In a two-player zero-sum graph game, the players move a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite play, which determines the winner of the game. \emph{Bidding games} are graph games in which in each turn, an auction (bidding) determines which player moves the token: the players have budgets, and in each turn, both players simultaneously submit bids that do not exceed their available budgets, the higher bidder moves the token, and pays the bid to the lower bidder (called {\em Richman} bidding). We focus on {\em discrete}-bidding games, in which, motivated by practical applications, the granularity of the players' bids is restricted, e.g., bids must be given in cents. A central quantity in bidding games is are {\em threshold budgets}: a necessary and sufficient initial budget for winning the game. Previously, thresholds were shown to exist in parity games, but their structure was only understood for reachability games. Moreover, the previously-known algorithms have a worst-case exponential running time for both reachability and parity objectives, and output strategies that use exponential memory. We describe two algorithms for finding threshold budgets in parity discrete-bidding games. The first is a fixed-point algorithm. It reveals, for the first time, the structure of threshold budgets in parity discrete-bidding games. Based on this structure, we develop a second algorithm that shows that the problem of finding threshold budgets is in \NP and co\NP for both reachability and parity objectives. Moreover, our algorithm constructs strategies that use only linear memory.
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A mediator observes no-regret learners playing an extensive-form game repeatedly across $T$ rounds. The mediator attempts to steer players toward some desirable predetermined equilibrium by giving (nonnegative) payments to players. We call this the steering problem. The steering problem captures problems several problems of interest, among them equilibrium selection and information design (persuasion). If the mediator's budget is unbounded, steering is trivial because the mediator can simply pay the players to play desirable actions. We study two bounds on the mediator's payments: a total budget and a per-round budget. If the mediator's total budget does not grow with $T$, we show that steering is impossible. However, we show that it is enough for the total budget to grow sublinearly with $T$, that is, for the average payment to vanish. When players' full strategies are observed at each round, we show that constant per-round budgets permit steering. In the more challenging setting where only trajectories through the game tree are observable, we show that steering is impossible with constant per-round budgets in general extensive-form games, but possible in normal-form games or if the per-round budget may itself depend on $T$. We also show how our results can be generalized to the case when the equilibrium is being computed online while steering is happening. We supplement our theoretical positive results with experiments highlighting the efficacy of steering in large games.
Learning in games considers how multiple agents maximize their own rewards through repeated games. Memory, an ability that an agent changes his/her action depending on the history of actions in previous games, is often introduced into learning to explore more clever strategies and discuss the decision-making of real agents like humans. However, such games with memory are hard to analyze because they exhibit complex phenomena like chaotic dynamics or divergence from Nash equilibrium. In particular, how asymmetry in memory capacities between agents affects learning in games is still unclear. In response, this study formulates a gradient ascent algorithm in games with asymmetry memory capacities. To obtain theoretical insights into learning dynamics, we first consider a simple case of zero-sum games. We observe complex behavior, where learning dynamics draw a heteroclinic connection from unstable fixed points to stable ones. Despite this complexity, we analyze learning dynamics and prove local convergence to these stable fixed points, i.e., the Nash equilibria. We identify the mechanism driving this convergence: an agent with a longer memory learns to exploit the other, which in turn endows the other's utility function with strict concavity. We further numerically observe such convergence in various initial strategies, action numbers, and memory lengths. This study reveals a novel phenomenon due to memory asymmetry, providing fundamental strides in learning in games and new insights into computing equilibria.
Contextual bandits constitute a classical framework for decision-making under uncertainty. In this setting, the goal is to learn the arms of highest reward subject to contextual information, while the unknown reward parameters of each arm need to be learned by experimenting that specific arm. Accordingly, a fundamental problem is that of balancing exploration (i.e., pulling different arms to learn their parameters), versus exploitation (i.e., pulling the best arms to gain reward). To study this problem, the existing literature mostly considers perfectly observed contexts. However, the setting of partial context observations remains unexplored to date, despite being theoretically more general and practically more versatile. We study bandit policies for learning to select optimal arms based on the data of observations, which are noisy linear functions of the unobserved context vectors. Our theoretical analysis shows that the Thompson sampling policy successfully balances exploration and exploitation. Specifically, we establish the followings: (i) regret bounds that grow poly-logarithmically with time, (ii) square-root consistency of parameter estimation, and (iii) scaling of the regret with other quantities including dimensions and number of arms. Extensive numerical experiments with both real and synthetic data are presented as well, corroborating the efficacy of Thompson sampling. To establish the results, we introduce novel martingale techniques and concentration inequalities to address partially observed dependent random variables generated from unspecified distributions, and also leverage problem-dependent information to sharpen probabilistic bounds for time-varying suboptimality gaps. These techniques pave the road towards studying other decision-making problems with contextual information as well as partial observations.
Existing approaches to video understanding, mainly designed for short videos from a third-person perspective, are limited in their applicability in certain fields, such as robotics. In this paper, we delve into open-ended question-answering (QA) in long, egocentric videos, which allows individuals or robots to inquire about their own past visual experiences. This task presents unique challenges, including the complexity of temporally grounding queries within extensive video content, the high resource demands for precise data annotation, and the inherent difficulty of evaluating open-ended answers due to their ambiguous nature. Our proposed approach tackles these challenges by (i) integrating query grounding and answering within a unified model to reduce error propagation; (ii) employing large language models for efficient and scalable data synthesis; and (iii) introducing a close-ended QA task for evaluation, to manage answer ambiguity. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, which also achieves state-of-the-art performance on the QAEgo4D and Ego4D-NLQ benchmarks. Code, data, and models are available at //github.com/Becomebright/GroundVQA.
