This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a generalization of the Aumann et al. [1] two-player zero-sum one-sided incomplete information model. Under a correlated prior, the informed player faces the problem of how to optimally disclose information among two uninformed players in order to maximize his long-term average payoffs. Our objective is to understand the adverse effects of \information spillover" from one game to the other in the equilibrium payoff set of the informed player. We provide conditions under which the informed player can fully overcome such adverse effects and characterize equilibrium payoffs. In a second result, we show how the effects of information spillover on the equilibrium payoff set of the informed player might be severe.
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We provide a new information-theoretic generalization error bound that is exactly tight (i.e., matching even the constant) for the canonical quadratic Gaussian mean estimation problem. Despite considerable existing efforts in deriving information-theoretic generalization error bounds, applying them to this simple setting where sample average is used as the estimate of the mean value of Gaussian data has not yielded satisfying results. In fact, most existing bounds are order-wise loose in this setting, which has raised concerns about the fundamental capability of information-theoretic bounds in reasoning the generalization behavior for machine learning. The proposed new bound adopts the individual-sample-based approach proposed by Bu et al., but also has several key new ingredients. Firstly, instead of applying the change of measure inequality on the loss function, we apply it to the generalization error function itself; secondly, the bound is derived in a conditional manner; lastly, a reference distribution, which bears a certain similarity to the prior distribution in the Bayesian setting, is introduced. The combination of these components produces a general KL-divergence-based generalization error bound. We further show that although the conditional bounding and the reference distribution can make the bound exactly tight, removing them does not significantly degrade the bound, which leads to a mutual-information-based bound that is also asymptotically tight in this setting.
Pulse timing is an important topic in nuclear instrumentation, with far-reaching applications from high energy physics to radiation imaging. While high-speed analog-to-digital converters become more and more developed and accessible, their potential uses and merits in nuclear detector signal processing are still uncertain, partially due to associated timing algorithms which are not fully understood and utilized. In this paper, we propose a novel method based on deep learning for timing analysis of modularized nuclear detectors without explicit needs of labelling event data. By taking advantage of the inner time correlation of individual detectors, a label-free loss function with a specially designed regularizer is formed to supervise the training of neural networks towards a meaningful and accurate mapping function. We mathematically demonstrate the existence of the optimal function desired by the method, and give a systematic algorithm for training and calibration of the model. The proposed method is validated on two experimental datasets. In the toy experiment, the neural network model achieves the single-channel time resolution of 8.8 ps and exhibits robustness against concept drift in the dataset. In the electromagnetic calorimeter experiment, several neural network models (FC, CNN and LSTM) are tested to show their conformance to the underlying physical constraint and to judge their performance against traditional methods. In total, the proposed method works well in either ideal or noisy experimental condition and recovers the time information from waveform samples successfully and precisely.
We propose the first online quantum algorithm for zero-sum games with $\tilde O(1)$ regret under the game setting. Moreover, our quantum algorithm computes an $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium of an $m \times n$ matrix zero-sum game in quantum time $\tilde O(\sqrt{m+n}/\varepsilon^{2.5})$, yielding a quadratic improvement over classical algorithms in terms of $m, n$. Our algorithm uses standard quantum inputs and generates classical outputs with succinct descriptions, facilitating end-to-end applications. As an application, we obtain a fast quantum linear programming solver. Technically, our online quantum algorithm "quantizes" classical algorithms based on the optimistic multiplicative weight update method. At the heart of our algorithm is a fast quantum multi-sampling procedure for the Gibbs sampling problem, which may be of independent interest.
Recent advances in quantum computing and in particular, the introduction of quantum GANs, have led to increased interest in quantum zero-sum game theory, extending the scope of learning algorithms for classical games into the quantum realm. In this paper, we focus on learning in quantum zero-sum games under Matrix Multiplicative Weights Update (a generalization of the multiplicative weights update method) and its continuous analogue, Quantum Replicator Dynamics. When each player selects their state according to quantum replicator dynamics, we show that the system exhibits conservation laws in a quantum-information theoretic sense. Moreover, we show that the system exhibits Poincare recurrence, meaning that almost all orbits return arbitrarily close to their initial conditions infinitely often. Our analysis generalizes previous results in the case of classical games.
In many real-world settings agents engage in strategic interactions with multiple opposing agents who can employ a wide variety of strategies. The standard approach for designing agents for such settings is to compute or approximate a relevant game-theoretic solution concept such as Nash equilibrium and then follow the prescribed strategy. However, such a strategy ignores any observations of opponents' play, which may indicate shortcomings that can be exploited. We present an approach for opponent modeling in multiplayer imperfect-information games where we collect observations of opponents' play through repeated interactions. We run experiments against a wide variety of real opponents and exact Nash equilibrium strategies in three-player Kuhn poker and show that our algorithm significantly outperforms all of the agents, including the exact Nash equilibrium strategies.
