We consider online no-regret learning in unknown games with bandit feedback, where each agent only observes its reward at each time -- determined by all players' current joint action -- rather than its gradient. We focus on the class of smooth and strongly monotone games and study optimal no-regret learning therein. Leveraging self-concordant barrier functions, we first construct an online bandit convex optimization algorithm and show that it achieves the single-agent optimal regret of $\tilde{\Theta}(\sqrt{T})$ under smooth and strongly-concave payoff functions. We then show that if each agent applies this no-regret learning algorithm in strongly monotone games, the joint action converges in \textit{last iterate} to the unique Nash equilibrium at a rate of $\tilde{\Theta}(1/\sqrt{T})$. Prior to our work, the best-know convergence rate in the same class of games is $O(1/T^{1/3})$ (achieved by a different algorithm), thus leaving open the problem of optimal no-regret learning algorithms (since the known lower bound is $\Omega(1/\sqrt{T})$). Our results thus settle this open problem and contribute to the broad landscape of bandit game-theoretical learning by identifying the first doubly optimal bandit learning algorithm, in that it achieves (up to log factors) both optimal regret in the single-agent learning and optimal last-iterate convergence rate in the multi-agent learning. We also present results on several simulation studies -- Cournot competition, Kelly auctions, and distributed regularized logistic regression -- to demonstrate the efficacy of our algorithm.
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The amount of training-data is one of the key factors which determines the generalization capacity of learning algorithms. Intuitively, one expects the error rate to decrease as the amount of training-data increases. Perhaps surprisingly, natural attempts to formalize this intuition give rise to interesting and challenging mathematical questions. For example, in their classical book on pattern recognition, Devroye, Gyorfi, and Lugosi (1996) ask whether there exists a {monotone} Bayes-consistent algorithm. This question remained open for over 25 years, until recently Pestov (2021) resolved it for binary classification, using an intricate construction of a monotone Bayes-consistent algorithm. We derive a general result in multiclass classification, showing that every learning algorithm A can be transformed to a monotone one with similar performance. Further, the transformation is efficient and only uses a black-box oracle access to A. This demonstrates that one can provably avoid non-monotonic behaviour without compromising performance, thus answering questions asked by Devroye et al (1996), Viering, Mey, and Loog (2019), Viering and Loog (2021), and by Mhammedi (2021). Our transformation readily implies monotone learners in a variety of contexts: for example it extends Pestov's result to classification tasks with an arbitrary number of labels. This is in contrast with Pestov's work which is tailored to binary classification. In addition, we provide uniform bounds on the error of the monotone algorithm. This makes our transformation applicable in distribution-free settings. For example, in PAC learning it implies that every learnable class admits a monotone PAC learner. This resolves questions by Viering, Mey, and Loog (2019); Viering and Loog (2021); Mhammedi (2021).
We study the interplay between feedback and communication in a cooperative online learning setting where a network of agents solves a task in which the learners' feedback is determined by an arbitrary graph. We characterize regret in terms of the independence number of the strong product between the feedback graph and the communication network. Our analysis recovers as special cases many previously known bounds for distributed online learning with either expert or bandit feedback. A more detailed version of our results also captures the dependence of the regret on the delay caused by the time the information takes to traverse each graph. Experiments run on synthetic data show that the empirical behavior of our algorithm is consistent with the theoretical results.
In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an underlying state space that affects the leader's rewards and available strategies and evolves in a Markovian manner depending on both the leader and follower's selected strategies. Although standard Stackelberg games have been utilized to improve scheduling in security domains, their deployment is often limited by requiring complete information of the follower's utility function. In contrast, we consider scenarios where the follower's utility function is unknown to the leader; however, it can be linearly parameterized. Our objective then is to provide an algorithm that prescribes a randomized strategy to the leader at each step of the game based on observations of how the follower responded in previous steps. We design a no-regret learning algorithm that, with high probability, achieves a regret bound (when compared to the best policy in hindsight) which is sublinear in the number of time steps; the degree of sublinearity depends on the number of features representing the follower's utility function. The regret of the proposed learning algorithm is independent of the size of the state space and polynomial in the rest of the parameters of the game. We show that the proposed learning algorithm outperforms existing model-free reinforcement learning approaches.
We consider the combinatorial bandits problem with semi-bandit feedback under finite sampling budget constraints, in which the learner can carry out its action only for a limited number of times specified by an overall budget. The action is to choose a set of arms, whereupon feedback for each arm in the chosen set is received. Unlike existing works, we study this problem in a non-stochastic setting with subset-dependent feedback, i.e., the semi-bandit feedback received could be generated by an oblivious adversary and also might depend on the chosen set of arms. In addition, we consider a general feedback scenario covering both the numerical-based as well as preference-based case and introduce a sound theoretical framework for this setting guaranteeing sensible notions of optimal arms, which a learner seeks to find. We suggest a generic algorithm suitable to cover the full spectrum of conceivable arm elimination strategies from aggressive to conservative. Theoretical questions about the sufficient and necessary budget of the algorithm to find the best arm are answered and complemented by deriving lower bounds for any learning algorithm for this problem scenario.
