Lipschitz bandit is a variant of stochastic bandits that deals with a continuous arm set defined on a metric space, where the reward function is subject to a Lipschitz constraint. In this paper, we introduce a new problem of Lipschitz bandits in the presence of adversarial corruptions where an adaptive adversary corrupts the stochastic rewards up to a total budget $C$. The budget is measured by the sum of corruption levels across the time horizon $T$. We consider both weak and strong adversaries, where the weak adversary is unaware of the current action before the attack, while the strong one can observe it. Our work presents the first line of robust Lipschitz bandit algorithms that can achieve sub-linear regret under both types of adversary, even when the total budget of corruption $C$ is unrevealed to the agent. We provide a lower bound under each type of adversary, and show that our algorithm is optimal under the strong case. Finally, we conduct experiments to illustrate the effectiveness of our algorithms against two classic kinds of attacks.
We adopt an information-theoretic framework to analyze the generalization behavior of the class of iterative, noisy learning algorithms. This class is particularly suitable for study under information-theoretic metrics as the algorithms are inherently randomized, and it includes commonly used algorithms such as Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics (SGLD). Herein, we use the maximal leakage (equivalently, the Sibson mutual information of order infinity) metric, as it is simple to analyze, and it implies both bounds on the probability of having a large generalization error and on its expected value. We show that, if the update function (e.g., gradient) is bounded in $L_2$-norm and the additive noise is isotropic Gaussian noise, then one can obtain an upper-bound on maximal leakage in semi-closed form. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the assumptions on the update function affect the optimal (in the sense of minimizing the induced maximal leakage) choice of the noise. Finally, we compute explicit tight upper bounds on the induced maximal leakage for other scenarios of interest.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) can produce high-quality samples, but do not provide an estimate of the probability density around the samples. However, it has been noted that maximizing the log-likelihood within an energy-based setting can lead to an adversarial framework where the discriminator provides unnormalized density (often called energy). We further develop this perspective, incorporate importance sampling, and show that 1) Wasserstein GAN performs a biased estimate of the partition function, and we propose instead to use an unbiased estimator; 2) when optimizing for likelihood, one must maximize generator entropy. This is hypothesized to provide a better mode coverage. Different from previous works, we explicitly compute the density of the generated samples. This is the key enabler to designing an unbiased estimator of the partition function and computation of the generator entropy term. The generator density is obtained via a new type of flow network, called one-way flow network, that is less constrained in terms of architecture, as it does not require to have a tractable inverse function. Our experimental results show that we converge faster, produce comparable sample quality to GANs with similar architecture, successfully avoid over-fitting to commonly used datasets and produce smooth low-dimensional latent representations of the training data.
The linear bandit problem has been studied for many years in both stochastic and adversarial settings. Designing an algorithm that can optimize the environment without knowing the loss type attracts lots of interest. \citet{LeeLWZ021} propose an algorithm that actively detects the loss type and then switches between different algorithms specially designed for specific settings. However, such an approach requires meticulous designs to perform well in all environments. Follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) is another type of popular algorithm that can adapt to different environments. This algorithm is of simple design and the regret bounds are shown to be optimal in traditional multi-armed bandit problems compared with the detect-switch type. Designing an FTRL-type algorithm for linear bandits is an important question that has been open for a long time. In this paper, we prove that the FTRL algorithm with a negative entropy regularizer can achieve the best-of-three-world results for the linear bandit problem. Our regret bounds achieve the same or nearly the same order as the previous detect-switch type algorithm but with a much simpler algorithmic design.
This paper studies distributed online learning under Byzantine attacks. The performance of an online learning algorithm is often characterized by (adversarial) regret, which evaluates the quality of one-step-ahead decision-making when an environment provides adversarial losses, and a sublinear bound is preferred. But we prove that, even with a class of state-of-the-art robust aggregation rules, in an adversarial environment and in the presence of Byzantine participants, distributed online gradient descent can only achieve a linear adversarial regret bound, which is tight. This is the inevitable consequence of Byzantine attacks, even though we can control the constant of the linear adversarial regret to a reasonable level. Interestingly, when the environment is not fully adversarial so that the losses of the honest participants are i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed), we show that sublinear stochastic regret, in contrast to the aforementioned adversarial regret, is possible. We develop a Byzantine-robust distributed online momentum algorithm to attain such a sublinear stochastic regret bound. Extensive numerical experiments corroborate our theoretical analysis.
Due to the broad range of applications of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), understanding the effects of adversarial attacks against MARL model is essential for the safe applications of this model. Motivated by this, we investigate the impact of adversarial attacks on MARL. In the considered setup, there is an exogenous attacker who is able to modify the rewards before the agents receive them or manipulate the actions before the environment receives them. The attacker aims to guide each agent into a target policy or maximize the cumulative rewards under some specific reward function chosen by the attacker, while minimizing the amount of manipulation on feedback and action. We first show the limitations of the action poisoning only attacks and the reward poisoning only attacks. We then introduce a mixed attack strategy with both the action poisoning and the reward poisoning. We show that the mixed attack strategy can efficiently attack MARL agents even if the attacker has no prior information about the underlying environment and the agents' algorithms.
