Recent research has demonstrated that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. Therefore, it is imperative to evaluate the resilience of advanced DNNs to adversarial attacks. However, traditional methods that use stickers as physical perturbations to deceive classifiers face challenges in achieving stealthiness and are susceptible to printing loss. Recently, advancements in physical attacks have utilized light beams, such as lasers, to perform attacks, where the optical patterns generated are artificial rather than natural. In this work, we propose a black-box projector-based physical attack, referred to as adversarial color projection (AdvCP), which manipulates the physical parameters of color projection to perform an adversarial attack. We evaluate our approach on three crucial criteria: effectiveness, stealthiness, and robustness. In the digital environment, we achieve an attack success rate of 97.60% on a subset of ImageNet, while in the physical environment, we attain an attack success rate of 100% in the indoor test and 82.14% in the outdoor test. The adversarial samples generated by AdvCP are compared with baseline samples to demonstrate the stealthiness of our approach. When attacking advanced DNNs, experimental results show that our method can achieve more than 85% attack success rate in all cases, which verifies the robustness of AdvCP. Finally, we consider the potential threats posed by AdvCP to future vision-based systems and applications and suggest some ideas for light-based physical attacks.
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Deep learning technology has made great achievements in the field of image. In order to defend against malware attacks, researchers have proposed many Windows malware detection models based on deep learning. However, deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial example attacks. Malware can generate adversarial malware with the same malicious function to attack the malware detection model and evade detection of the model. Currently, many adversarial defense studies have been proposed, but existing adversarial defense studies are based on image sample and cannot be directly applied to malware sample. Therefore, this paper proposes an adversarial malware defense method based on adversarial training. This method uses preprocessing to defend simple adversarial examples to reduce the difficulty of adversarial training. Moreover, this method improves the adversarial defense capability of the model through adversarial training. We experimented with three attack methods in two sets of datasets, and the results show that the method in this paper can improve the adversarial defense capability of the model without reducing the accuracy of the model.
Medical image classification is a challenging task due to the scarcity of labeled samples and class imbalance caused by the high variance in disease prevalence. Semi-supervised learning (SSL) methods can mitigate these challenges by leveraging both labeled and unlabeled data. However, SSL methods for medical image classification need to address two key challenges: (1) estimating reliable pseudo-labels for the images in the unlabeled dataset and (2) reducing biases caused by class imbalance. In this paper, we propose a novel SSL approach, SPLAL, that effectively addresses these challenges. SPLAL leverages class prototypes and a weighted combination of classifiers to predict reliable pseudo-labels over a subset of unlabeled images. Additionally, we introduce alignment loss to mitigate model biases toward majority classes. To evaluate the performance of our proposed approach, we conduct experiments on two publicly available medical image classification benchmark datasets: the skin lesion classification (ISIC 2018) and the blood cell classification dataset (BCCD). The experimental results empirically demonstrate that our approach outperforms several state-of-the-art SSL methods over various evaluation metrics. Specifically, our proposed approach achieves a significant improvement over the state-of-the-art approach on the ISIC 2018 dataset in both Accuracy and F1 score, with relative margins of 2.24\% and 11.40\%, respectively. Finally, we conduct extensive ablation experiments to examine the contribution of different components of our approach, validating its effectiveness.
Model overconfidence and poor calibration are common in machine learning and difficult to account for when applying standard empirical risk minimization. In this work, we propose a novel method to alleviate these problems that we call odd-$k$-out learning (OKO), which minimizes the cross-entropy error for sets rather than for single examples. This naturally allows the model to capture correlations across data examples and achieves both better accuracy and calibration, especially in limited training data and class-imbalanced regimes. Perhaps surprisingly, OKO often yields better calibration even when training with hard labels and dropping any additional calibration parameter tuning, such as temperature scaling. We provide theoretical justification, establishing that OKO naturally yields better calibration, and provide extensive experimental analyses that corroborate our theoretical findings. We emphasize that OKO is a general framework that can be easily adapted to many settings and the trained model can be applied to single examples at inference time, without introducing significant run-time overhead or architecture changes.
Vulnerability to adversarial attacks is one of the principal hurdles to the adoption of deep learning in safety-critical applications. Despite significant efforts, both practical and theoretical, training deep learning models robust to adversarial attacks is still an open problem. In this paper, we analyse the geometry of adversarial attacks in the large-data, overparameterized limit for Bayesian Neural Networks (BNNs). We show that, in the limit, vulnerability to gradient-based attacks arises as a result of degeneracy in the data distribution, i.e., when the data lies on a lower-dimensional submanifold of the ambient space. As a direct consequence, we demonstrate that in this limit BNN posteriors are robust to gradient-based adversarial attacks. Crucially, we prove that the expected gradient of the loss with respect to the BNN posterior distribution is vanishing, even when each neural network sampled from the posterior is vulnerable to gradient-based attacks. Experimental results on the MNIST, Fashion MNIST, and half moons datasets, representing the finite data regime, with BNNs trained with Hamiltonian Monte Carlo and Variational Inference, support this line of arguments, showing that BNNs can display both high accuracy on clean data and robustness to both gradient-based and gradient-free based adversarial attacks.
