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Environments with multi-agent interactions often result a rich set of modalities of behavior between agents due to the inherent suboptimality of decision making processes when agents settle for satisfactory decisions. However, existing algorithms for solving these dynamic games are strictly unimodal and fail to capture the intricate multimodal behaviors of the agents. In this paper, we propose MMELQGames (Multimodal Maximum-Entropy Linear Quadratic Games), a novel constrained multimodal maximum entropy formulation of the Differential Dynamic Programming algorithm for solving generalized Nash equilibria. By formulating the problem as a certain dynamic game with incomplete and asymmetric information where agents are uncertain about the cost and dynamics of the game itself, the proposed method is able to reason about multiple local generalized Nash equilibria, enforce constraints with the Augmented Lagrangian framework and also perform Bayesian inference on the latent mode from past observations. We assess the efficacy of the proposed algorithm on two illustrative examples: multi-agent collision avoidance and autonomous racing. In particular, we show that only MMELQGames is able to effectively block a rear vehicle when given a speed disadvantage and the rear vehicle can overtake from multiple positions.

Softmax policy gradient is a popular algorithm for policy optimization in single-agent reinforcement learning, particularly since projection is not needed for each gradient update. However, in multi-agent systems, the lack of central coordination introduces significant additional difficulties in the convergence analysis. Even for a stochastic game with identical interest, there can be multiple Nash Equilibria (NEs), which disables proof techniques that rely on the existence of a unique global optimum. Moreover, the softmax parameterization introduces non-NE policies with zero gradient, making NE-seeking difficult for gradient-based algorithms. In this paper, we study the finite time convergence of decentralized softmax gradient play in a special form of game, Markov Potential Games (MPGs), which includes the identical interest game as a special case. We investigate both gradient play and natural gradient play, with and without $\log$-barrier regularization. Establishing convergence for the unregularized cases relies on an assumption that the stationary policies are isolated, and yields convergence bounds that contain a trajectory dependent constant that can be arbitrarily large. We introduce the $\log$-barrier regularization to overcome these drawbacks, with the cost of slightly worse dependence on other factors such as the action set size. An empirical study on an identical interest matrix game confirms the theoretical findings.

We study the problem of multi-agent control of a dynamical system with known dynamics and adversarial disturbances. Our study focuses on optimal control without centralized precomputed policies, but rather with adaptive control policies for the different agents that are only equipped with a stabilizing controller. We give a reduction from any (standard) regret minimizing control method to a distributed algorithm. The reduction guarantees that the resulting distributed algorithm has low regret relative to the optimal precomputed joint policy. Our methodology involves generalizing online convex optimization to a multi-agent setting and applying recent tools from nonstochastic control derived for a single agent. We empirically evaluate our method on a model of an overactuated aircraft. We show that the distributed method is robust to failure and to adversarial perturbations in the dynamics.

This paper addresses the problem of learning an equilibrium efficiently in general-sum Markov games through decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning. Given the fundamental difficulty of calculating a Nash equilibrium (NE), we instead aim at finding a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE), a solution concept that generalizes NE by allowing possible correlations among the agents' strategies. We propose an algorithm in which each agent independently runs optimistic V-learning (a variant of Q-learning) to efficiently explore the unknown environment, while using a stabilized online mirror descent (OMD) subroutine for policy updates. We show that the agents can find an $\epsilon$-approximate CCE in at most $\widetilde{O}( H^6S A /\epsilon^2)$ episodes, where $S$ is the number of states, $A$ is the size of the largest individual action space, and $H$ is the length of an episode. This appears to be the first sample complexity result for learning in generic general-sum Markov games. Our results rely on a novel investigation of an anytime high-probability regret bound for OMD with a dynamic learning rate and weighted regret, which would be of independent interest. One key feature of our algorithm is that it is fully \emph{decentralized}, in the sense that each agent has access to only its local information, and is completely oblivious to the presence of others. This way, our algorithm can readily scale up to an arbitrary number of agents, without suffering from the exponential dependence on the number of agents.

