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We derive a new analysis of Follow The Regularized Leader (FTRL) for online learning with delayed bandit feedback. By separating the cost of delayed feedback from that of bandit feedback, our analysis allows us to obtain new results in three important settings. On the one hand, we derive the first optimal (up to logarithmic factors) regret bounds for combinatorial semi-bandits with delay and adversarial Markov decision processes with delay (and known transition functions). On the other hand, we use our analysis to derive an efficient algorithm for linear bandits with delay achieving near-optimal regret bounds. Our novel regret decomposition shows that FTRL remains stable across multiple rounds under mild assumptions on the Hessian of the regularizer.

Recent studies have shown that episodic reinforcement learning (RL) is no harder than bandits when the total reward is bounded by $1$, and proved regret bounds that have a polylogarithmic dependence on the planning horizon $H$. However, it remains an open question that if such results can be carried over to adversarial RL, where the reward is adversarially chosen at each episode. In this paper, we answer this question affirmatively by proposing the first horizon-free policy search algorithm. To tackle the challenges caused by exploration and adversarially chosen reward, our algorithm employs (1) a variance-uncertainty-aware weighted least square estimator for the transition kernel; and (2) an occupancy measure-based technique for the online search of a \emph{stochastic} policy. We show that our algorithm achieves an $\tilde{O}\big((d+\log (|\mathcal{S}|^2 |\mathcal{A}|))\sqrt{K}\big)$ regret with full-information feedback, where $d$ is the dimension of a known feature mapping linearly parametrizing the unknown transition kernel of the MDP, $K$ is the number of episodes, $|\mathcal{S}|$ and $|\mathcal{A}|$ are the cardinalities of the state and action spaces. We also provide hardness results and regret lower bounds to justify the near optimality of our algorithm and the unavoidability of $\log|\mathcal{S}|$ and $\log|\mathcal{A}|$ in the regret bound.

Adversarial robustness is a critical property in a variety of modern machine learning applications. While it has been the subject of several recent theoretical studies, many important questions related to adversarial robustness are still open. In this work, we study a fundamental question regarding Bayes optimality for adversarial robustness. We provide general sufficient conditions under which the existence of a Bayes optimal classifier can be guaranteed for adversarial robustness. Our results can provide a useful tool for a subsequent study of surrogate losses in adversarial robustness and their consistency properties. This manuscript is the extended and corrected version of the paper \emph{On the Existence of the Adversarial Bayes Classifier} published in NeurIPS 2021. There were two errors in theorem statements in the original paper -- one in the definition of pseudo-certifiable robustness and the other in the measurability of $A^\e$ for arbitrary metric spaces. In this version we correct the errors. Furthermore, the results of the original paper did not apply to some non-strictly convex norms and here we extend our results to all possible norms.

With deep learning deployed in many security-sensitive areas, machine learning security is becoming progressively important. Recent studies demonstrate attackers can exploit system-level techniques exploiting the RowHammer vulnerability of DRAM to deterministically and precisely flip bits in Deep Neural Networks (DNN) model weights to affect inference accuracy. The existing defense mechanisms are software-based, such as weight reconstruction requiring expensive training overhead or performance degradation. On the other hand, generic hardware-based victim-/aggressor-focused mechanisms impose expensive hardware overheads and preserve the spatial connection between victim and aggressor rows. In this paper, we present the first DRAM-based victim-focused defense mechanism tailored for quantized DNNs, named DNN-Defender that leverages the potential of in-DRAM swapping to withstand the targeted bit-flip attacks. Our results indicate that DNN-Defender can deliver a high level of protection downgrading the performance of targeted RowHammer attacks to a random attack level. In addition, the proposed defense has no accuracy drop on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets without requiring any software training or incurring additional hardware overhead.

We consider the problem of authenticated communication over a discrete arbitrarily varying channel where the legitimate parties are unaware of whether or not an adversary is present. When there is no adversary, the channel state always takes a default value $s_0$. When the adversary is present, they may choose the channel state sequence based on a non-causal noisy view of the transmitted codewords and the encoding and decoding scheme. We require that the decoder output the correct message with a high probability when there is no adversary, and either output the correct message or reject the transmission when the adversary is present. Further, we allow the transmitter to employ private randomness during encoding that is known neither to the receiver nor the adversary. Our first result proves a dichotomy property for the capacity for this problem -- the capacity either equals zero or it equals the non-adversarial capacity of the channel. Next, we give a sufficient condition for the capacity for this problem to be positive even when the non-adversarial channel to the receiver is stochastically degraded with respect to the channel to the adversary. Our proofs rely on a connection to a standalone authentication problem, where the goal is to accept or reject a candidate message that is already available to the decoder. Finally, we give examples and compare our sufficient condition with other related conditions known in the literature

