If devices are physically accessible optical fault injection attacks pose a great threat since the data processed as well as the operation flow can be manipulated. Successful physical attacks may lead not only to leakage of secret information such as cryptographic private keys, but can also cause economic damage especially if as a result of such a manipulation a critical infrastructure is successfully attacked. Laser based attacks exploit the sensitivity of CMOS technologies to electromagnetic radiation in the visible or the infrared spectrum. It can be expected that radiation-hard designs, specially crafted for space applications, are more robust not only against high-energy particles and short electromagnetic waves but also against optical fault injection attacks. In this work we investigated the sensitivity of radiation-hard JICG shift registers to optical fault injection attacks. In our experiments, we were able to trigger bit-set and bit-reset repeatedly changing the data stored in single JICG flip-flops despite their high-radiation fault tolerance.
The growing complexity of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and challenges in ensuring safety and security have led to the increasing use of deep learning methods for accurate and scalable anomaly detection. However, machine learning (ML) models often suffer from low performance in predicting unexpected data and are vulnerable to accidental or malicious perturbations. Although robustness testing of deep learning models has been extensively explored in applications such as image classification and speech recognition, less attention has been paid to ML-driven safety monitoring in CPS. This paper presents the preliminary results on evaluating the robustness of ML-based anomaly detection methods in safety-critical CPS against two types of accidental and malicious input perturbations, generated using a Gaussian-based noise model and the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). We test the hypothesis of whether integrating the domain knowledge (e.g., on unsafe system behavior) with the ML models can improve the robustness of anomaly detection without sacrificing accuracy and transparency. Experimental results with two case studies of Artificial Pancreas Systems (APS) for diabetes management show that ML-based safety monitors trained with domain knowledge can reduce on average up to 54.2% of robustness error and keep the average F1 scores high while improving transparency.
Recent developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have fueled the emergence of human-AI collaboration, a setting where AI is a coequal partner. Especially in clinical decision-making, it has the potential to improve treatment quality by assisting overworked medical professionals. Even though research has started to investigate the utilization of AI for clinical decision-making, its potential benefits do not imply its adoption by medical professionals. While several studies have started to analyze adoption criteria from a technical perspective, research providing a human-centered perspective with a focus on AI's potential for becoming a coequal team member in the decision-making process remains limited. Therefore, in this work, we identify factors for the adoption of human-AI collaboration by conducting a series of semi-structured interviews with experts in the healthcare domain. We identify six relevant adoption factors and highlight existing tensions between them and effective human-AI collaboration.
Cross-site scripting (XSS) is the most common vulnerability class in web applications over the last decade. Much research attention has focused on building exploit mitigation defenses for this problem, but no technique provides adequate protection in the face of advanced attacks. One technique that bypasses XSS mitigations is the scriptless attack: a content injection technique that uses (among other options) CSS and HTML injection to infiltrate data. In studying this technique and others, we realized that the common property among the exploitation of all content injection vulnerabilities, including not just XSS and scriptless attacks, but also command injections and several others, is an unintended context switch in the victim program's parsing engine that is caused by untrusted user input. In this paper, we propose Context-Auditor, a novel technique that leverages this insight to identify content injection vulnerabilities ranging from XSS to scriptless attacks and command injections. We implemented Context-Auditor as a general solution to content injection exploit detection problem in the form of a flexible, stand-alone detection module. We deployed instances of Context-Auditor as (1) a browser plugin, (2) a web proxy (3) a web server plugin, and (4) as a wrapper around potentially-injectable system endpoints. Because Context-Auditor targets the root cause of content injection exploitation (and, more specifically for the purpose of our prototype, XSS exploitation, scriptless exploitation, and command injection), our evaluation results demonstrate that Context-Auditor can identify and block content injection exploits that modern defenses cannot while maintaining low throughput overhead and avoiding false positives.
This paper proposes a numerical method based on the Adomian decomposition approach for the time discretization, applied to Euler equations. A recursive property is demonstrated that allows to formulate the method in an appropriate and efficient way. To obtain a fully numerical scheme, the space discretization is achieved using the classical DG techniques. The efficiency of the obtained numerical scheme is demonstrated through numerical tests by comparison to exact solution and the popular Runge-Kutta DG method results.
Cross-slide image analysis provides additional information by analysing the expression of different biomarkers as compared to a single slide analysis. These biomarker stained slides are analysed side by side, revealing unknown relations between them. During the slide preparation, a tissue section may be placed at an arbitrary orientation as compared to other sections of the same tissue block. The problem is compounded by the fact that tissue contents are likely to change from one section to the next and there may be unique artefacts on some of the slides. This makes registration of each section to a reference section of the same tissue block an important pre-requisite task before any cross-slide analysis. We propose a deep feature based registration (DFBR) method which utilises data-driven features to estimate the rigid transformation. We adopted a multi-stage strategy for improving the quality of registration. We also developed a visualisation tool to view registered pairs of WSIs at different magnifications. With the help of this tool, one can apply a transformation on the fly without the need to generate transformed source WSI in a pyramidal form. We compared the performance of data-driven features with that of hand-crafted features on the COMET dataset. Our approach can align the images with low registration errors. Generally, the success of non-rigid registration is dependent on the quality of rigid registration. To evaluate the efficacy of the DFBR method, the first two steps of the ANHIR winner's framework are replaced with our DFBR to register challenge provided image pairs. The modified framework produces comparable results to that of challenge winning team.
