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When humans are given a policy to execute, there can be policy execution errors and deviations in execution if there is uncertainty in identifying a state. So an algorithm that computes a policy for a human to execute ought to consider these effects in its computations. An optimal MDP policy that is poorly executed (because of a human agent) maybe much worse than another policy that is executed with fewer errors. In this paper, we consider the problems of erroneous execution and execution delay when computing policies for a human agent that would act in a setting modeled by a Markov Decision Process. We present a framework to model the likelihood of policy execution errors and likelihood of non-policy actions like inaction (delays) due to state uncertainty. This is followed by a hill climbing algorithm to search for good policies that account for these errors. We then use the best policy found by hill climbing with a branch and bound algorithm to find the optimal policy. We show experimental results in a Gridworld domain and analyze the performance of the two algorithms. We also present human studies that verify if our assumptions on policy execution by humans under state-aliasing are reasonable.

We propose a formulation of the stochastic cutting stock problem as a discounted infinite-horizon Markov decision process. At each decision epoch, given current inventory of items, an agent chooses in which patterns to cut objects in stock in anticipation of the unknown demand. An optimal solution corresponds to a policy that associates each state with a decision and minimizes the expected total cost. Since exact algorithms scale exponentially with the state-space dimension, we develop a heuristic solution approach based on reinforcement learning. We propose an approximate policy iteration algorithm in which we apply a linear model to approximate the action-value function of a policy. Policy evaluation is performed by solving the projected Bellman equation from a sample of state transitions, decisions and costs obtained by simulation. Due to the large decision space, policy improvement is performed via the cross-entropy method. Computational experiments are carried out with the use of realistic data to illustrate the application of the algorithm. Heuristic policies obtained with polynomial and Fourier basis functions are compared with myopic and random policies. Results indicate the possibility of obtaining policies capable of adequately controlling inventories with an average cost up to 80% lower than the cost obtained by a myopic policy.

The use of heuristics to assess the convergence and compress the output of Markov chain Monte Carlo can be sub-optimal in terms of the empirical approximations that are produced. Typically a number of the initial states are attributed to "burn in" and removed, whilst the remainder of the chain is "thinned" if compression is also required. In this paper we consider the problem of retrospectively selecting a subset of states, of fixed cardinality, from the sample path such that the approximation provided by their empirical distribution is close to optimal. A novel method is proposed, based on greedy minimisation of a kernel Stein discrepancy, that is suitable for problems where heavy compression is required. Theoretical results guarantee consistency of the method and its effectiveness is demonstrated in the challenging context of parameter inference for ordinary differential equations. Software is available in the Stein Thinning package in Python, R and MATLAB.

We study network games in which players choose both an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for others and the partners with whom they associate. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts that extend standard solutions for each choice made separately: Nash equilibrium in actions and pairwise stability in links. Our main results show that, under suitable monotonicity conditions on incentives, stable networks take simple forms. The first condition concerns whether links create positive or negative payoff spillovers. The second condition concerns whether actions and links are strategic complements or substitutes. Together, these conditions allow a taxonomy of how network structure depends on economic primitives. We apply our model to understand the consequences of competition for status, to microfound matching models that assume clique formation, and to interpret empirical findings that highlight unintended consequences of group design.

We study the problem of allocating m indivisible items to n agents with additive utilities. It is desirable for the allocation to be both fair and efficient, which we formalize through the notions of envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality. While envy-free and Pareto-optimal allocations may not exist for arbitrary utility profiles, previous work has shown that such allocations exist with high probability assuming that all agents' values for all items are independently drawn from a common distribution. In this paper, we consider a generalization of this model with asymmetric agents, where an agent's utilities for the items are drawn independently from a distribution specific to the agent. We show that envy-free and Pareto-optimal allocations are likely to exist in this asymmetric model when $m=\Omega\left(n\, \log n\right)$, matching the best bounds known for the symmetric subsetting. Empirically, an algorithm based on Maximum Nash Welfare obtains envy-free and Pareto-optimal allocations for small numbers of items.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as input the reported -- rather than the true -- values of the agents. Our main goal is to explore whether there exist mechanisms that have pure Nash equilibria for every instance and, at the same time, provide fairness guarantees for the allocations that correspond to these equilibria. We focus on two relaxations of envy-freeness, namely envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), and we positively answer the above question. In particular, we study two algorithms that are known to produce such allocations in the non-strategic setting: Round-Robin (EF1 allocations for any number of agents) and a cut-and-choose algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden [SIAM Journal of Discrete Mathematics, 2020] (EFX allocations for two agents). For Round-Robin we show that all of its pure Nash equilibria induce allocations that are EF1 with respect to the underlying true values, while for the algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden we show that the corresponding allocations not only are EFX but also satisfy maximin share fairness, something that is not true for this algorithm in the non-strategic setting! Further, we show that a weaker version of the latter result holds for any mechanism for two agents that always has pure Nash equilibria which all induce EFX allocations.

