Due to their robustness to degraded capturing conditions, radars are widely used for environment perception, which is a critical task in applications like autonomous vehicles. More specifically, Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) radars are particularly efficient for short range settings as they carry rich information on the environment. Recent UWB-based systems rely on Machine Learning (ML) to exploit the rich signature of these sensors. However, ML classifiers are susceptible to adversarial examples, which are created from raw data to fool the classifier such that it assigns the input to the wrong class. These attacks represent a serious threat to systems integrity, especially for safety-critical applications. In this work, we present a new adversarial attack on UWB radars in which an adversary injects adversarial radio noise in the wireless channel to cause an obstacle recognition failure. First, based on signals collected in real-life environment, we show that conventional attacks fail to generate robust noise under realistic conditions. We propose a-RNA, i.e., Adversarial Radio Noise Attack to overcome these issues. Specifically, a-RNA generates an adversarial noise that is efficient without synchronization between the input signal and the noise. Moreover, a-RNA generated noise is, by-design, robust against pre-processing countermeasures such as filtering-based defenses. Moreover, in addition to the undetectability objective by limiting the noise magnitude budget, a-RNA is also efficient in the presence of sophisticated defenses in the spectral domain by introducing a frequency budget. We believe this work should alert about potentially critical implementations of adversarial attacks on radar systems that should be taken seriously.
It is well-known that the performance of well-trained deep neural networks may degrade significantly when they are applied to data with even slightly shifted distributions. Recent studies have shown that introducing certain perturbation on feature statistics (\eg, mean and standard deviation) during training can enhance the cross-domain generalization ability. Existing methods typically conduct such perturbation by utilizing the feature statistics within a mini-batch, limiting their representation capability. Inspired by the domain generalization objective, we introduce a novel Adversarial Style Augmentation (ASA) method, which explores broader style spaces by generating more effective statistics perturbation via adversarial training. Specifically, we first search for the most sensitive direction and intensity for statistics perturbation by maximizing the task loss. By updating the model against the adversarial statistics perturbation during training, we allow the model to explore the worst-case domain and hence improve its generalization performance. To facilitate the application of ASA, we design a simple yet effective module, namely AdvStyle, which instantiates the ASA method in a plug-and-play manner. We justify the efficacy of AdvStyle on tasks of cross-domain classification and instance retrieval. It achieves higher mean accuracy and lower performance fluctuation. Especially, our method significantly outperforms its competitors on the PACS dataset under the single source generalization setting, \eg, boosting the classification accuracy from 61.2\% to 67.1\% with a ResNet50 backbone. Our code will be available at \url{//github.com/YBZh/AdvStyle}.
Deep Neural Networks have proven to be highly accurate at a variety of tasks in recent years. The benefits of Deep Neural Networks have also been embraced in power grids to detect False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA) while conducting critical tasks like state estimation. However, the vulnerabilities of DNNs along with the distinct infrastructure of cyber-physical-system (CPS) can favor the attackers to bypass the detection mechanism. Moreover, the divergent nature of CPS engenders limitations to the conventional defense mechanisms for False Data Injection Attacks. In this paper, we propose a DNN framework with additional layer which utilizes randomization to mitigate the adversarial effect by padding the inputs. The primary advantage of our method is when deployed to a DNN model it has trivial impact on the models performance even with larger padding sizes. We demonstrate the favorable outcome of the framework through simulation using the IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus, 118-bus and 300-bus systems. Furthermore to justify the framework we select attack techniques that generate subtle adversarial examples that can bypass the detection mechanism effortlessly.
Face recognition (FR) models can be easily fooled by adversarial examples, which are crafted by adding imperceptible perturbations on benign face images. To improve the transferability of adversarial face examples, we propose a novel attack method called Beneficial Perturbation Feature Augmentation Attack (BPFA), which reduces the overfitting of adversarial examples to surrogate FR models by constantly generating new models that have the similar effect of hard samples to craft the adversarial examples. Specifically, in the backpropagation, BPFA records the gradients on pre-selected features and uses the gradient on the input image to craft the adversarial example. In the next forward propagation, BPFA leverages the recorded gradients to add perturbations (i.e., beneficial perturbations) that can be pitted against the adversarial example on their corresponding features. The optimization process of the adversarial example and the optimization process of the beneficial perturbations added on the features correspond to a minimax two-player game. Extensive experiments demonstrate that BPFA can significantly boost the transferability of adversarial attacks on FR.
Knowledge graphs represent factual knowledge about the world as relationships between concepts and are critical for intelligent decision making in enterprise applications. New knowledge is inferred from the existing facts in the knowledge graphs by encoding the concepts and relations into low-dimensional feature vector representations. The most effective representations for this task, called Knowledge Graph Embeddings (KGE), are learned through neural network architectures. Due to their impressive predictive performance, they are increasingly used in high-impact domains like healthcare, finance and education. However, are the black-box KGE models adversarially robust for use in domains with high stakes? This thesis argues that state-of-the-art KGE models are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, that is, their predictive performance can be degraded by systematically crafted perturbations to the training knowledge graph. To support this argument, two novel data poisoning attacks are proposed that craft input deletions or additions at training time to subvert the learned model's performance at inference time. These adversarial attacks target the task of predicting the missing facts in knowledge graphs using KGE models, and the evaluation shows that the simpler attacks are competitive with or outperform the computationally expensive ones. The thesis contributions not only highlight and provide an opportunity to fix the security vulnerabilities of KGE models, but also help to understand the black-box predictive behaviour of KGE models.
