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We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets, with each agent having an average degree $d$ in a random (undirected) graph, and a uniformly random preference ranking over their neighbors in the graph. We formally characterize stable matchings in large markets random with small imbalance and find a threshold in the connectivity $d$ at $\log^2 n$ (where $n$ is the number of agents on one side of the market) which separates a ``weak competition'' regime, where agents on both sides of the market do equally well, from a ``strong competition'' regime, where agents on the short (long) side of the market enjoy a significant advantage (disadvantage). Numerical simulations confirm and sharpen our theoretical predictions, and demonstrate robustness to our assumptions. We leverage our characterizations in two ways: First, we derive prescriptive insights into how to design the connectivity of the market to trade off optimally between the average agent welfare achieved and the number of agents who remain unmatched in the market. For most market primitives, we find that the optimal connectivity should lie in the weak competition regime or at the threshold between the regimes. Second, our analysis uncovers a new conceptual principle governing whether the short side enjoys a significant advantage in a given matching market, which can moreover be applied as a diagnostic tool given only basic summary statistics for the market. Counterfactual analyses using data on centralized high school admissions in a major USA city show the practical value of both our design insights and our diagnostic principle.

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Rational and neural network based approximations are efficient tools in modern approximation. These approaches are able to produce accurate approximations to nonsmooth and non-Lipschitz functions, including multivariate domain functions. In this paper we compare the efficiency of function approximation using rational approximation, neural network and their combinations. It was found that rational approximation is superior to neural network based approaches with the same number of decision variables. Our numerical experiments demonstrate the efficiency of rational approximation, even when the number of approximation parameters (that is, the dimension of the corresponding optimisation problems) is small. Another important contribution of this paper lies in the improvement of rational approximation algorithms. Namely, the optimisation based algorithms for rational approximation can be adjusted to in such a way that the conditioning number of the constraint matrices are controlled. This simple adjustment enables us to work with high dimension optimisation problems and improve the design of the neural network. The main strength of neural networks is in their ability to handle models with a large number of variables: complex models are decomposed in several simple optimisation problems. Therefore the the large number of decision variables is in the nature of neural networks.

We study the problem of dynamic matching in heterogeneous networks, where agents are subject to compatibility restrictions and stochastic arrival and departure times. In particular, we consider networks with one type of easy-to-match agents and multiple types of hard-to-match agents, each subject to its own compatibility constraints. Such a setting arises in many real-world applications, including kidney exchange programs and carpooling platforms. We introduce a novel approach to modeling dynamic matching by establishing the ordinary differential equation (ODE) model, which offers a new perspective for evaluating various matching algorithms. We study two algorithms, namely the Greedy and Patient Algorithms, where both algorithms prioritize matching compatible hard-to-match agents over easy-to-match agents in heterogeneous networks. Our results demonstrate the trade-off between the conflicting goals of matching agents quickly and optimally, offering insights into the design of real-world dynamic matching systems. We provide simulations and a real-world case study using data from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network to validate theoretical predictions.

While preserving the privacy of federated learning (FL), differential privacy (DP) inevitably degrades the utility (i.e., accuracy) of FL due to model perturbations caused by DP noise added to model updates. Existing studies have considered exclusively noise with persistent root-mean-square amplitude and overlooked an opportunity of adjusting the amplitudes to alleviate the adverse effects of the noise. This paper presents a new DP perturbation mechanism with a time-varying noise amplitude to protect the privacy of FL and retain the capability of adjusting the learning performance. Specifically, we propose a geometric series form for the noise amplitude and reveal analytically the dependence of the series on the number of global aggregations and the $(\epsilon,\delta)$-DP requirement. We derive an online refinement of the series to prevent FL from premature convergence resulting from excessive perturbation noise. Another important aspect is an upper bound developed for the loss function of a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) trained by FL running the new DP mechanism. Accordingly, the optimal number of global aggregations is obtained, balancing the learning and privacy. Extensive experiments are conducted using MLP, supporting vector machine, and convolutional neural network models on four public datasets. The contribution of the new DP mechanism to the convergence and accuracy of privacy-preserving FL is corroborated, compared to the state-of-the-art Gaussian noise mechanism with a persistent noise amplitude.

Two-sided online matching platforms have been employed in various markets. However, agents' preferences in present market are usually implicit and unknown and must be learned from data. With the growing availability of side information involved in the decision process, modern online matching methodology demands the capability to track preference dynamics for agents based on their contextual information. This motivates us to consider a novel Contextual Online Matching Bandit prOblem (COMBO), which allows dynamic preferences in matching decisions. Existing works focus on multi-armed bandit with static preference, but this is insufficient: the two-sided preference changes as along as one-side's contextual information updates, resulting in non-static matching. In this paper, we propose a Centralized Contextual - Explore Then Commit (CC-ETC) algorithm to adapt to the COMBO. CC-ETC solves online matching with dynamic preference. In theory, we show that CC-ETC achieves a sublinear regret upper bound O(log(T)) and is a rate-optimal algorithm by proving a matching lower bound. In the experiments, we demonstrate that CC-ETC is robust to variant preference schemes, dimensions of contexts, reward noise levels, and contexts variation levels.