Nanodrone swarm is formulated by multiple light-weight and low-cost nanodrones to perform the tasks in very challenging environments. Therefore, it is essential to estimate the relative position of nanodrones in the swarm for accurate and safe platooning in inclement indoor environment. However, the vision and infrared sensors are constrained by the line-of-sight perception, and instrumenting extra motion sensors on drone's body is constrained by the nanodrone's form factor and energy-efficiency. This paper presents the design, implementation and evaluation of RFDrone, a system that can sense the relative position of nanodrone in the swarm using wireless signals, which can naturally identify each individual nanodrone. To do so, each light-weight nanodrone is attached with a RF sticker (i.e., called RFID tag), which will be localized by the external RFID reader in the inclement indoor environment. Instead of accurately localizing each RFID-tagged nanodrone, we propose to estimate the relative position of all the RFID-tagged nanodrones in the swarm based on the spatial-temporal phase profiling. We implement an end-to-end physical prototype of RFDrone. Our experimental results show that RFDrone can accurately estimate the relative position of nanodrones in the swarm with average relative localization accuracy of around 0.95 across x, y and z axis, and average accuracy of around 0.93 for nanodrone swarm's geometry estimation.
Backdoor attacks insert malicious data into a training set so that, during inference time, it misclassifies inputs that have been patched with a backdoor trigger as the malware specified label. For backdoor attacks to bypass human inspection, it is essential that the injected data appear to be correctly labeled. The attacks with such property are often referred to as "clean-label attacks." Existing clean-label backdoor attacks require knowledge of the entire training set to be effective. Obtaining such knowledge is difficult or impossible because training data are often gathered from multiple sources (e.g., face images from different users). It remains a question whether backdoor attacks still present a real threat. This paper provides an affirmative answer to this question by designing an algorithm to mount clean-label backdoor attacks based only on the knowledge of representative examples from the target class. With poisoning equal to or less than 0.5% of the target-class data and 0.05% of the training set, we can train a model to classify test examples from arbitrary classes into the target class when the examples are patched with a backdoor trigger. Our attack works well across datasets and models, even when the trigger presents in the physical world. We explore the space of defenses and find that, surprisingly, our attack can evade the latest state-of-the-art defenses in their vanilla form, or after a simple twist, we can adapt to the downstream defenses. We study the cause of the intriguing effectiveness and find that because the trigger synthesized by our attack contains features as persistent as the original semantic features of the target class, any attempt to remove such triggers would inevitably hurt the model accuracy first.
"There and Back Again" (TABA) is a programming pattern where the recursive calls traverse one data structure and the subsequent returns traverse another. This article presents new TABA examples, refines existing ones, and formalizes both their control flow and their data flow using the Coq Proof Assistant. Each formalization mechanizes a pen-and-paper proof, thus making it easier to "get" TABA. In addition, this article identifies and illustrates a tail-recursive variant of TABA, There and Forth Again (TAFA) that does not come back but goes forth instead with more tail calls.
Adversarial attack is a technique for deceiving Machine Learning (ML) models, which provides a way to evaluate the adversarial robustness. In practice, attack algorithms are artificially selected and tuned by human experts to break a ML system. However, manual selection of attackers tends to be sub-optimal, leading to a mistakenly assessment of model security. In this paper, a new procedure called Composite Adversarial Attack (CAA) is proposed for automatically searching the best combination of attack algorithms and their hyper-parameters from a candidate pool of \textbf{32 base attackers}. We design a search space where attack policy is represented as an attacking sequence, i.e., the output of the previous attacker is used as the initialization input for successors. Multi-objective NSGA-II genetic algorithm is adopted for finding the strongest attack policy with minimum complexity. The experimental result shows CAA beats 10 top attackers on 11 diverse defenses with less elapsed time (\textbf{6 $\times$ faster than AutoAttack}), and achieves the new state-of-the-art on $l_{\infty}$, $l_{2}$ and unrestricted adversarial attacks.
As data are increasingly being stored in different silos and societies becoming more aware of data privacy issues, the traditional centralized training of artificial intelligence (AI) models is facing efficiency and privacy challenges. Recently, federated learning (FL) has emerged as an alternative solution and continue to thrive in this new reality. Existing FL protocol design has been shown to be vulnerable to adversaries within or outside of the system, compromising data privacy and system robustness. Besides training powerful global models, it is of paramount importance to design FL systems that have privacy guarantees and are resistant to different types of adversaries. In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive survey on this topic. Through a concise introduction to the concept of FL, and a unique taxonomy covering: 1) threat models; 2) poisoning attacks and defenses against robustness; 3) inference attacks and defenses against privacy, we provide an accessible review of this important topic. We highlight the intuitions, key techniques as well as fundamental assumptions adopted by various attacks and defenses. Finally, we discuss promising future research directions towards robust and privacy-preserving federated learning.