The work of neural retrieval so far focuses on ranking short texts and is challenged with long documents. There are many cases where the users want to find a relevant passage within a long document from a huge corpus, e.g. Wikipedia articles, research papers, etc. We propose and name this task \emph{Document-Aware Passage Retrieval} (DAPR). While analyzing the errors of the State-of-The-Art (SoTA) passage retrievers, we find the major errors (53.5\%) are due to missing document context. This drives us to build a benchmark for this task including multiple datasets from heterogeneous domains. In the experiments, we extend the SoTA passage retrievers with document context via (1) hybrid retrieval with BM25 and (2) contextualized passage representations, which inform the passage representation with document context. We find despite that hybrid retrieval performs the strongest on the mixture of the easy and the hard queries, it completely fails on the hard queries that require document-context understanding. On the other hand, contextualized passage representations (e.g. prepending document titles) achieve good improvement on these hard queries, but overall they also perform rather poorly. Our created benchmark enables future research on developing and comparing retrieval systems for the new task. The code and the data are available at //github.com/UKPLab/arxiv2023-dapr.
A mediator observes no-regret learners playing an extensive-form game repeatedly across $T$ rounds. The mediator attempts to steer players toward some desirable predetermined equilibrium by giving (nonnegative) payments to players. We call this the steering problem. The steering problem captures problems several problems of interest, among them equilibrium selection and information design (persuasion). If the mediator's budget is unbounded, steering is trivial because the mediator can simply pay the players to play desirable actions. We study two bounds on the mediator's payments: a total budget and a per-round budget. If the mediator's total budget does not grow with $T$, we show that steering is impossible. However, we show that it is enough for the total budget to grow sublinearly with $T$, that is, for the average payment to vanish. When players' full strategies are observed at each round, we show that constant per-round budgets permit steering. In the more challenging setting where only trajectories through the game tree are observable, we show that steering is impossible with constant per-round budgets in general extensive-form games, but possible in normal-form games or if the per-round budget may itself depend on $T$. We also show how our results can be generalized to the case when the equilibrium is being computed online while steering is happening. We supplement our theoretical positive results with experiments highlighting the efficacy of steering in large games.
Promoting behavioural diversity is critical for solving games with non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). Yet, there is a lack of rigorous treatment for defining diversity and constructing diversity-aware learning dynamics. In this work, we offer a geometric interpretation of behavioural diversity in games and introduce a novel diversity metric based on \emph{determinantal point processes} (DPP). By incorporating the diversity metric into best-response dynamics, we develop \emph{diverse fictitious play} and \emph{diverse policy-space response oracle} for solving normal-form games and open-ended games. We prove the uniqueness of the diverse best response and the convergence of our algorithms on two-player games. Importantly, we show that maximising the DPP-based diversity metric guarantees to enlarge the \emph{gamescape} -- convex polytopes spanned by agents' mixtures of strategies. To validate our diversity-aware solvers, we test on tens of games that show strong non-transitivity. Results suggest that our methods achieve much lower exploitability than state-of-the-art solvers by finding effective and diverse strategies.
Machine learning plays a role in many deployed decision systems, often in ways that are difficult or impossible to understand by human stakeholders. Explaining, in a human-understandable way, the relationship between the input and output of machine learning models is essential to the development of trustworthy machine-learning-based systems. A burgeoning body of research seeks to define the goals and methods of explainability in machine learning. In this paper, we seek to review and categorize research on counterfactual explanations, a specific class of explanation that provides a link between what could have happened had input to a model been changed in a particular way. Modern approaches to counterfactual explainability in machine learning draw connections to the established legal doctrine in many countries, making them appealing to fielded systems in high-impact areas such as finance and healthcare. Thus, we design a rubric with desirable properties of counterfactual explanation algorithms and comprehensively evaluate all currently-proposed algorithms against that rubric. Our rubric provides easy comparison and comprehension of the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches and serves as an introduction to major research themes in this field. We also identify gaps and discuss promising research directions in the space of counterfactual explainability.
Emotion plays an important role in detecting fake news online. When leveraging emotional signals, the existing methods focus on exploiting the emotions of news contents that conveyed by the publishers (i.e., publisher emotion). However, fake news is always fabricated to evoke high-arousal or activating emotions of people to spread like a virus, so the emotions of news comments that aroused by the crowd (i.e., social emotion) can not be ignored. Furthermore, it needs to be explored whether there exists a relationship between publisher emotion and social emotion (i.e., dual emotion), and how the dual emotion appears in fake news. In the paper, we propose Dual Emotion Features to mine dual emotion and the relationship between them for fake news detection. And we design a universal paradigm to plug it into any existing detectors as an enhancement. Experimental results on three real-world datasets indicate the effectiveness of the proposed features.
Learning with limited data is a key challenge for visual recognition. Few-shot learning methods address this challenge by learning an instance embedding function from seen classes and apply the function to instances from unseen classes with limited labels. This style of transfer learning is task-agnostic: the embedding function is not learned optimally discriminative with respect to the unseen classes, where discerning among them is the target task. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to adapt the embedding model to the target classification task, yielding embeddings that are task-specific and are discriminative. To this end, we employ a type of self-attention mechanism called Transformer to transform the embeddings from task-agnostic to task-specific by focusing on relating instances from the test instances to the training instances in both seen and unseen classes. Our approach also extends to both transductive and generalized few-shot classification, two important settings that have essential use cases. We verify the effectiveness of our model on two standard benchmark few-shot classification datasets --- MiniImageNet and CUB, where our approach demonstrates state-of-the-art empirical performance.
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