Recently, there is an emerging interest in adversarially training a classifier with a rejection option (also known as a selective classifier) for boosting adversarial robustness. While rejection can incur a cost in many applications, existing studies typically associate zero cost with rejecting perturbed inputs, which can result in the rejection of numerous slightly-perturbed inputs that could be correctly classified. In this work, we study adversarially-robust classification with rejection in the stratified rejection setting, where the rejection cost is modeled by rejection loss functions monotonically non-increasing in the perturbation magnitude. We theoretically analyze the stratified rejection setting and propose a novel defense method -- Adversarial Training with Consistent Prediction-based Rejection (CPR) -- for building a robust selective classifier. Experiments on image datasets demonstrate that the proposed method significantly outperforms existing methods under strong adaptive attacks. For instance, on CIFAR-10, CPR reduces the total robust loss (for different rejection losses) by at least 7.3% under both seen and unseen attacks.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (CMARL) has shown to be promising for many real-world applications. Previous works mainly focus on improving coordination ability via solving MARL-specific challenges (e.g., non-stationarity, credit assignment, scalability), but ignore the policy perturbation issue when testing in a different environment. This issue hasn't been considered in problem formulation or efficient algorithm design. To address this issue, we firstly model the problem as a limited policy adversary Dec-POMDP (LPA-Dec-POMDP), where some coordinators from a team might accidentally and unpredictably encounter a limited number of malicious action attacks, but the regular coordinators still strive for the intended goal. Then, we propose Robust Multi-Agent Coordination via Evolutionary Generation of Auxiliary Adversarial Attackers (ROMANCE), which enables the trained policy to encounter diversified and strong auxiliary adversarial attacks during training, thus achieving high robustness under various policy perturbations. Concretely, to avoid the ego-system overfitting to a specific attacker, we maintain a set of attackers, which is optimized to guarantee the attackers high attacking quality and behavior diversity. The goal of quality is to minimize the ego-system coordination effect, and a novel diversity regularizer based on sparse action is applied to diversify the behaviors among attackers. The ego-system is then paired with a population of attackers selected from the maintained attacker set, and alternately trained against the constantly evolving attackers. Extensive experiments on multiple scenarios from SMAC indicate our ROMANCE provides comparable or better robustness and generalization ability than other baselines.

Adversarial attack is a technique for deceiving Machine Learning (ML) models, which provides a way to evaluate the adversarial robustness. In practice, attack algorithms are artificially selected and tuned by human experts to break a ML system. However, manual selection of attackers tends to be sub-optimal, leading to a mistakenly assessment of model security. In this paper, a new procedure called Composite Adversarial Attack (CAA) is proposed for automatically searching the best combination of attack algorithms and their hyper-parameters from a candidate pool of \textbf{32 base attackers}. We design a search space where attack policy is represented as an attacking sequence, i.e., the output of the previous attacker is used as the initialization input for successors. Multi-objective NSGA-II genetic algorithm is adopted for finding the strongest attack policy with minimum complexity. The experimental result shows CAA beats 10 top attackers on 11 diverse defenses with less elapsed time (\textbf{6 $\times$ faster than AutoAttack}), and achieves the new state-of-the-art on $l_{\infty}$, $l_{2}$ and unrestricted adversarial attacks.

Deep Learning algorithms have achieved the state-of-the-art performance for Image Classification and have been used even in security-critical applications, such as biometric recognition systems and self-driving cars. However, recent works have shown those algorithms, which can even surpass the human capabilities, are vulnerable to adversarial examples. In Computer Vision, adversarial examples are images containing subtle perturbations generated by malicious optimization algorithms in order to fool classifiers. As an attempt to mitigate these vulnerabilities, numerous countermeasures have been constantly proposed in literature. Nevertheless, devising an efficient defense mechanism has proven to be a difficult task, since many approaches have already shown to be ineffective to adaptive attackers. Thus, this self-containing paper aims to provide all readerships with a review of the latest research progress on Adversarial Machine Learning in Image Classification, however with a defender's perspective. Here, novel taxonomies for categorizing adversarial attacks and defenses are introduced and discussions about the existence of adversarial examples are provided. Further, in contrast to exisiting surveys, it is also given relevant guidance that should be taken into consideration by researchers when devising and evaluating defenses. Finally, based on the reviewed literature, it is discussed some promising paths for future research.

There is a recent large and growing interest in generative adversarial networks (GANs), which offer powerful features for generative modeling, density estimation, and energy function learning. GANs are difficult to train and evaluate but are capable of creating amazingly realistic, though synthetic, image data. Ideas stemming from GANs such as adversarial losses are creating research opportunities for other challenges such as domain adaptation. In this paper, we look at the field of GANs with emphasis on these areas of emerging research. To provide background for adversarial techniques, we survey the field of GANs, looking at the original formulation, training variants, evaluation methods, and extensions. Then we survey recent work on transfer learning, focusing on comparing different adversarial domain adaptation methods. Finally, we take a look forward to identify open research directions for GANs and domain adaptation, including some promising applications such as sensor-based human behavior modeling.