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In this paper, we focus on the important yet understudied problem of Continual Federated Learning (CFL), where a server communicates with a set of clients to incrementally learn new concepts over time without sharing or storing any data. The complexity of this problem is compounded by challenges from both the Continual and Federated Learning perspectives. Specifically, models trained in a CFL setup suffer from catastrophic forgetting which is exacerbated by data heterogeneity across clients. Existing attempts at this problem tend to impose large overheads on clients and communication channels or require access to stored data which renders them unsuitable for real-world use due to privacy. In this paper, we attempt to tackle forgetting and heterogeneity while minimizing overhead costs and without requiring access to any stored data. We achieve this by leveraging a prompting based approach (such that only prompts and classifier heads have to be communicated) and proposing a novel and lightweight generation and distillation scheme to consolidate client models at the server. We formulate this problem for image classification and establish strong baselines for comparison, conduct experiments on CIFAR-100 as well as challenging, large-scale datasets like ImageNet-R and DomainNet. Our approach outperforms both existing methods and our own baselines by as much as 7% while significantly reducing communication and client-level computation costs.

We propose novel statistics which maximise the power of a two-sample test based on the Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD), by adapting over the set of kernels used in defining it. For finite sets, this reduces to combining (normalised) MMD values under each of these kernels via a weighted soft maximum. Exponential concentration bounds are proved for our proposed statistics under the null and alternative. We further show how these kernels can be chosen in a data-dependent but permutation-independent way, in a well-calibrated test, avoiding data splitting. This technique applies more broadly to general permutation-based MMD testing, and includes the use of deep kernels with features learnt using unsupervised models such as auto-encoders. We highlight the applicability of our MMD-FUSE test on both synthetic low-dimensional and real-world high-dimensional data, and compare its performance in terms of power against current state-of-the-art kernel tests.

Prompt-based learning has been proved to be an effective way in pre-trained language models (PLMs), especially in low-resource scenarios like few-shot settings. However, the trustworthiness of PLMs is of paramount significance and potential vulnerabilities have been shown in prompt-based templates that could mislead the predictions of language models, causing serious security concerns. In this paper, we will shed light on some vulnerabilities of PLMs, by proposing a prompt-based adversarial attack on manual templates in black box scenarios. First of all, we design character-level and word-level heuristic approaches to break manual templates separately. Then we present a greedy algorithm for the attack based on the above heuristic destructive approaches. Finally, we evaluate our approach with the classification tasks on three variants of BERT series models and eight datasets. And comprehensive experimental results justify the effectiveness of our approach in terms of attack success rate and attack speed. Further experimental studies indicate that our proposed method also displays good capabilities in scenarios with varying shot counts, template lengths and query counts, exhibiting good generalizability.

Recent deep neural networks (DNNs) have come to rely on vast amounts of training data, providing an opportunity for malicious attackers to exploit and contaminate the data to carry out backdoor attacks. These attacks significantly undermine the reliability of DNNs. However, existing backdoor attack methods make unrealistic assumptions, assuming that all training data comes from a single source and that attackers have full access to the training data. In this paper, we address this limitation by introducing a more realistic attack scenario where victims collect data from multiple sources, and attackers cannot access the complete training data. We refer to this scenario as data-constrained backdoor attacks. In such cases, previous attack methods suffer from severe efficiency degradation due to the entanglement between benign and poisoning features during the backdoor injection process. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel approach that leverages the pre-trained Contrastive Language-Image Pre-Training (CLIP) model. We introduce three CLIP-based technologies from two distinct streams: Clean Feature Suppression, which aims to suppress the influence of clean features to enhance the prominence of poisoning features, and Poisoning Feature Augmentation, which focuses on augmenting the presence and impact of poisoning features to effectively manipulate the model's behavior. To evaluate the effectiveness, harmlessness to benign accuracy, and stealthiness of our method, we conduct extensive experiments on 3 target models, 3 datasets, and over 15 different settings. The results demonstrate remarkable improvements, with some settings achieving over 100% improvement compared to existing attacks in data-constrained scenarios. Our research contributes to addressing the limitations of existing methods and provides a practical and effective solution for data-constrained backdoor attacks.

Backdoor attacks for neural code models have gained considerable attention due to the advancement of code intelligence. However, most existing works insert triggers into task-specific data for code-related downstream tasks, thereby limiting the scope of attacks. Moreover, the majority of attacks for pre-trained models are designed for understanding tasks. In this paper, we propose task-agnostic backdoor attacks for code pre-trained models. Our backdoored model is pre-trained with two learning strategies (i.e., Poisoned Seq2Seq learning and token representation learning) to support the multi-target attack of downstream code understanding and generation tasks. During the deployment phase, the implanted backdoors in the victim models can be activated by the designed triggers to achieve the targeted attack. We evaluate our approach on two code understanding tasks and three code generation tasks over seven datasets. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach can effectively and stealthily attack code-related downstream tasks.

