Adversarial attacks are feasible in the real world for object detection. However, most of the previous works have tried to learn local "patches" applied to an object to fool detectors, which become less effective in squint view angles. To address this issue, we propose the Dense Proposals Attack (DPA) to learn one-piece, physical, and targeted adversarial camouflages for detectors. The camouflages are one-piece because they are generated as a whole for an object, physical because they remain adversarial when filmed under arbitrary viewpoints and different illumination conditions, and targeted because they can cause detectors to misidentify an object as a specific target class. In order to make the generated camouflages robust in the physical world, we introduce a combination of transformations to model the physical phenomena. In addition, to improve the attacks, DPA simultaneously attacks all the classifications in the fixed proposals. Moreover, we build a virtual 3D scene using the Unity simulation engine to fairly and reproducibly evaluate different physical attacks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DPA outperforms the state-of-the-art methods, and it is generic for any object and generalized well to the real world, posing a potential threat to the security-critical computer vision systems.
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Dangerous Cloaking: Natural Trigger based Backdoor Attacks on Object Detectors in the Physical World
Deep learning models have been shown to be vulnerable to recent backdoor attacks. A backdoored model behaves normally for inputs containing no attacker-secretly-chosen trigger and maliciously for inputs with the trigger. To date, backdoor attacks and countermeasures mainly focus on image classification tasks. And most of them are implemented in the digital world with digital triggers. Besides the classification tasks, object detection systems are also considered as one of the basic foundations of computer vision tasks. However, there is no investigation and understanding of the backdoor vulnerability of the object detector, even in the digital world with digital triggers. For the first time, this work demonstrates that existing object detectors are inherently susceptible to physical backdoor attacks. We use a natural T-shirt bought from a market as a trigger to enable the cloaking effect--the person bounding-box disappears in front of the object detector. We show that such a backdoor can be implanted from two exploitable attack scenarios into the object detector, which is outsourced or fine-tuned through a pretrained model. We have extensively evaluated three popular object detection algorithms: anchor-based Yolo-V3, Yolo-V4, and anchor-free CenterNet. Building upon 19 videos shot in real-world scenes, we confirm that the backdoor attack is robust against various factors: movement, distance, angle, non-rigid deformation, and lighting. Specifically, the attack success rate (ASR) in most videos is 100% or close to it, while the clean data accuracy of the backdoored model is the same as its clean counterpart. The latter implies that it is infeasible to detect the backdoor behavior merely through a validation set. The averaged ASR still remains sufficiently high to be 78% in the transfer learning attack scenarios evaluated on CenterNet. See the demo video on //youtu.be/Q3HOF4OobbY.
With various facial manipulation techniques arising, face forgery detection has drawn growing attention due to security concerns. Previous works always formulate face forgery detection as a classification problem based on cross-entropy loss, which emphasizes category-level differences rather than the essential discrepancies between real and fake faces, limiting model generalization in unseen domains. To address this issue, we propose a novel face forgery detection framework, named Dual Contrastive Learning (DCL), which specially constructs positive and negative paired data and performs designed contrastive learning at different granularities to learn generalized feature representation. Concretely, combined with the hard sample selection strategy, Inter-Instance Contrastive Learning (Inter-ICL) is first proposed to promote task-related discriminative features learning by especially constructing instance pairs. Moreover, to further explore the essential discrepancies, Intra-Instance Contrastive Learning (Intra-ICL) is introduced to focus on the local content inconsistencies prevalent in the forged faces by constructing local-region pairs inside instances. Extensive experiments and visualizations on several datasets demonstrate the generalization of our method against the state-of-the-art competitors.
Visual salient object detection (SOD) aims at finding the salient object(s) that attract human attention, while camouflaged object detection (COD) on the contrary intends to discover the camouflaged object(s) that hidden in the surrounding. In this paper, we propose a paradigm of leveraging the contradictory information to enhance the detection ability of both salient object detection and camouflaged object detection. We start by exploiting the easy positive samples in the COD dataset to serve as hard positive samples in the SOD task to improve the robustness of the SOD model. Then, we introduce a similarity measure module to explicitly model the contradicting attributes of these two tasks. Furthermore, considering the uncertainty of labeling in both tasks' datasets, we propose an adversarial learning network to achieve both higher order similarity measure and network confidence estimation. Experimental results on benchmark datasets demonstrate that our solution leads to state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance for both tasks.
There has been an ongoing cycle where stronger defenses against adversarial attacks are subsequently broken by a more advanced defense-aware attack. We present a new approach towards ending this cycle where we "deflect'' adversarial attacks by causing the attacker to produce an input that semantically resembles the attack's target class. To this end, we first propose a stronger defense based on Capsule Networks that combines three detection mechanisms to achieve state-of-the-art detection performance on both standard and defense-aware attacks. We then show that undetected attacks against our defense often perceptually resemble the adversarial target class by performing a human study where participants are asked to label images produced by the attack. These attack images can no longer be called "adversarial'' because our network classifies them the same way as humans do.