Game theory has by now found numerous applications in various fields, including economics, industry, jurisprudence, and artificial intelligence, where each player only cares about its own interest in a noncooperative or cooperative manner, but without obvious malice to other players. However, in many practical applications, such as poker, chess, evader pursuing, drug interdiction, coast guard, cyber-security, and national defense, players often have apparently adversarial stances, that is, selfish actions of each player inevitably or intentionally inflict loss or wreak havoc on other players. Along this line, this paper provides a systematic survey on three main game models widely employed in adversarial games, i.e., zero-sum normal-form and extensive-form games, Stackelberg (security) games, zero-sum differential games, from an array of perspectives, including basic knowledge of game models, (approximate) equilibrium concepts, problem classifications, research frontiers, (approximate) optimal strategy seeking techniques, prevailing algorithms, and practical applications. Finally, promising future research directions are also discussed for relevant adversarial games.
Emotion recognition in conversation (ERC) aims to detect the emotion label for each utterance. Motivated by recent studies which have proven that feeding training examples in a meaningful order rather than considering them randomly can boost the performance of models, we propose an ERC-oriented hybrid curriculum learning framework. Our framework consists of two curricula: (1) conversation-level curriculum (CC); and (2) utterance-level curriculum (UC). In CC, we construct a difficulty measurer based on "emotion shift" frequency within a conversation, then the conversations are scheduled in an "easy to hard" schema according to the difficulty score returned by the difficulty measurer. For UC, it is implemented from an emotion-similarity perspective, which progressively strengthens the model's ability in identifying the confusing emotions. With the proposed model-agnostic hybrid curriculum learning strategy, we observe significant performance boosts over a wide range of existing ERC models and we are able to achieve new state-of-the-art results on four public ERC datasets.
Recent years have witnessed significant advances in technologies and services in modern network applications, including smart grid management, wireless communication, cybersecurity as well as multi-agent autonomous systems. Considering the heterogeneous nature of networked entities, emerging network applications call for game-theoretic models and learning-based approaches in order to create distributed network intelligence that responds to uncertainties and disruptions in a dynamic or an adversarial environment. This paper articulates the confluence of networks, games and learning, which establishes a theoretical underpinning for understanding multi-agent decision-making over networks. We provide an selective overview of game-theoretic learning algorithms within the framework of stochastic approximation theory, and associated applications in some representative contexts of modern network systems, such as the next generation wireless communication networks, the smart grid and distributed machine learning. In addition to existing research works on game-theoretic learning over networks, we highlight several new angles and research endeavors on learning in games that are related to recent developments in artificial intelligence. Some of the new angles extrapolate from our own research interests. The overall objective of the paper is to provide the reader a clear picture of the strengths and challenges of adopting game-theoretic learning methods within the context of network systems, and further to identify fruitful future research directions on both theoretical and applied studies.
Recent advances in maximizing mutual information (MI) between the source and target have demonstrated its effectiveness in text generation. However, previous works paid little attention to modeling the backward network of MI (i.e., dependency from the target to the source), which is crucial to the tightness of the variational information maximization lower bound. In this paper, we propose Adversarial Mutual Information (AMI): a text generation framework which is formed as a novel saddle point (min-max) optimization aiming to identify joint interactions between the source and target. Within this framework, the forward and backward networks are able to iteratively promote or demote each other's generated instances by comparing the real and synthetic data distributions. We also develop a latent noise sampling strategy that leverages random variations at the high-level semantic space to enhance the long term dependency in the generation process. Extensive experiments based on different text generation tasks demonstrate that the proposed AMI framework can significantly outperform several strong baselines, and we also show that AMI has potential to lead to a tighter lower bound of maximum mutual information for the variational information maximization problem.
We propose a new method for event extraction (EE) task based on an imitation learning framework, specifically, inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) via generative adversarial network (GAN). The GAN estimates proper rewards according to the difference between the actions committed by the expert (or ground truth) and the agent among complicated states in the environment. EE task benefits from these dynamic rewards because instances and labels yield to various extents of difficulty and the gains are expected to be diverse -- e.g., an ambiguous but correctly detected trigger or argument should receive high gains -- while the traditional RL models usually neglect such differences and pay equal attention on all instances. Moreover, our experiments also demonstrate that the proposed framework outperforms state-of-the-art methods, without explicit feature engineering.
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