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In black-box adversarial attacks, adversaries query the deep neural network (DNN), use the output to reconstruct gradients, and then optimize the adversarial inputs iteratively. In this paper, we study the method of adding white noise to the DNN output to mitigate such attacks, with a unique focus on the trade-off analysis of noise level and query cost. The attacker's query count (QC) is derived mathematically as a function of noise standard deviation. With this result, the defender can conveniently find the noise level needed to mitigate attacks for the desired security level specified by QC and limited DNN performance loss. Our analysis shows that the added noise is drastically magnified by the small variation of DNN outputs, which makes the reconstructed gradient have an extremely low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Adding slight white noise with a standard deviation less than 0.01 is enough to increase QC by many orders of magnitude without introducing any noticeable classification accuracy reduction. Our experiments demonstrate that this method can effectively mitigate both soft-label and hard-label black-box attacks under realistic QC constraints. We also show that this method outperforms many other defense methods and is robust to the attacker's countermeasures.

Natural language processing (NLP) systems have been proven to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, whereby hidden features (backdoors) are trained into a language model and may only be activated by specific inputs (called triggers), to trick the model into producing unexpected behaviors. In this paper, we create covert and natural triggers for textual backdoor attacks, \textit{hidden backdoors}, where triggers can fool both modern language models and human inspection. We deploy our hidden backdoors through two state-of-the-art trigger embedding methods. The first approach via homograph replacement, embeds the trigger into deep neural networks through the visual spoofing of lookalike character replacement. The second approach uses subtle differences between text generated by language models and real natural text to produce trigger sentences with correct grammar and high fluency. We demonstrate that the proposed hidden backdoors can be effective across three downstream security-critical NLP tasks, representative of modern human-centric NLP systems, including toxic comment detection, neural machine translation (NMT), and question answering (QA). Our two hidden backdoor attacks can achieve an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of at least $97\%$ with an injection rate of only $3\%$ in toxic comment detection, $95.1\%$ ASR in NMT with less than $0.5\%$ injected data, and finally $91.12\%$ ASR against QA updated with only 27 poisoning data samples on a model previously trained with 92,024 samples (0.029\%). We are able to demonstrate the adversary's high success rate of attacks, while maintaining functionality for regular users, with triggers inconspicuous by the human administrators.

Deep learning has brought great progress for the sequential recommendation (SR) tasks. With advanced network architectures, sequential recommender models can be stacked with many hidden layers, e.g., up to 100 layers on real-world recommendation datasets. Training such a deep network is difficult because it can be computationally very expensive and takes much longer time, especially in situations where there are tens of billions of user-item interactions. To deal with such a challenge, we present StackRec, a simple, yet very effective and efficient training framework for deep SR models by iterative layer stacking. Specifically, we first offer an important insight that hidden layers/blocks in a well-trained deep SR model have very similar distributions. Enlightened by this, we propose the stacking operation on the pre-trained layers/blocks to transfer knowledge from a shallower model to a deep model, then we perform iterative stacking so as to yield a much deeper but easier-to-train SR model. We validate the performance of StackRec by instantiating it with four state-of-the-art SR models in three practical scenarios with real-world datasets. Extensive experiments show that StackRec achieves not only comparable performance, but also substantial acceleration in training time, compared to SR models that are trained from scratch. Codes are available at //github.com/wangjiachun0426/StackRec.

Because of the superior feature representation ability of deep learning, various deep Click-Through Rate (CTR) models are deployed in the commercial systems by industrial companies. To achieve better performance, it is necessary to train the deep CTR models on huge volume of training data efficiently, which makes speeding up the training process an essential problem. Different from the models with dense training data, the training data for CTR models is usually high-dimensional and sparse. To transform the high-dimensional sparse input into low-dimensional dense real-value vectors, almost all deep CTR models adopt the embedding layer, which easily reaches hundreds of GB or even TB. Since a single GPU cannot afford to accommodate all the embedding parameters, when performing distributed training, it is not reasonable to conduct the data-parallelism only. Therefore, existing distributed training platforms for recommendation adopt model-parallelism. Specifically, they use CPU (Host) memory of servers to maintain and update the embedding parameters and utilize GPU worker to conduct forward and backward computations. Unfortunately, these platforms suffer from two bottlenecks: (1) the latency of pull \& push operations between Host and GPU; (2) parameters update and synchronization in the CPU servers. To address such bottlenecks, in this paper, we propose the ScaleFreeCTR: a MixCache-based distributed training system for CTR models. Specifically, in SFCTR, we also store huge embedding table in CPU but utilize GPU instead of CPU to conduct embedding synchronization efficiently. To reduce the latency of data transfer between both GPU-Host and GPU-GPU, the MixCache mechanism and Virtual Sparse Id operation are proposed. Comprehensive experiments and ablation studies are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of SFCTR.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known vulnerable to backdoor attacks, a training time attack that injects a trigger pattern into a small proportion of training data so as to control the model's prediction at the test time. Backdoor attacks are notably dangerous since they do not affect the model's performance on clean examples, yet can fool the model to make incorrect prediction whenever the trigger pattern appears during testing. In this paper, we propose a novel defense framework Neural Attention Distillation (NAD) to erase backdoor triggers from backdoored DNNs. NAD utilizes a teacher network to guide the finetuning of the backdoored student network on a small clean subset of data such that the intermediate-layer attention of the student network aligns with that of the teacher network. The teacher network can be obtained by an independent finetuning process on the same clean subset. We empirically show, against 6 state-of-the-art backdoor attacks, NAD can effectively erase the backdoor triggers using only 5\% clean training data without causing obvious performance degradation on clean examples. Code is available in //github.com/bboylyg/NAD.

