Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved promising performance in various real-world applications. Building a powerful GNN model is not a trivial task, as it requires a large amount of training data, powerful computing resources, and human expertise on fine-tuning the model. What is more, with the development of adversarial attacks, e.g., model stealing attacks, GNNs raise challenges to model authentication. To avoid copyright infringement on GNNs, it is necessary to verify the ownership of the GNN models. In this paper, we present a watermarking framework for GNNs for both graph and node classification tasks. We 1) design two strategies to generate watermarked data for the graph classification and one for the node classification task, 2) embed the watermark into the host model through training to obtain the watermarked GNN model, and 3) verify the ownership of the suspicious model in a black-box setting. The experiments show that our framework can verify the ownership of GNN models with a very high probability (around $100\%$) for both tasks. In addition, we experimentally show that our watermarking approach is still effective even when considering suspicious models obtained from different architectures than the owner's.
In this work, we propose the first backdoor attack to graph neural networks (GNN). Specifically, we propose a \emph{subgraph based backdoor attack} to GNN for graph classification. In our backdoor attack, a GNN classifier predicts an attacker-chosen target label for a testing graph once a predefined subgraph is injected to the testing graph. Our empirical results on three real-world graph datasets show that our backdoor attacks are effective with a small impact on a GNN's prediction accuracy for clean testing graphs. Moreover, we generalize a randomized smoothing based certified defense to defend against our backdoor attacks. Our empirical results show that the defense is effective in some cases but ineffective in other cases, highlighting the needs of new defenses for our backdoor attacks.
Many real-world data come in the form of graphs. Graph neural networks (GNNs), a new family of machine learning (ML) models, have been proposed to fully leverage graph data to build powerful applications. In particular, the inductive GNNs, which can generalize to unseen data, become mainstream in this direction. Machine learning models have shown great potential in various tasks and have been deployed in many real-world scenarios. To train a good model, a large amount of data as well as computational resources are needed, leading to valuable intellectual property. Previous research has shown that ML models are prone to model stealing attacks, which aim to steal the functionality of the target models. However, most of them focus on the models trained with images and texts. On the other hand, little attention has been paid to models trained with graph data, i.e., GNNs. In this paper, we fill the gap by proposing the first model stealing attacks against inductive GNNs. We systematically define the threat model and propose six attacks based on the adversary's background knowledge and the responses of the target models. Our evaluation on six benchmark datasets shows that the proposed model stealing attacks against GNNs achieve promising performance.
Graph neural networks, a popular class of models effective in a wide range of graph-based learning tasks, have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. While the majority of the literature focuses on such vulnerability in node-level classification tasks, little effort has been dedicated to analysing adversarial attacks on graph-level classification, an important problem with numerous real-life applications such as biochemistry and social network analysis. The few existing methods often require unrealistic setups, such as access to internal information of the victim models, or an impractically-large number of queries. We present a novel Bayesian optimisation-based attack method for graph classification models. Our method is black-box, query-efficient and parsimonious with respect to the perturbation applied. We empirically validate the effectiveness and flexibility of the proposed method on a wide range of graph classification tasks involving varying graph properties, constraints and modes of attack. Finally, we analyse common interpretable patterns behind the adversarial samples produced, which may shed further light on the adversarial robustness of graph classification models.
Graph neural networks (GNNs) is widely used to learn a powerful representation of graph-structured data. Recent work demonstrates that transferring knowledge from self-supervised tasks to downstream tasks could further improve graph representation. However, there is an inherent gap between self-supervised tasks and downstream tasks in terms of optimization objective and training data. Conventional pre-training methods may be not effective enough on knowledge transfer since they do not make any adaptation for downstream tasks. To solve such problems, we propose a new transfer learning paradigm on GNNs which could effectively leverage self-supervised tasks as auxiliary tasks to help the target task. Our methods would adaptively select and combine different auxiliary tasks with the target task in the fine-tuning stage. We design an adaptive auxiliary loss weighting model to learn the weights of auxiliary tasks by quantifying the consistency between auxiliary tasks and the target task. In addition, we learn the weighting model through meta-learning. Our methods can be applied to various transfer learning approaches, it performs well not only in multi-task learning but also in pre-training and fine-tuning. Comprehensive experiments on multiple downstream tasks demonstrate that the proposed methods can effectively combine auxiliary tasks with the target task and significantly improve the performance compared to state-of-the-art methods.
Data augmentation has been widely used to improve generalizability of machine learning models. However, comparatively little work studies data augmentation for graphs. This is largely due to the complex, non-Euclidean structure of graphs, which limits possible manipulation operations. Augmentation operations commonly used in vision and language have no analogs for graphs. Our work studies graph data augmentation for graph neural networks (GNNs) in the context of improving semi-supervised node-classification. We discuss practical and theoretical motivations, considerations and strategies for graph data augmentation. Our work shows that neural edge predictors can effectively encode class-homophilic structure to promote intra-class edges and demote inter-class edges in given graph structure, and our main contribution introduces the GAug graph data augmentation framework, which leverages these insights to improve performance in GNN-based node classification via edge prediction. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmarks show that augmentation via GAug improves performance across GNN architectures and datasets.
