in which a malicious adversary aims to influence a model by injecting "poisoned" data into the training process, have attracted significant recent attention. In this work, we take a closer look at existing poisoning attacks and connect them with old and new algorithms for solving sequential Stackelberg games. By choosing an appropriate loss function for the attacker and optimizing with algorithms that exploit second-order information, we design poisoning attacks that are effective on neural networks. We present efficient implementations that exploit modern auto-differentiation packages and allow simultaneous and coordinated generation of tens of thousands of poisoned points, in contrast to existing methods that generate poisoned points one by one. We further perform extensive experiments that empirically explore the effect of data poisoning attacks on deep neural networks.
We study online convex optimization with switching costs, a practically important but also extremely challenging problem due to the lack of complete offline information. By tapping into the power of machine learning (ML) based optimizers, ML-augmented online algorithms (also referred to as expert calibration in this paper) have been emerging as state of the art, with provable worst-case performance guarantees. Nonetheless, by using the standard practice of training an ML model as a standalone optimizer and plugging it into an ML-augmented algorithm, the average cost performance can be even worse than purely using ML predictions. In order to address the "how to learn" challenge, we propose EC-L2O (expert-calibrated learning to optimize), which trains an ML-based optimizer by explicitly taking into account the downstream expert calibrator. To accomplish this, we propose a new differentiable expert calibrator that generalizes regularized online balanced descent and offers a provably better competitive ratio than pure ML predictions when the prediction error is large. For training, our loss function is a weighted sum of two different losses -- one minimizing the average ML prediction error for better robustness, and the other one minimizing the post-calibration average cost. We also provide theoretical analysis for EC-L2O, highlighting that expert calibration can be even beneficial for the average cost performance and that the high-percentile tail ratio of the cost achieved by EC-L2O to that of the offline optimal oracle (i.e., tail cost ratio) can be bounded. Finally, we test EC-L2O by running simulations for sustainable datacenter demand response. Our results demonstrate that EC-L2O can empirically achieve a lower average cost as well as a lower competitive ratio than the existing baseline algorithms.
Faster-than-Nyquist (FTN) signaling is a candidate non-orthonormal transmission technique to improve the spectral efficiency (SE) of future communication systems. However, such improvements of the SE are at the cost of additional computational complexity to remove the intentionally introduced intersymbol interference. In this paper, we investigate the use of deep learning (DL) to reduce the detection complexity of FTN signaling. To eliminate the need of having a noise whitening filter at the receiver, we first present an equivalent FTN signaling model based on using a set of orthonormal basis functions and identify its operation region. Second, we propose a DL-based list sphere decoding (DL-LSD) algorithm that selects and updates the initial radius of the original LSD to guarantee a pre-defined number $N_{\text{L}}$ of lattice points inside the hypersphere. This is achieved by training a neural network to output an approximate initial radius that includes $N_{\text{L}}$ lattice points. At the testing phase, if the hypersphere has more than $N_{\text{L}}$ lattice points, we keep the $N_{\text{L}}$ closest points to the point corresponding to the received FTN signal; however, if the hypersphere has less than $N_{\text{L}}$ points, we increase the approximate initial radius by a value that depends on the standard deviation of the distribution of the output radii from the training phase. Then, the approximate value of the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) is calculated based on the obtained $N_{\text{L}}$ points. Simulation results show that the computational complexity of the proposed DL-LSD is lower than its counterpart of the original LSD by orders of magnitude.
Adversarial training (i.e., training on adversarially perturbed input data) is a well-studied method for making neural networks robust to potential adversarial attacks during inference. However, the improved robustness does not come for free but rather is accompanied by a decrease in overall model accuracy and performance. Recent work has shown that, in practical robot learning applications, the effects of adversarial training do not pose a fair trade-off but inflict a net loss when measured in holistic robot performance. This work revisits the robustness-accuracy trade-off in robot learning by systematically analyzing if recent advances in robust training methods and theory in conjunction with adversarial robot learning can make adversarial training suitable for real-world robot applications. We evaluate a wide variety of robot learning tasks ranging from autonomous driving in a high-fidelity environment amenable to sim-to-real deployment, to mobile robot gesture recognition. Our results demonstrate that, while these techniques make incremental improvements on the trade-off on a relative scale, the negative side-effects caused by adversarial training still outweigh the improvements by an order of magnitude. We conclude that more substantial advances in robust learning methods are necessary before they can benefit robot learning tasks in practice.