We study the conjectured relationship between the implicit regularization in neural networks, trained with gradient-based methods, and rank minimization of their weight matrices. Previously, it was proved that for linear networks (of depth 2 and vector-valued outputs), gradient flow (GF) w.r.t. the square loss acts as a rank minimization heuristic. However, understanding to what extent this generalizes to nonlinear networks is an open problem. In this paper, we focus on nonlinear ReLU networks, providing several new positive and negative results. On the negative side, we prove (and demonstrate empirically) that, unlike the linear case, GF on ReLU networks may no longer tend to minimize ranks, in a rather strong sense (even approximately, for "most" datasets of size 2). On the positive side, we reveal that ReLU networks of sufficient depth are provably biased towards low-rank solutions in several reasonable settings.

We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent transition probabilities. Moreover, players can only receive realizations of their payoffs but not the actual functions, nor can they observe each others' states/actions. Under some assumptions on the structure of the payoff functions, we develop efficient learning algorithms based on Dual Averaging and Dual Mirror Descent, which provably converge almost surely or in expectation to the set of $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium policies. In particular, we derive upper bounds on the number of iterates that scale polynomially in terms of the game parameters to achieve an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium policy. Besides Markov potential games and linear-quadratic stochastic games, this work provides another interesting subclass of $n$-player stochastic games that under some assumption provably admit polynomial-time learning algorithm for finding their $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium policies.

Exploration-exploitation is a powerful and practical tool in multi-agent learning (MAL), however, its effects are far from understood. To make progress in this direction, we study a smooth analogue of Q-learning. We start by showing that our learning model has strong theoretical justification as an optimal model for studying exploration-exploitation. Specifically, we prove that smooth Q-learning has bounded regret in arbitrary games for a cost model that explicitly captures the balance between game and exploration costs and that it always converges to the set of quantal-response equilibria (QRE), the standard solution concept for games under bounded rationality, in weighted potential games with heterogeneous learning agents. In our main task, we then turn to measure the effect of exploration in collective system performance. We characterize the geometry of the QRE surface in low-dimensional MAL systems and link our findings with catastrophe (bifurcation) theory. In particular, as the exploration hyperparameter evolves over-time, the system undergoes phase transitions where the number and stability of equilibria can change radically given an infinitesimal change to the exploration parameter. Based on this, we provide a formal theoretical treatment of how tuning the exploration parameter can provably lead to equilibrium selection with both positive as well as negative (and potentially unbounded) effects to system performance.

Existing multi-agent reinforcement learning methods are limited typically to a small number of agents. When the agent number increases largely, the learning becomes intractable due to the curse of the dimensionality and the exponential growth of agent interactions. In this paper, we present Mean Field Reinforcement Learning where the interactions within the population of agents are approximated by those between a single agent and the average effect from the overall population or neighboring agents; the interplay between the two entities is mutually reinforced: the learning of the individual agent's optimal policy depends on the dynamics of the population, while the dynamics of the population change according to the collective patterns of the individual policies. We develop practical mean field Q-learning and mean field Actor-Critic algorithms and analyze the convergence of the solution to Nash equilibrium. Experiments on Gaussian squeeze, Ising model, and battle games justify the learning effectiveness of our mean field approaches. In addition, we report the first result to solve the Ising model via model-free reinforcement learning methods.

We explore deep reinforcement learning methods for multi-agent domains. We begin by analyzing the difficulty of traditional algorithms in the multi-agent case: Q-learning is challenged by an inherent non-stationarity of the environment, while policy gradient suffers from a variance that increases as the number of agents grows. We then present an adaptation of actor-critic methods that considers action policies of other agents and is able to successfully learn policies that require complex multi-agent coordination. Additionally, we introduce a training regimen utilizing an ensemble of policies for each agent that leads to more robust multi-agent policies. We show the strength of our approach compared to existing methods in cooperative as well as competitive scenarios, where agent populations are able to discover various physical and informational coordination strategies.

We develop an approach to risk minimization and stochastic optimization that provides a convex surrogate for variance, allowing near-optimal and computationally efficient trading between approximation and estimation error. Our approach builds off of techniques for distributionally robust optimization and Owen's empirical likelihood, and we provide a number of finite-sample and asymptotic results characterizing the theoretical performance of the estimator. In particular, we show that our procedure comes with certificates of optimality, achieving (in some scenarios) faster rates of convergence than empirical risk minimization by virtue of automatically balancing bias and variance. We give corroborating empirical evidence showing that in practice, the estimator indeed trades between variance and absolute performance on a training sample, improving out-of-sample (test) performance over standard empirical risk minimization for a number of classification problems.