Recently, NLP has seen a surge in the usage of large pre-trained models. Users download weights of models pre-trained on large datasets, then fine-tune the weights on a task of their choice. This raises the question of whether downloading untrusted pre-trained weights can pose a security threat. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct ``weight poisoning'' attacks where pre-trained weights are injected with vulnerabilities that expose ``backdoors'' after fine-tuning, enabling the attacker to manipulate the model prediction simply by injecting an arbitrary keyword. We show that by applying a regularization method, which we call RIPPLe, and an initialization procedure, which we call Embedding Surgery, such attacks are possible even with limited knowledge of the dataset and fine-tuning procedure. Our experiments on sentiment classification, toxicity detection, and spam detection show that this attack is widely applicable and poses a serious threat. Finally, we outline practical defenses against such attacks. Code to reproduce our experiments is available at //github.com/neulab/RIPPLe.
There has been an ongoing cycle where stronger defenses against adversarial attacks are subsequently broken by a more advanced defense-aware attack. We present a new approach towards ending this cycle where we "deflect'' adversarial attacks by causing the attacker to produce an input that semantically resembles the attack's target class. To this end, we first propose a stronger defense based on Capsule Networks that combines three detection mechanisms to achieve state-of-the-art detection performance on both standard and defense-aware attacks. We then show that undetected attacks against our defense often perceptually resemble the adversarial target class by performing a human study where participants are asked to label images produced by the attack. These attack images can no longer be called "adversarial'' because our network classifies them the same way as humans do.
Deep neural networks (DNN) have achieved unprecedented success in numerous machine learning tasks in various domains. However, the existence of adversarial examples has raised concerns about applying deep learning to safety-critical applications. As a result, we have witnessed increasing interests in studying attack and defense mechanisms for DNN models on different data types, such as images, graphs and text. Thus, it is necessary to provide a systematic and comprehensive overview of the main threats of attacks and the success of corresponding countermeasures. In this survey, we review the state of the art algorithms for generating adversarial examples and the countermeasures against adversarial examples, for the three popular data types, i.e., images, graphs and text.
Graph neural networks (GNNs) are widely used in many applications. However, their robustness against adversarial attacks is criticized. Prior studies show that using unnoticeable modifications on graph topology or nodal features can significantly reduce the performances of GNNs. It is very challenging to design robust graph neural networks against poisoning attack and several efforts have been taken. Existing work aims at reducing the negative impact from adversarial edges only with the poisoned graph, which is sub-optimal since they fail to discriminate adversarial edges from normal ones. On the other hand, clean graphs from similar domains as the target poisoned graph are usually available in the real world. By perturbing these clean graphs, we create supervised knowledge to train the ability to detect adversarial edges so that the robustness of GNNs is elevated. However, such potential for clean graphs is neglected by existing work. To this end, we investigate a novel problem of improving the robustness of GNNs against poisoning attacks by exploring clean graphs. Specifically, we propose PA-GNN, which relies on a penalized aggregation mechanism that directly restrict the negative impact of adversarial edges by assigning them lower attention coefficients. To optimize PA-GNN for a poisoned graph, we design a meta-optimization algorithm that trains PA-GNN to penalize perturbations using clean graphs and their adversarial counterparts, and transfers such ability to improve the robustness of PA-GNN on the poisoned graph. Experimental results on four real-world datasets demonstrate the robustness of PA-GNN against poisoning attacks on graphs.
Traditional methods for link prediction can be categorized into three main types: graph structure feature-based, latent feature-based, and explicit feature-based. Graph structure feature methods leverage some handcrafted node proximity scores, e.g., common neighbors, to estimate the likelihood of links. Latent feature methods rely on factorizing networks' matrix representations to learn an embedding for each node. Explicit feature methods train a machine learning model on two nodes' explicit attributes. Each of the three types of methods has its unique merits. In this paper, we propose SEAL (learning from Subgraphs, Embeddings, and Attributes for Link prediction), a new framework for link prediction which combines the power of all the three types into a single graph neural network (GNN). GNN is a new type of neural network which directly accepts graphs as input and outputs their labels. In SEAL, the input to the GNN is a local subgraph around each target link. We prove theoretically that our local subgraphs also reserve a great deal of high-order graph structure features related to link existence. Another key feature is that our GNN can naturally incorporate latent features and explicit features. It is achieved by concatenating node embeddings (latent features) and node attributes (explicit features) in the node information matrix for each subgraph, thus combining the three types of features to enhance GNN learning. Through extensive experiments, SEAL shows unprecedentedly strong performance against a wide range of baseline methods, including various link prediction heuristics and network embedding methods.