Stochastic games combine controllable and adversarial non-determinism with stochastic behavior and are a common tool in control, verification and synthesis of reactive systems facing uncertainty. Multi-objective stochastic games are natural in situations where several - possibly conflicting - performance criteria like time and energy consumption are relevant. Such conjunctive combinations are the most studied multi-objective setting in the literature. In this paper, we consider the dual disjunctive problem. More concretely, we study turn-based stochastic two-player games on graphs where the winning condition is to guarantee at least one reachability or safety objective from a given set of alternatives. We present a fine-grained overview of strategy and computational complexity of such disjunctive queries (DQs) and provide new lower and upper bounds for several variants of the problem, significantly extending previous works. We also propose a novel value iteration-style algorithm for approximating the set of Pareto optimal thresholds for a given DQ.

Finding approximate Nash equilibria in zero-sum imperfect-information games is challenging when the number of information states is large. Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is a deep reinforcement learning algorithm grounded in game theory that is guaranteed to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium. However, PSRO requires training a reinforcement learning policy at each iteration, making it too slow for large games. We show through counterexamples and experiments that DCH and Rectified PSRO, two existing approaches to scaling up PSRO, fail to converge even in small games. We introduce Pipeline PSRO (P2SRO), the first scalable general method for finding approximate Nash equilibria in large zero-sum imperfect-information games. P2SRO is able to parallelize PSRO with convergence guarantees by maintaining a hierarchical pipeline of reinforcement learning workers, each training against the policies generated by lower levels in the hierarchy. We show that unlike existing methods, P2SRO converges to an approximate Nash equilibrium, and does so faster as the number of parallel workers increases, across a variety of imperfect information games. We also introduce an open-source environment for Barrage Stratego, a variant of Stratego with an approximate game tree complexity of $10^{50}$. P2SRO is able to achieve state-of-the-art performance on Barrage Stratego and beats all existing bots.

We propose a new method of estimation in topic models, that is not a variation on the existing simplex finding algorithms, and that estimates the number of topics K from the observed data. We derive new finite sample minimax lower bounds for the estimation of A, as well as new upper bounds for our proposed estimator. We describe the scenarios where our estimator is minimax adaptive. Our finite sample analysis is valid for any number of documents (n), individual document length (N_i), dictionary size (p) and number of topics (K), and both p and K are allowed to increase with n, a situation not handled well by previous analyses. We complement our theoretical results with a detailed simulation study. We illustrate that the new algorithm is faster and more accurate than the current ones, although we start out with a computational and theoretical disadvantage of not knowing the correct number of topics K, while we provide the competing methods with the correct value in our simulations.

We present an end-to-end framework for solving the Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP) using reinforcement learning. In this approach, we train a single model that finds near-optimal solutions for problem instances sampled from a given distribution, only by observing the reward signals and following feasibility rules. Our model represents a parameterized stochastic policy, and by applying a policy gradient algorithm to optimize its parameters, the trained model produces the solution as a sequence of consecutive actions in real time, without the need to re-train for every new problem instance. On capacitated VRP, our approach outperforms classical heuristics and Google's OR-Tools on medium-sized instances in solution quality with comparable computation time (after training). We demonstrate how our approach can handle problems with split delivery and explore the effect of such deliveries on the solution quality. Our proposed framework can be applied to other variants of the VRP such as the stochastic VRP, and has the potential to be applied more generally to combinatorial optimization problems.