The essence of multivariate sequential learning is all about how to extract dependencies in data. These data sets, such as hourly medical records in intensive care units and multi-frequency phonetic time series, often time exhibit not only strong serial dependencies in the individual components (the "marginal" memory) but also non-negligible memories in the cross-sectional dependencies (the "joint" memory). Because of the multivariate complexity in the evolution of the joint distribution that underlies the data generating process, we take a data-driven approach and construct a novel recurrent network architecture, termed Memory-Gated Recurrent Networks (mGRN), with gates explicitly regulating two distinct types of memories: the marginal memory and the joint memory. Through a combination of comprehensive simulation studies and empirical experiments on a range of public datasets, we show that our proposed mGRN architecture consistently outperforms state-of-the-art architectures targeting multivariate time series.
Adversarial attack is a technique for deceiving Machine Learning (ML) models, which provides a way to evaluate the adversarial robustness. In practice, attack algorithms are artificially selected and tuned by human experts to break a ML system. However, manual selection of attackers tends to be sub-optimal, leading to a mistakenly assessment of model security. In this paper, a new procedure called Composite Adversarial Attack (CAA) is proposed for automatically searching the best combination of attack algorithms and their hyper-parameters from a candidate pool of \textbf{32 base attackers}. We design a search space where attack policy is represented as an attacking sequence, i.e., the output of the previous attacker is used as the initialization input for successors. Multi-objective NSGA-II genetic algorithm is adopted for finding the strongest attack policy with minimum complexity. The experimental result shows CAA beats 10 top attackers on 11 diverse defenses with less elapsed time (\textbf{6 $\times$ faster than AutoAttack}), and achieves the new state-of-the-art on $l_{\infty}$, $l_{2}$ and unrestricted adversarial attacks.
As data are increasingly being stored in different silos and societies becoming more aware of data privacy issues, the traditional centralized training of artificial intelligence (AI) models is facing efficiency and privacy challenges. Recently, federated learning (FL) has emerged as an alternative solution and continue to thrive in this new reality. Existing FL protocol design has been shown to be vulnerable to adversaries within or outside of the system, compromising data privacy and system robustness. Besides training powerful global models, it is of paramount importance to design FL systems that have privacy guarantees and are resistant to different types of adversaries. In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive survey on this topic. Through a concise introduction to the concept of FL, and a unique taxonomy covering: 1) threat models; 2) poisoning attacks and defenses against robustness; 3) inference attacks and defenses against privacy, we provide an accessible review of this important topic. We highlight the intuitions, key techniques as well as fundamental assumptions adopted by various attacks and defenses. Finally, we discuss promising future research directions towards robust and privacy-preserving federated learning.
Backdoor attack intends to embed hidden backdoor into deep neural networks (DNNs), such that the attacked model performs well on benign samples, whereas its prediction will be maliciously changed if the hidden backdoor is activated by the attacker-defined trigger. Backdoor attack could happen when the training process is not fully controlled by the user, such as training on third-party datasets or adopting third-party models, which poses a new and realistic threat. Although backdoor learning is an emerging and rapidly growing research area, its systematic review, however, remains blank. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive survey of this realm. We summarize and categorize existing backdoor attacks and defenses based on their characteristics, and provide a unified framework for analyzing poisoning-based backdoor attacks. Besides, we also analyze the relation between backdoor attacks and the relevant fields ($i.e.,$ adversarial attack and data poisoning), and summarize the benchmark datasets. Finally, we briefly outline certain future research directions relying upon reviewed works.
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