This paper studies online convex optimization with stochastic constraints. We propose a variant of the drift-plus-penalty algorithm that guarantees $O(\sqrt{T})$ expected regret and zero constraint violation, after a fixed number of iterations, which improves the vanilla drift-plus-penalty method with $O(\sqrt{T})$ constraint violation. Our algorithm is oblivious to the length of the time horizon $T$, in contrast to the vanilla drift-plus-penalty method. This is based on our novel drift lemma that provides time-varying bounds on the virtual queue drift and, as a result, leads to time-varying bounds on the expected virtual queue length. Moreover, we extend our framework to stochastic-constrained online convex optimization under two-point bandit feedback. We show that by adapting our algorithmic framework to the bandit feedback setting, we may still achieve $O(\sqrt{T})$ expected regret and zero constraint violation, improving upon the previous work for the case of identical constraint functions. Numerical results demonstrate our theoretical results.
We consider a persuasion problem between a sender and a receiver whose utility may be nonlinear in her belief; we call such receivers risk-conscious. Such utility models arise when the receiver exhibits systematic biases away from expected-utility-maximization, such as uncertainty aversion (e.g., from sensitivity to the variance of the waiting time for a service). Due to this nonlinearity, the standard approach to finding the optimal persuasion mechanism using revelation principle fails. To overcome this difficulty, we use the underlying geometry of the problem to develop a convex optimization framework to find the optimal persuasion mechanism. We define the notion of full persuasion and use our framework to characterize conditions under which full persuasion can be achieved. We use our approach to study binary persuasion, where the receiver has two actions and the sender strictly prefers one of them at every state. Under a convexity assumption, we show that the binary persuasion problem reduces to a linear program, and establish a canonical set of signals where each signal either reveals the state or induces in the receiver uncertainty between two states. Finally, we discuss the broader applicability of our methods to more general contexts, and illustrate our methodology by studying information sharing of waiting times in service systems.
Adversarial attack is a technique for deceiving Machine Learning (ML) models, which provides a way to evaluate the adversarial robustness. In practice, attack algorithms are artificially selected and tuned by human experts to break a ML system. However, manual selection of attackers tends to be sub-optimal, leading to a mistakenly assessment of model security. In this paper, a new procedure called Composite Adversarial Attack (CAA) is proposed for automatically searching the best combination of attack algorithms and their hyper-parameters from a candidate pool of \textbf{32 base attackers}. We design a search space where attack policy is represented as an attacking sequence, i.e., the output of the previous attacker is used as the initialization input for successors. Multi-objective NSGA-II genetic algorithm is adopted for finding the strongest attack policy with minimum complexity. The experimental result shows CAA beats 10 top attackers on 11 diverse defenses with less elapsed time (\textbf{6 $\times$ faster than AutoAttack}), and achieves the new state-of-the-art on $l_{\infty}$, $l_{2}$ and unrestricted adversarial attacks.
While existing work in robust deep learning has focused on small pixel-level $\ell_p$ norm-based perturbations, this may not account for perturbations encountered in several real world settings. In many such cases although test data might not be available, broad specifications about the types of perturbations (such as an unknown degree of rotation) may be known. We consider a setup where robustness is expected over an unseen test domain that is not i.i.d. but deviates from the training domain. While this deviation may not be exactly known, its broad characterization is specified a priori, in terms of attributes. We propose an adversarial training approach which learns to generate new samples so as to maximize exposure of the classifier to the attributes-space, without having access to the data from the test domain. Our adversarial training solves a min-max optimization problem, with the inner maximization generating adversarial perturbations, and the outer minimization finding model parameters by optimizing the loss on adversarial perturbations generated from the inner maximization. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach on three types of naturally occurring perturbations -- object-related shifts, geometric transformations, and common image corruptions. Our approach enables deep neural networks to be robust against a wide range of naturally occurring perturbations. We demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed approach by showing the robustness gains of deep neural networks trained using our adversarial training on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and a new variant of the CLEVR dataset.
Adversarial attacks to image classification systems present challenges to convolutional networks and opportunities for understanding them. This study suggests that adversarial perturbations on images lead to noise in the features constructed by these networks. Motivated by this observation, we develop new network architectures that increase adversarial robustness by performing feature denoising. Specifically, our networks contain blocks that denoise the features using non-local means or other filters; the entire networks are trained end-to-end. When combined with adversarial training, our feature denoising networks substantially improve the state-of-the-art in adversarial robustness in both white-box and black-box attack settings. On ImageNet, under 10-iteration PGD white-box attacks where prior art has 27.9% accuracy, our method achieves 55.7%; even under extreme 2000-iteration PGD white-box attacks, our method secures 42.6% accuracy. A network based on our method was ranked first in Competition on Adversarial Attacks and Defenses (CAAD) 2018 --- it achieved 50.6% classification accuracy on a secret, ImageNet-like test dataset against 48 unknown attackers, surpassing the runner-up approach by ~10%. Code and models will be made publicly available.