An instance $I$ of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a preference list of neighbors for every vertex. A swap in $I$ is the exchange of two consecutive vertices in a preference list. A swap can be viewed as a smallest perturbation of $I$. Boehmer et al. (2021) designed a polynomial-time algorithm to find the minimum number of swaps required to turn a given maximal matching into a stable matching. To generalize this result to the many-to-many version of SMP, we introduce a new representation of SMP as an extended bipartite graph and reduce the problem to submodular minimization. It is a natural problem to establish computational complexity of deciding whether at most $k$ swaps are enough to turn $I$ into an instance where one of the maximum matchings is stable. Using a hardness result of Gupta et al. (2020), we prove that it is NP-hard to decide whether at most $k$ swaps are enough to turn $I$ into an instance with a stable perfect matching. Moreover, this problem parameterized by $k$ is W[1]-hard. We also obtain a lower bound on the running time for solving the problem using the Exponential Time Hypothesis.
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The hard thresholding technique plays a vital role in the development of algorithms for sparse signal recovery. By merging this technique and heavy-ball acceleration method which is a multi-step extension of the traditional gradient descent method, we propose the so-called heavy-ball-based hard thresholding (HBHT) and heavy-ball-based hard thresholding pursuit (HBHTP) algorithms for signal recovery. It turns out that the HBHT and HBHTP can successfully recover a $k$-sparse signal if the restricted isometry constant of the measurement matrix satisfies $\delta_{3k}<0.618 $ and $\delta_{3k}<0.577,$ respectively. The guaranteed success of HBHT and HBHTP is also shown under the conditions $\delta_{2k}<0.356$ and $\delta_{2k}<0.377,$ respectively. Moreover, the finite convergence and stability of the two algorithms are also established in this paper. Simulations on random problem instances are performed to compare the performance of the proposed algorithms and several existing ones. Empirical results indicate that the HBHTP performs very comparably to a few existing algorithms and it takes less average time to achieve the signal recovery than these existing methods.
We study reinforcement learning for two-player zero-sum Markov games with simultaneous moves in the finite-horizon setting, where the transition kernel of the underlying Markov games can be parameterized by a linear function over the current state, both players' actions and the next state. In particular, we assume that we can control both players and aim to find the Nash Equilibrium by minimizing the duality gap. We propose an algorithm Nash-UCRL based on the principle "Optimism-in-Face-of-Uncertainty". Our algorithm only needs to find a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE), which is computationally efficient. Specifically, we show that Nash-UCRL can provably achieve an $\tilde{O}(dH\sqrt{T})$ regret, where $d$ is the linear function dimension, $H$ is the length of the game and $T$ is the total number of steps in the game. To assess the optimality of our algorithm, we also prove an $\tilde{\Omega}( dH\sqrt{T})$ lower bound on the regret. Our upper bound matches the lower bound up to logarithmic factors, which suggests the optimality of our algorithm.
The Schrijver graph $S(n,k)$ is defined for integers $n$ and $k$ with $n \geq 2k$ as the graph whose vertices are all the $k$-subsets of $\{1,2,\ldots,n\}$ that do not include two consecutive elements modulo $n$, where two such sets are adjacent if they are disjoint. A result of Schrijver asserts that the chromatic number of $S(n,k)$ is $n-2k+2$ (Nieuw Arch. Wiskd., 1978). In the computational Schrijver problem, we are given an access to a coloring of the vertices of $S(n,k)$ with $n-2k+1$ colors, and the goal is to find a monochromatic edge. The Schrijver problem is known to be complete in the complexity class $\mathsf{PPA}$. We prove that it can be solved by a randomized algorithm with running time $n^{O(1)} \cdot k^{O(k)}$, hence it is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the parameter $k$.