Adversarial attacks have the potential to mislead deep neural network classifiers by introducing slight perturbations. Developing algorithms that can mitigate the effects of these attacks is crucial for ensuring the safe use of artificial intelligence. Recent studies have suggested that score-based diffusion models are effective in adversarial defenses. However, existing diffusion-based defenses rely on the sequential simulation of the reversed stochastic differential equations of diffusion models, which are computationally inefficient and yield suboptimal results. In this paper, we introduce a novel adversarial defense scheme named ScoreOpt, which optimizes adversarial samples at test-time, towards original clean data in the direction guided by score-based priors. We conduct comprehensive experiments on multiple datasets, including CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and ImageNet. Our experimental results demonstrate that our approach outperforms existing adversarial defenses in terms of both robustness performance and inference speed.
We explore Reconstruction Robustness (ReRo), which was recently proposed as an upper bound on the success of data reconstruction attacks against machine learning models. Previous research has demonstrated that differential privacy (DP) mechanisms also provide ReRo, but so far, only asymptotic Monte Carlo estimates of a tight ReRo bound have been shown. Directly computable ReRo bounds for general DP mechanisms are thus desirable. In this work, we establish a connection between hypothesis testing DP and ReRo and derive closed-form, analytic or numerical ReRo bounds for the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms and their subsampled variants.
Adversarial attack is a technique for deceiving Machine Learning (ML) models, which provides a way to evaluate the adversarial robustness. In practice, attack algorithms are artificially selected and tuned by human experts to break a ML system. However, manual selection of attackers tends to be sub-optimal, leading to a mistakenly assessment of model security. In this paper, a new procedure called Composite Adversarial Attack (CAA) is proposed for automatically searching the best combination of attack algorithms and their hyper-parameters from a candidate pool of \textbf{32 base attackers}. We design a search space where attack policy is represented as an attacking sequence, i.e., the output of the previous attacker is used as the initialization input for successors. Multi-objective NSGA-II genetic algorithm is adopted for finding the strongest attack policy with minimum complexity. The experimental result shows CAA beats 10 top attackers on 11 diverse defenses with less elapsed time (\textbf{6 $\times$ faster than AutoAttack}), and achieves the new state-of-the-art on $l_{\infty}$, $l_{2}$ and unrestricted adversarial attacks.
While existing work in robust deep learning has focused on small pixel-level $\ell_p$ norm-based perturbations, this may not account for perturbations encountered in several real world settings. In many such cases although test data might not be available, broad specifications about the types of perturbations (such as an unknown degree of rotation) may be known. We consider a setup where robustness is expected over an unseen test domain that is not i.i.d. but deviates from the training domain. While this deviation may not be exactly known, its broad characterization is specified a priori, in terms of attributes. We propose an adversarial training approach which learns to generate new samples so as to maximize exposure of the classifier to the attributes-space, without having access to the data from the test domain. Our adversarial training solves a min-max optimization problem, with the inner maximization generating adversarial perturbations, and the outer minimization finding model parameters by optimizing the loss on adversarial perturbations generated from the inner maximization. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach on three types of naturally occurring perturbations -- object-related shifts, geometric transformations, and common image corruptions. Our approach enables deep neural networks to be robust against a wide range of naturally occurring perturbations. We demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed approach by showing the robustness gains of deep neural networks trained using our adversarial training on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and a new variant of the CLEVR dataset.
Adversarial attacks to image classification systems present challenges to convolutional networks and opportunities for understanding them. This study suggests that adversarial perturbations on images lead to noise in the features constructed by these networks. Motivated by this observation, we develop new network architectures that increase adversarial robustness by performing feature denoising. Specifically, our networks contain blocks that denoise the features using non-local means or other filters; the entire networks are trained end-to-end. When combined with adversarial training, our feature denoising networks substantially improve the state-of-the-art in adversarial robustness in both white-box and black-box attack settings. On ImageNet, under 10-iteration PGD white-box attacks where prior art has 27.9% accuracy, our method achieves 55.7%; even under extreme 2000-iteration PGD white-box attacks, our method secures 42.6% accuracy. A network based on our method was ranked first in Competition on Adversarial Attacks and Defenses (CAAD) 2018 --- it achieved 50.6% classification accuracy on a secret, ImageNet-like test dataset against 48 unknown attackers, surpassing the runner-up approach by ~10%. Code and models will be made publicly available.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples resulting from adding small-magnitude perturbations to inputs. Such adversarial examples can mislead DNNs to produce adversary-selected results. Different attack strategies have been proposed to generate adversarial examples, but how to produce them with high perceptual quality and more efficiently requires more research efforts. In this paper, we propose AdvGAN to generate adversarial examples with generative adversarial networks (GANs), which can learn and approximate the distribution of original instances. For AdvGAN, once the generator is trained, it can generate adversarial perturbations efficiently for any instance, so as to potentially accelerate adversarial training as defenses. We apply AdvGAN in both semi-whitebox and black-box attack settings. In semi-whitebox attacks, there is no need to access the original target model after the generator is trained, in contrast to traditional white-box attacks. In black-box attacks, we dynamically train a distilled model for the black-box model and optimize the generator accordingly. Adversarial examples generated by AdvGAN on different target models have high attack success rate under state-of-the-art defenses compared to other attacks. Our attack has placed the first with 92.76% accuracy on a public MNIST black-box attack challenge.
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