Detection and classification of objects in aerial imagery have several applications like urban planning, crop surveillance, and traffic surveillance. However, due to the lower resolution of the objects and the effect of noise in aerial images, extracting distinguishing features for the objects is a challenge. We evaluate CenterNet, a state of the art method for real-time 2D object detection, on the VisDrone2019 dataset. We evaluate the performance of the model with different backbone networks in conjunction with varying resolutions during training and testing.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are found to be vulnerable against adversarial examples, which are carefully crafted inputs with a small magnitude of perturbation aiming to induce arbitrarily incorrect predictions. Recent studies show that adversarial examples can pose a threat to real-world security-critical applications: a "physical adversarial Stop Sign" can be synthesized such that the autonomous driving cars will misrecognize it as others (e.g., a speed limit sign). However, these image-space adversarial examples cannot easily alter 3D scans of widely equipped LiDAR or radar on autonomous vehicles. In this paper, we reveal the potential vulnerabilities of LiDAR-based autonomous driving detection systems, by proposing an optimization based approach LiDAR-Adv to generate adversarial objects that can evade the LiDAR-based detection system under various conditions. We first show the vulnerabilities using a blackbox evolution-based algorithm, and then explore how much a strong adversary can do, using our gradient-based approach LiDAR-Adv. We test the generated adversarial objects on the Baidu Apollo autonomous driving platform and show that such physical systems are indeed vulnerable to the proposed attacks. We also 3D-print our adversarial objects and perform physical experiments to illustrate that such vulnerability exists in the real world. Please find more visualizations and results on the anonymous website: //sites.google.com/view/lidar-adv.
In recent years, object detection has experienced impressive progress. Despite these improvements, there is still a significant gap in the performance between the detection of small and large objects. We analyze the current state-of-the-art model, Mask-RCNN, on a challenging dataset, MS COCO. We show that the overlap between small ground-truth objects and the predicted anchors is much lower than the expected IoU threshold. We conjecture this is due to two factors; (1) only a few images are containing small objects, and (2) small objects do not appear enough even within each image containing them. We thus propose to oversample those images with small objects and augment each of those images by copy-pasting small objects many times. It allows us to trade off the quality of the detector on large objects with that on small objects. We evaluate different pasting augmentation strategies, and ultimately, we achieve 9.7\% relative improvement on the instance segmentation and 7.1\% on the object detection of small objects, compared to the current state of the art method on MS COCO.
Object detectors have emerged as an indispensable module in modern computer vision systems. Their vulnerability to adversarial attacks thus become a vital issue to consider. In this work, we propose DPatch, a adversarial-patch-based attack towards mainstream object detectors (i.e., Faster R-CNN and YOLO). Unlike the original adversarial patch that only manipulates image-level classifier, our DPatch simultaneously optimizes the bounding box location and category targets so as to disable their predictions. Compared to prior works, DPatch has several appealing properties: (1) DPatch can perform both untargeted and targeted effective attacks, degrading the mAP of Faster R-CNN and YOLO from 70.0% and 65.7% down to below 1% respectively; (2) DPatch is small in size and its attacking effect is location-independent, making it very practical to implement real-world attacks; (3) DPatch demonstrates great transferability between different detector architectures. For example, DPatch that is trained on Faster R-CNN can effectively attack YOLO, and vice versa. Extensive evaluations imply that DPatch can perform effective attacks under black-box setup, i.e., even without the knowledge of the attacked network's architectures and parameters. The successful realization of DPatch also illustrates the intrinsic vulnerability of the modern detector architectures to such patch-based adversarial attacks.
In recent years, deep learning has shown performance breakthroughs in many applications, such as image detection, image segmentation, pose estimation, and speech recognition. However, this comes with a major concern: deep networks have been found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are slightly modified inputs that are intentionally designed to cause a misclassification by the model. In the domains of images and speech, the modifications are so small that they are not seen or heard by humans, but nevertheless greatly affect the classification of the model. Deep learning models have been successfully applied to malware detection. In this domain, generating adversarial examples is not straightforward, as small modifications to the bytes of the file could lead to significant changes in its functionality and validity. We introduce a novel loss function for generating adversarial examples specifically tailored for discrete input sets, such as executable bytes. We modify malicious binaries so that they would be detected as benign, while preserving their original functionality, by injecting a small sequence of bytes (payload) in the binary file. We applied this approach to an end-to-end convolutional deep learning malware detection model and show a high rate of detection evasion. Moreover, we show that our generated payload is robust enough to be transferable within different locations of the same file and across different files, and that its entropy is low and similar to that of benign data sections.
Object detection typically assumes that training and test data are drawn from an identical distribution, which, however, does not always hold in practice. Such a distribution mismatch will lead to a significant performance drop. In this work, we aim to improve the cross-domain robustness of object detection. We tackle the domain shift on two levels: 1) the image-level shift, such as image style, illumination, etc, and 2) the instance-level shift, such as object appearance, size, etc. We build our approach based on the recent state-of-the-art Faster R-CNN model, and design two domain adaptation components, on image level and instance level, to reduce the domain discrepancy. The two domain adaptation components are based on H-divergence theory, and are implemented by learning a domain classifier in adversarial training manner. The domain classifiers on different levels are further reinforced with a consistency regularization to learn a domain-invariant region proposal network (RPN) in the Faster R-CNN model. We evaluate our newly proposed approach using multiple datasets including Cityscapes, KITTI, SIM10K, etc. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach for robust object detection in various domain shift scenarios.
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