We consider the question of adaptive data analysis within the framework of convex optimization. We ask how many samples are needed in order to compute $\epsilon$-accurate estimates of $O(1/\epsilon^2)$ gradients queried by gradient descent, and we provide two intermediate answers to this question. First, we show that for a general analyst (not necessarily gradient descent) $\Omega(1/\epsilon^3)$ samples are required. This rules out the possibility of a foolproof mechanism. Our construction builds upon a new lower bound (that may be of interest of its own right) for an analyst that may ask several non adaptive questions in a batch of fixed and known $T$ rounds of adaptivity and requires a fraction of true discoveries. We show that for such an analyst $\Omega (\sqrt{T}/\epsilon^2)$ samples are necessary. Second, we show that, under certain assumptions on the oracle, in an interaction with gradient descent $\tilde \Omega(1/\epsilon^{2.5})$ samples are necessary. Our assumptions are that the oracle has only \emph{first order access} and is \emph{post-hoc generalizing}. First order access means that it can only compute the gradients of the sampled function at points queried by the algorithm. Our assumption of \emph{post-hoc generalization} follows from existing lower bounds for statistical queries. More generally then, we provide a generic reduction from the standard setting of statistical queries to the problem of estimating gradients queried by gradient descent. These results are in contrast with classical bounds that show that with $O(1/\epsilon^2)$ samples one can optimize the population risk to accuracy of $O(\epsilon)$ but, as it turns out, with spurious gradients.
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, which is a convex combination of integral matchings, is a natural extension of integral matchings. The topic of stability of fractional matchings has started receiving attention only very recently. Further, incentive compatibility in the context of fractional matchings has received very little attention. With this as the backdrop, our paper studies the important topic of incentive compatibility of mechanisms to find stable fractional matchings. We work with preferences expressed in the form of cardinal utilities. Our first result is an impossibility result that there are matching instances for which no mechanism that produces a stable fractional matching can be incentive compatible or even approximately incentive compatible. This provides the motivation to seek special classes of matching instances for which there exist incentive compatible mechanisms that produce stable fractional matchings. Our study leads to a class of matching instances that admit unique stable fractional matchings. We first show that a unique stable fractional matching for a matching instance exists if and only if the given matching instance satisfies the conditional mutual first preference (CMFP) property. To this end, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that makes ingenious use of envy-graphs to find a non-integral stable matching whenever the preferences are strict and the given instance is not a CMFP matching instance. For this class of CMFP matching instances, we prove that every mechanism that produces the unique stable fractional matching is (a) incentive compatible and further (b) resistant to coalitional manipulations.
Given a set $P$ of $n$ points in the plane, the $k$-center problem is to find $k$ congruent disks of minimum possible radius such that their union covers all the points in $P$. The $2$-center problem is a special case of the $k$-center problem that has been extensively studied in the recent past \cite{CAHN,HT,SH}. In this paper, we consider a generalized version of the $2$-center problem called \textit{proximity connected} $2$-center (PCTC) problem. In this problem, we are also given a parameter $\delta\geq 0$ and we have the additional constraint that the distance between the centers of the disks should be at most $\delta$. Note that when $\delta=0$, the PCTC problem is reduced to the $1$-center(minimum enclosing disk) problem and when $\delta$ tends to infinity, it is reduced to the $2$-center problem. The PCTC problem first appeared in the context of wireless networks in 1992 \cite{ACN0}, but obtaining a nontrivial deterministic algorithm for the problem remained open. In this paper, we resolve this open problem by providing a deterministic $O(n^2\log n)$ time algorithm for the problem.
In this paper, we propose a depth-first search (DFS) algorithm for searching maximum matchings in general graphs. Unlike blossom shrinking algorithms, which store all possible alternative alternating paths in the super-vertices shrunk from blossoms, the newly proposed algorithm does not involve blossom shrinking. The basic idea is to deflect the alternating path when facing blossoms. The algorithm maintains detour information in an auxiliary stack to minimize the redundant data structures. A benefit of our technique is to avoid spending time on shrinking and expanding blossoms. This DFS algorithm can determine a maximum matching of a general graph with $m$ edges and $n$ vertices in $O(mn)$ time with space complexity $O(n)$.