Deep Learning (DL) is the most widely used tool in the contemporary field of computer vision. Its ability to accurately solve complex problems is employed in vision research to learn deep neural models for a variety of tasks, including security critical applications. However, it is now known that DL is vulnerable to adversarial attacks that can manipulate its predictions by introducing visually imperceptible perturbations in images and videos. Since the discovery of this phenomenon in 2013~[1], it has attracted significant attention of researchers from multiple sub-fields of machine intelligence. In [2], we reviewed the contributions made by the computer vision community in adversarial attacks on deep learning (and their defenses) until the advent of year 2018. Many of those contributions have inspired new directions in this area, which has matured significantly since witnessing the first generation methods. Hence, as a legacy sequel of [2], this literature review focuses on the advances in this area since 2018. To ensure authenticity, we mainly consider peer-reviewed contributions published in the prestigious sources of computer vision and machine learning research. Besides a comprehensive literature review, the article also provides concise definitions of technical terminologies for non-experts in this domain. Finally, this article discusses challenges and future outlook of this direction based on the literature reviewed herein and [2].
Adversarial attack is a technique for deceiving Machine Learning (ML) models, which provides a way to evaluate the adversarial robustness. In practice, attack algorithms are artificially selected and tuned by human experts to break a ML system. However, manual selection of attackers tends to be sub-optimal, leading to a mistakenly assessment of model security. In this paper, a new procedure called Composite Adversarial Attack (CAA) is proposed for automatically searching the best combination of attack algorithms and their hyper-parameters from a candidate pool of \textbf{32 base attackers}. We design a search space where attack policy is represented as an attacking sequence, i.e., the output of the previous attacker is used as the initialization input for successors. Multi-objective NSGA-II genetic algorithm is adopted for finding the strongest attack policy with minimum complexity. The experimental result shows CAA beats 10 top attackers on 11 diverse defenses with less elapsed time (\textbf{6 $\times$ faster than AutoAttack}), and achieves the new state-of-the-art on $l_{\infty}$, $l_{2}$ and unrestricted adversarial attacks.
While existing work in robust deep learning has focused on small pixel-level $\ell_p$ norm-based perturbations, this may not account for perturbations encountered in several real world settings. In many such cases although test data might not be available, broad specifications about the types of perturbations (such as an unknown degree of rotation) may be known. We consider a setup where robustness is expected over an unseen test domain that is not i.i.d. but deviates from the training domain. While this deviation may not be exactly known, its broad characterization is specified a priori, in terms of attributes. We propose an adversarial training approach which learns to generate new samples so as to maximize exposure of the classifier to the attributes-space, without having access to the data from the test domain. Our adversarial training solves a min-max optimization problem, with the inner maximization generating adversarial perturbations, and the outer minimization finding model parameters by optimizing the loss on adversarial perturbations generated from the inner maximization. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach on three types of naturally occurring perturbations -- object-related shifts, geometric transformations, and common image corruptions. Our approach enables deep neural networks to be robust against a wide range of naturally occurring perturbations. We demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed approach by showing the robustness gains of deep neural networks trained using our adversarial training on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and a new variant of the CLEVR dataset.
Deep learning models on graphs have achieved remarkable performance in various graph analysis tasks, e.g., node classification, link prediction and graph clustering. However, they expose uncertainty and unreliability against the well-designed inputs, i.e., adversarial examples. Accordingly, various studies have emerged for both attack and defense addressed in different graph analysis tasks, leading to the arms race in graph adversarial learning. For instance, the attacker has poisoning and evasion attack, and the defense group correspondingly has preprocessing- and adversarial- based methods. Despite the booming works, there still lacks a unified problem definition and a comprehensive review. To bridge this gap, we investigate and summarize the existing works on graph adversarial learning tasks systemically. Specifically, we survey and unify the existing works w.r.t. attack and defense in graph analysis tasks, and give proper definitions and taxonomies at the same time. Besides, we emphasize the importance of related evaluation metrics, and investigate and summarize them comprehensively. Hopefully, our works can serve as a reference for the relevant researchers, thus providing assistance for their studies. More details of our works are available at //github.com/gitgiter/Graph-Adversarial-Learning.
Deep neural networks (DNN) have achieved unprecedented success in numerous machine learning tasks in various domains. However, the existence of adversarial examples has raised concerns about applying deep learning to safety-critical applications. As a result, we have witnessed increasing interests in studying attack and defense mechanisms for DNN models on different data types, such as images, graphs and text. Thus, it is necessary to provide a systematic and comprehensive overview of the main threats of attacks and the success of corresponding countermeasures. In this survey, we review the state of the art algorithms for generating adversarial examples and the countermeasures against adversarial examples, for the three popular data types, i.e., images, graphs and text.
Adversarial attacks to image classification systems present challenges to convolutional networks and opportunities for understanding them. This study suggests that adversarial perturbations on images lead to noise in the features constructed by these networks. Motivated by this observation, we develop new network architectures that increase adversarial robustness by performing feature denoising. Specifically, our networks contain blocks that denoise the features using non-local means or other filters; the entire networks are trained end-to-end. When combined with adversarial training, our feature denoising networks substantially improve the state-of-the-art in adversarial robustness in both white-box and black-box attack settings. On ImageNet, under 10-iteration PGD white-box attacks where prior art has 27.9% accuracy, our method achieves 55.7%; even under extreme 2000-iteration PGD white-box attacks, our method secures 42.6% accuracy. A network based on our method was ranked first in Competition on Adversarial Attacks and Defenses (CAAD) 2018 --- it achieved 50.6% classification accuracy on a secret, ImageNet-like test dataset against 48 unknown attackers, surpassing the runner-up approach by ~10%. Code and models will be made publicly available.