Latent diffusion models achieve state-of-the-art performance on a variety of generative tasks, such as image synthesis and image editing. However, the robustness of latent diffusion models is not well studied. Previous works only focus on the adversarial attacks against the encoder or the output image under white-box settings, regardless of the denoising process. Therefore, in this paper, we aim to analyze the robustness of latent diffusion models more thoroughly. We first study the influence of the components inside latent diffusion models on their white-box robustness. In addition to white-box scenarios, we evaluate the black-box robustness of latent diffusion models via transfer attacks, where we consider both prompt-transfer and model-transfer settings and possible defense mechanisms. However, all these explorations need a comprehensive benchmark dataset, which is missing in the literature. Therefore, to facilitate the research of the robustness of latent diffusion models, we propose two automatic dataset construction pipelines for two kinds of image editing models and release the whole dataset. Our code and dataset are available at \url{//github.com/jpzhang1810/LDM-Robustness}.

Backdoor attacks have emerged as an urgent threat to Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), where victim DNNs are furtively implanted with malicious neurons that could be triggered by the adversary. To defend against backdoor attacks, many works establish a staged pipeline to remove backdoors from victim DNNs: inspecting, locating, and erasing. However, in a scenario where a few clean data can be accessible, such pipeline is fragile and cannot erase backdoors completely without sacrificing model accuracy. To address this issue, in this paper, we propose a novel data-free holistic backdoor erasing (DHBE) framework. Instead of the staged pipeline, the DHBE treats the backdoor erasing task as a unified adversarial procedure, which seeks equilibrium between two different competing processes: distillation and backdoor regularization. In distillation, the backdoored DNN is distilled into a proxy model, transferring its knowledge about clean data, yet backdoors are simultaneously transferred. In backdoor regularization, the proxy model is holistically regularized to prevent from infecting any possible backdoor transferred from distillation. These two processes jointly proceed with data-free adversarial optimization until a clean, high-accuracy proxy model is obtained. With the novel adversarial design, our framework demonstrates its superiority in three aspects: 1) minimal detriment to model accuracy, 2) high tolerance for hyperparameters, and 3) no demand for clean data. Extensive experiments on various backdoor attacks and datasets are performed to verify the effectiveness of the proposed framework. Code is available at \url{//github.com/yanzhicong/DHBE}

With the rise of powerful pre-trained vision-language models like CLIP, it becomes essential to investigate ways to adapt these models to downstream datasets. A recently proposed method named Context Optimization (CoOp) introduces the concept of prompt learning -- a recent trend in NLP -- to the vision domain for adapting pre-trained vision-language models. Specifically, CoOp turns context words in a prompt into a set of learnable vectors and, with only a few labeled images for learning, can achieve huge improvements over intensively-tuned manual prompts. In our study we identify a critical problem of CoOp: the learned context is not generalizable to wider unseen classes within the same dataset, suggesting that CoOp overfits base classes observed during training. To address the problem, we propose Conditional Context Optimization (CoCoOp), which extends CoOp by further learning a lightweight neural network to generate for each image an input-conditional token (vector). Compared to CoOp's static prompts, our dynamic prompts adapt to each instance and are thus less sensitive to class shift. Extensive experiments show that CoCoOp generalizes much better than CoOp to unseen classes, even showing promising transferability beyond a single dataset; and yields stronger domain generalization performance as well. Code is available at //github.com/KaiyangZhou/CoOp.

As data are increasingly being stored in different silos and societies becoming more aware of data privacy issues, the traditional centralized training of artificial intelligence (AI) models is facing efficiency and privacy challenges. Recently, federated learning (FL) has emerged as an alternative solution and continue to thrive in this new reality. Existing FL protocol design has been shown to be vulnerable to adversaries within or outside of the system, compromising data privacy and system robustness. Besides training powerful global models, it is of paramount importance to design FL systems that have privacy guarantees and are resistant to different types of adversaries. In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive survey on this topic. Through a concise introduction to the concept of FL, and a unique taxonomy covering: 1) threat models; 2) poisoning attacks and defenses against robustness; 3) inference attacks and defenses against privacy, we provide an accessible review of this important topic. We highlight the intuitions, key techniques as well as fundamental assumptions adopted by various attacks and defenses. Finally, we discuss promising future research directions towards robust and privacy-preserving federated learning.

Backdoor attack intends to embed hidden backdoor into deep neural networks (DNNs), such that the attacked model performs well on benign samples, whereas its prediction will be maliciously changed if the hidden backdoor is activated by the attacker-defined trigger. Backdoor attack could happen when the training process is not fully controlled by the user, such as training on third-party datasets or adopting third-party models, which poses a new and realistic threat. Although backdoor learning is an emerging and rapidly growing research area, its systematic review, however, remains blank. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive survey of this realm. We summarize and categorize existing backdoor attacks and defenses based on their characteristics, and provide a unified framework for analyzing poisoning-based backdoor attacks. Besides, we also analyze the relation between backdoor attacks and the relevant fields ($i.e.,$ adversarial attack and data poisoning), and summarize the benchmark datasets. Finally, we briefly outline certain future research directions relying upon reviewed works.