In this paper we propose a methodology to accelerate the resolution of the so-called "Sorted L-One Penalized Estimation" (SLOPE) problem. Our method leverages the concept of "safe screening", well-studied in the literature for \textit{group-separable} sparsity-inducing norms, and aims at identifying the zeros in the solution of SLOPE. More specifically, we derive a set of \(\tfrac{n(n+1)}{2}\) inequalities for each element of the \(n\)-dimensional primal vector and prove that the latter can be safely screened if some subsets of these inequalities are verified. We propose moreover an efficient algorithm to jointly apply the proposed procedure to all the primal variables. Our procedure has a complexity \(\mathcal{O}(n\log n + LT)\) where \(T\leq n\) is a problem-dependent constant and \(L\) is the number of zeros identified by the tests. Numerical experiments confirm that, for a prescribed computational budget, the proposed methodology leads to significant improvements of the solving precision.
In the storied Colonel Blotto game, two colonels allocate $a$ and $b$ troops, respectively, to $k$ distinct battlefields. A colonel wins a battle if they assign more troops to that particular battle, and each colonel seeks to maximize their total number of victories. Despite the problem's formulation in 1921, the first polynomial-time algorithm to compute Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies for this game was discovered only quite recently. In 2016, \citep{ahmadinejad_dehghani_hajiaghayi_lucier_mahini_seddighin_2019} formulated a breakthrough algorithm to compute NE strategies for the Colonel Blotto game\footnote{To the best of our knowledge, the algorithm from \citep{ahmadinejad_dehghani_hajiaghayi_lucier_mahini_seddighin_2019} has computational complexity $O(k^{14}\max\{a,b\}^{13})$}, receiving substantial media coverage (e.g. \citep{Insider}, \citep{NSF}, \citep{ScienceDaily}). In this work, we present the first known $\epsilon$-approximation algorithm to compute NE strategies in the two-player Colonel Blotto game in runtime $\widetilde{O}(\epsilon^{-4} k^8 \max\{a,b\}^2)$ for arbitrary settings of these parameters. Moreover, this algorithm computes approximate coarse correlated equilibrium strategies in the multiplayer (continuous and discrete) Colonel Blotto game (when there are $\ell > 2$ colonels) with runtime $\widetilde{O}(\ell \epsilon^{-4} k^8 n^2 + \ell^2 \epsilon^{-2} k^3 n (n+k))$, where $n$ is the maximum troop count. Before this work, no polynomial-time algorithm was known to compute exact or approximate equilibrium (in any sense) strategies for multiplayer Colonel Blotto with arbitrary parameters. Our algorithm computes these approximate equilibria by a novel (to the author's knowledge) sampling technique with which we implicitly perform multiplicative weights update over the exponentially many strategies available to each player.
For a given nonnegative matrix $A=(A_{ij})$, the matrix scaling problem asks whether $A$ can be scaled to a doubly stochastic matrix $XAY$ for some positive diagonal matrices $X,Y$. The Sinkhorn algorithm is a simple iterative algorithm, which repeats row-normalization $A_{ij} \leftarrow A_{ij}/\sum_{j}A_{ij}$ and column-normalization $A_{ij} \leftarrow A_{ij}/\sum_{i}A_{ij}$ alternatively. By this algorithm, $A$ converges to a doubly stochastic matrix in limit if and only if the bipartite graph associated with $A$ has a perfect matching. This property can decide the existence of a perfect matching in a given bipartite graph $G$, which is identified with the $0,1$-matrix $A_G$. Linial, Samorodnitsky, and Wigderson showed that a polynomial number of the Sinkhorn iterations for $A_G$ decides whether $G$ has a perfect matching. In this paper, we show an extension of this result: If $G$ has no perfect matching, then a polynomial number of the Sinkhorn iterations identifies a Hall blocker -- a certificate of the nonexistence of a perfect matching. Our analysis is based on an interpretation of the Sinkhorn algorithm as alternating KL-divergence minimization (Csisz\'{a}r and Tusn\'{a}dy 1984, Gietl and Reffel 2013) and its limiting behavior for a nonscalable matrix (Aas 2014). We also relate the Sinkhorn limit with parametric network flow, principal partition of polymatroids, and the Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition of a bipartite graph.
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