Recently, NLP has seen a surge in the usage of large pre-trained models. Users download weights of models pre-trained on large datasets, then fine-tune the weights on a task of their choice. This raises the question of whether downloading untrusted pre-trained weights can pose a security threat. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct ``weight poisoning'' attacks where pre-trained weights are injected with vulnerabilities that expose ``backdoors'' after fine-tuning, enabling the attacker to manipulate the model prediction simply by injecting an arbitrary keyword. We show that by applying a regularization method, which we call RIPPLe, and an initialization procedure, which we call Embedding Surgery, such attacks are possible even with limited knowledge of the dataset and fine-tuning procedure. Our experiments on sentiment classification, toxicity detection, and spam detection show that this attack is widely applicable and poses a serious threat. Finally, we outline practical defenses against such attacks. Code to reproduce our experiments is available at //github.com/neulab/RIPPLe.

There has been an ongoing cycle where stronger defenses against adversarial attacks are subsequently broken by a more advanced defense-aware attack. We present a new approach towards ending this cycle where we "deflect'' adversarial attacks by causing the attacker to produce an input that semantically resembles the attack's target class. To this end, we first propose a stronger defense based on Capsule Networks that combines three detection mechanisms to achieve state-of-the-art detection performance on both standard and defense-aware attacks. We then show that undetected attacks against our defense often perceptually resemble the adversarial target class by performing a human study where participants are asked to label images produced by the attack. These attack images can no longer be called "adversarial'' because our network classifies them the same way as humans do.

The demand for artificial intelligence has grown significantly over the last decade and this growth has been fueled by advances in machine learning techniques and the ability to leverage hardware acceleration. However, in order to increase the quality of predictions and render machine learning solutions feasible for more complex applications, a substantial amount of training data is required. Although small machine learning models can be trained with modest amounts of data, the input for training larger models such as neural networks grows exponentially with the number of parameters. Since the demand for processing training data has outpaced the increase in computation power of computing machinery, there is a need for distributing the machine learning workload across multiple machines, and turning the centralized into a distributed system. These distributed systems present new challenges, first and foremost the efficient parallelization of the training process and the creation of a coherent model. This article provides an extensive overview of the current state-of-the-art in the field by outlining the challenges and opportunities of distributed machine learning over conventional (centralized) machine learning, discussing the techniques used for distributed machine learning, and providing an overview of the systems that are available.

In federated learning, multiple client devices jointly learn a machine learning model: each client device maintains a local model for its local training dataset, while a master device maintains a global model via aggregating the local models from the client devices. The machine learning community recently proposed several federated learning methods that were claimed to be robust against Byzantine failures (e.g., system failures, adversarial manipulations) of certain client devices. In this work, we perform the first systematic study on local model poisoning attacks to federated learning. We assume an attacker has compromised some client devices, and the attacker manipulates the local model parameters on the compromised client devices during the learning process such that the global model has a large testing error rate. We formulate our attacks as optimization problems and apply our attacks to four recent Byzantine-robust federated learning methods. Our empirical results on four real-world datasets show that our attacks can substantially increase the error rates of the models learnt by the federated learning methods that were claimed to be robust against Byzantine failures of some client devices. We generalize two defenses for data poisoning attacks to defend against our local model poisoning attacks. Our evaluation results show that one defense can effectively defend against our attacks in some cases, but the defenses are not effective enough in other cases, highlighting the need for new defenses against our local model poisoning attacks to federated learning.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has advanced greatly in the past few years with the employment of effective deep neural networks (DNNs) on the policy networks. With the great effectiveness came serious vulnerability issues with DNNs that small adversarial perturbations on the input can change the output of the network. Several works have pointed out that learned agents with a DNN policy network can be manipulated against achieving the original task through a sequence of small perturbations on the input states. In this paper, we demonstrate furthermore that it is also possible to impose an arbitrary adversarial reward on the victim policy network through a sequence of attacks. Our method involves the latest adversarial attack technique, Adversarial Transformer Network (ATN), that learns to generate the attack and is easy to integrate into the policy network. As a result of our attack, the victim agent is misguided to optimise for the adversarial reward over time. Our results expose serious security threats for RL applications in safety-critical systems including drones, medical analysis, and self-driving cars.