This paper considers the problem of online clustering with bandit feedback. A set of arms (or items) can be partitioned into various groups that are unknown. Within each group, the observations associated to each of the arms follow the same distribution with the same mean vector. At each time step, the agent queries or pulls an arm and obtains an independent observation from the distribution it is associated to. Subsequent pulls depend on previous ones as well as the previously obtained samples. The agent's task is to uncover the underlying partition of the arms with the least number of arm pulls and with a probability of error not exceeding a prescribed constant $\delta$. The problem proposed finds numerous applications from clustering of variants of viruses to online market segmentation. We present an instance-dependent information-theoretic lower bound on the expected sample complexity for this task, and design a computationally efficient and asymptotically optimal algorithm, namely Bandit Online Clustering (BOC). The algorithm includes a novel stopping rule for adaptive sequential testing that circumvents the need to exactly solve any NP-hard weighted clustering problem as its subroutines. We show through extensive simulations on synthetic and real-world datasets that BOC's performance matches the lower bound asymptotically, and significantly outperforms a non-adaptive baseline algorithm.
We examine global non-asymptotic convergence properties of policy gradient methods for multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) problems in Markov potential games (MPG). To learn a Nash equilibrium of an MPG in which the size of state space and/or the number of players can be very large, we propose new independent policy gradient algorithms that are run by all players in tandem. When there is no uncertainty in the gradient evaluation, we show that our algorithm finds an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium with $O(1/\epsilon^2)$ iteration complexity which does not explicitly depend on the state space size. When the exact gradient is not available, we establish $O(1/\epsilon^5)$ sample complexity bound in a potentially infinitely large state space for a sample-based algorithm that utilizes function approximation. Moreover, we identify a class of independent policy gradient algorithms that enjoys convergence for both zero-sum Markov games and Markov cooperative games with the players that are oblivious to the types of games being played. Finally, we provide computational experiments to corroborate the merits and the effectiveness of our theoretical developments.
We study constrained reinforcement learning (CRL) from a novel perspective by setting constraints directly on state density functions, rather than the value functions considered by previous works. State density has a clear physical and mathematical interpretation, and is able to express a wide variety of constraints such as resource limits and safety requirements. Density constraints can also avoid the time-consuming process of designing and tuning cost functions required by value function-based constraints to encode system specifications. We leverage the duality between density functions and Q functions to develop an effective algorithm to solve the density constrained RL problem optimally and the constrains are guaranteed to be satisfied. We prove that the proposed algorithm converges to a near-optimal solution with a bounded error even when the policy update is imperfect. We use a set of comprehensive experiments to demonstrate the advantages of our approach over state-of-the-art CRL methods, with a wide range of density constrained tasks as well as standard CRL benchmarks such as Safety-Gym.
Exploration-exploitation is a powerful and practical tool in multi-agent learning (MAL), however, its effects are far from understood. To make progress in this direction, we study a smooth analogue of Q-learning. We start by showing that our learning model has strong theoretical justification as an optimal model for studying exploration-exploitation. Specifically, we prove that smooth Q-learning has bounded regret in arbitrary games for a cost model that explicitly captures the balance between game and exploration costs and that it always converges to the set of quantal-response equilibria (QRE), the standard solution concept for games under bounded rationality, in weighted potential games with heterogeneous learning agents. In our main task, we then turn to measure the effect of exploration in collective system performance. We characterize the geometry of the QRE surface in low-dimensional MAL systems and link our findings with catastrophe (bifurcation) theory. In particular, as the exploration hyperparameter evolves over-time, the system undergoes phase transitions where the number and stability of equilibria can change radically given an infinitesimal change to the exploration parameter. Based on this, we provide a formal theoretical treatment of how tuning the exploration parameter can provably lead to equilibrium selection with both positive as well as negative (and potentially unbounded) effects to system performance.
We consider the exploration-exploitation trade-off in reinforcement learning and we show that an agent imbued with a risk-seeking utility function is able to explore efficiently, as measured by regret. The parameter that controls how risk-seeking the agent is can be optimized exactly, or annealed according to a schedule. We call the resulting algorithm K-learning and show that the corresponding K-values are optimistic for the expected Q-values at each state-action pair. The K-values induce a natural Boltzmann exploration policy for which the `temperature' parameter is equal to the risk-seeking parameter. This policy achieves an expected regret bound of $\tilde O(L^{3/2} \sqrt{S A T})$, where $L$ is the time horizon, $S$ is the number of states, $A$ is the number of actions, and $T$ is the total number of elapsed time-steps. This bound is only a factor of $L$ larger than the established lower bound. K-learning can be interpreted as mirror descent in the policy space, and it is similar to other well-known methods in the literature, including Q-learning, soft-Q-learning, and maximum entropy policy gradient, and is closely related to optimism and count based exploration methods. K-learning is simple to implement, as it only requires adding a bonus to the reward at each state-action and then solving a Bellman equation. We conclude with a numerical example demonstrating that K-learning is competitive with other state-of-the-art algorithms in practice.
Existing multi-agent reinforcement learning methods are limited typically to a small number of agents. When the agent number increases largely, the learning becomes intractable due to the curse of the dimensionality and the exponential growth of agent interactions. In this paper, we present Mean Field Reinforcement Learning where the interactions within the population of agents are approximated by those between a single agent and the average effect from the overall population or neighboring agents; the interplay between the two entities is mutually reinforced: the learning of the individual agent's optimal policy depends on the dynamics of the population, while the dynamics of the population change according to the collective patterns of the individual policies. We develop practical mean field Q-learning and mean field Actor-Critic algorithms and analyze the convergence of the solution to Nash equilibrium. Experiments on Gaussian squeeze, Ising model, and battle games justify the learning effectiveness of our mean field approaches. In addition, we report the first result to solve the Ising model via model-free reinforcement learning methods.
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