This paper develops a framework to conduct a counterfactual analysis to regulate matching markets with regional constraints that impose lower and upper bounds on the number of matches in each region. Our work is motivated by the Japan Residency Matching Program, in which the policymaker wants to guarantee the least number of doctors working in rural regions to achieve the minimum standard of service. Among the multiple possible policies that satisfy such constraints, a policymaker wants to choose the best. To this end, we develop a discrete choice model approach that estimates the utility functions of agents from observed data and predicts agents' behavior under different counterfactual policies. Our framework also allows the policymaker to design the welfare-maximizing tax scheme, which outperforms the policy currently used in practice. Furthermore, a numerical experiment illustrates how our method works.

Autonomous vehicles will be an integral part of ride-sharing services in the future. This setting differs from traditional ride-sharing marketplaces because of the absence of the supply side (drivers). However, it has far-reaching consequences because in addition to pricing, players now have to make decisions on how to distribute fleets across network locations and re-balance vehicles in order to serve future demand. In this paper, we explore a duopoly setting in the ride-sharing marketplace where the players have fully autonomous fleets. Each ride-service provider (RSP)'s prices depend on the prices and the supply of the other player. We formulate their decision-making problems using a game-theoretic setup where each player seeks to find the optimal prices and supplies at each node while considering the decisions of the other player. This leads to a scenario where the players' optimization problems are coupled and it is challenging to find the equilibrium. We characterize the types of demand functions (e.g.: linear) for which this game admits an exact potential function and can be solved efficiently. For other types of demand functions, we propose an iterative algorithm to compute the equilibrium. We conclude by providing numerical insights into how different kinds of equilibria would play out in the market when the players are asymmetric. Our numerical evaluations also provide insights into how the regulator needs to consider network effects while deciding regulation in order to avoid unfavorable outcomes.

In this work we develop a discretisation method for the Brinkman problem that is uniformly well-behaved in all regimes (as identified by a local dimensionless number with the meaning of a friction coefficient) and supports general meshes as well as arbitrary approximation orders. The method is obtained combining ideas from the Hybrid High-Order and Discrete de Rham methods, and its robustness rests on a potential reconstruction and stabilisation terms that change in nature according to the value of the local friction coefficient. We derive error estimates that, thanks to the presence of cut-off factors, are valid across the all regimes and provide extensive numerical validation.

Joint species distribution models (JSDM) are among the most important statistical tools in community ecology. They are routinely used for inference and various prediction tasks, such as to build species distribution maps or biomass estimation over spatial areas. Existing JSDM's cannot, however, model mutual exclusion between species, which may happen in some species groups, such as mosses in the bottom layer of a peatland site. We tackle this deficiency in the context of modeling plant percentage cover data, where mutual exclusion arises from limited growing space and competition for light. We propose a hierarchical JSDM where multivariate latent Gaussian variable model describes species' niche preferences and Dirichlet-Multinomial distribution models the observation process and exclusive competition for space between species. We use both stationary and non-stationary multivariate Gaussian processes to model residual phenomena. We also propose a decision theoretic model comparison and validation approach to assess the goodness of JSDMs in four different types of predictive tasks. We apply our models and methods to a case study on modeling vegetation cover in a boreal peatland. Our results show that ignoring the interspecific interactions and competition for space significantly reduces models' predictive performance and leads to biased estimates for total percentage cover both for individual species and over all species combined. A model's relative predictive performance also depends on the model comparison methods highlighting that model comparison and assessment should resemble the true predictive task. Our results also demonstrate that the proposed joint species distribution model can be used to simultaneously infer interspecific correlations in niche preference as well as mutual exclusive competition for space and through that provide novel insight into ecological research.

Advances in artificial intelligence often stem from the development of new environments that abstract real-world situations into a form where research can be done conveniently. This paper contributes such an environment based on ideas inspired by elementary Microeconomics. Agents learn to produce resources in a spatially complex world, trade them with one another, and consume those that they prefer. We show that the emergent production, consumption, and pricing behaviors respond to environmental conditions in the directions predicted by supply and demand shifts in Microeconomics. We also demonstrate settings where the agents' emergent prices for goods vary over space, reflecting the local abundance of goods. After the price disparities emerge, some agents then discover a niche of transporting goods between regions with different prevailing prices -- a profitable strategy because they can buy goods where they are cheap and sell them where they are expensive. Finally, in a series of ablation experiments, we investigate how choices in the environmental rewards, bartering actions, agent architecture, and ability to consume tradable goods can either aid or inhibit the emergence of this economic behavior. This work is part of the environment development branch of a research program that aims to build human-like artificial general intelligence through multi-agent interactions in simulated societies. By exploring which environment features are needed for the basic phenomena of elementary microeconomics to emerge automatically from learning, we arrive at an environment that differs from those studied in prior multi-agent reinforcement learning work along several dimensions. For example, the model incorporates heterogeneous tastes and physical abilities, and agents negotiate with one another as a grounded form of communication.

Seamlessly interacting with humans or robots is hard because these agents are non-stationary. They update their policy in response to the ego agent's behavior, and the ego agent must anticipate these changes to co-adapt. Inspired by humans, we recognize that robots do not need to explicitly model every low-level action another agent will make; instead, we can capture the latent strategy of other agents through high-level representations. We propose a reinforcement learning-based framework for learning latent representations of an agent's policy, where the ego agent identifies the relationship between its behavior and the other agent's future strategy. The ego agent then leverages these latent dynamics to influence the other agent, purposely guiding them towards policies suitable for co-adaptation. Across several simulated domains and a real-world air hockey game, our approach outperforms the alternatives and learns to influence the other agent.

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