The increasingly pervasive facial recognition (FR) systems raise serious concerns about personal privacy, especially for billions of users who have publicly shared their photos on social media. Several attempts have been made to protect individuals from being identified by unauthorized FR systems utilizing adversarial attacks to generate encrypted face images. However, existing methods suffer from poor visual quality or low attack success rates, which limit their utility. Recently, diffusion models have achieved tremendous success in image generation. In this work, we ask: can diffusion models be used to generate adversarial examples to improve both visual quality and attack performance? We propose DiffProtect, which utilizes a diffusion autoencoder to generate semantically meaningful perturbations on FR systems. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DiffProtect produces more natural-looking encrypted images than state-of-the-art methods while achieving significantly higher attack success rates, e.g., 24.5% and 25.1% absolute improvements on the CelebA-HQ and FFHQ datasets.
The performance of automated face recognition systems is inevitably impacted by the facial aging process. However, high quality datasets of individuals collected over several years are typically small in scale. In this work, we propose, train, and validate the use of latent text-to-image diffusion models for synthetically aging and de-aging face images. Our models succeed with few-shot training, and have the added benefit of being controllable via intuitive textual prompting. We observe high degrees of visual realism in the generated images while maintaining biometric fidelity measured by commonly used metrics. We evaluate our method on two benchmark datasets (CelebA and AgeDB) and observe significant reduction (~44%) in the False Non-Match Rate compared to existing state-of the-art baselines.
Generative AI models have recently achieved astonishing results in quality and are consequently employed in a fast-growing number of applications. However, since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the internet, they also suffer from degenerated and biased human behavior, as we demonstrate. In fact, they may even reinforce such biases. To not only uncover but also combat these undesired effects, we present a novel strategy, called Fair Diffusion, to attenuate biases after the deployment of generative text-to-image models. Specifically, we demonstrate shifting a bias, based on human instructions, in any direction yielding arbitrarily new proportions for, e.g., identity groups. As our empirical evaluation demonstrates, this introduced control enables instructing generative image models on fairness, with no data filtering and additional training required.
Man-at-the-end (MATE) attackers have full control over the system on which the attacked software runs, and try to break the confidentiality or integrity of assets embedded in the software. Both companies and malware authors want to prevent such attacks. This has driven an arms race between attackers and defenders, resulting in a plethora of different protection and analysis methods. However, it remains difficult to measure the strength of protections because MATE attackers can reach their goals in many different ways and a universally accepted evaluation methodology does not exist. This survey systematically reviews the evaluation methodologies of papers on obfuscation, a major class of protections against MATE attacks. For 572 papers, we collected 113 aspects of their evaluation methodologies, ranging from sample set types and sizes, over sample treatment, to performed measurements. We provide detailed insights into how the academic state of the art evaluates both the protections and analyses thereon. In summary, there is a clear need for better evaluation methodologies. We identify nine challenges for software protection evaluations, which represent threats to the validity, reproducibility, and interpretation of research results in the context of MATE attacks.
Although Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been widely applied in various real-world scenarios, they are vulnerable to adversarial examples. The current adversarial attacks in computer vision can be divided into digital attacks and physical attacks according to their different attack forms. Compared with digital attacks, which generate perturbations in the digital pixels, physical attacks are more practical in the real world. Owing to the serious security problem caused by physically adversarial examples, many works have been proposed to evaluate the physically adversarial robustness of DNNs in the past years. In this paper, we summarize a survey versus the current physically adversarial attacks and physically adversarial defenses in computer vision. To establish a taxonomy, we organize the current physical attacks from attack tasks, attack forms, and attack methods, respectively. Thus, readers can have a systematic knowledge of this topic from different aspects. For the physical defenses, we establish the taxonomy from pre-processing, in-processing, and post-processing for the DNN models to achieve full coverage of the adversarial defenses. Based on the above survey, we finally discuss the challenges of this research field and further outlook on the future direction.
Recently, the no-box adversarial attack, in which the attacker lacks access to the model's architecture, weights, and training data, become the most practical and challenging attack setup. However, there is an unawareness of the potential and flexibility inherent in the surrogate model selection process on no-box setting. Inspired by the burgeoning interest in utilizing foundational models to address downstream tasks, this paper adopts an innovative idea that 1) recasting adversarial attack as a downstream task. Specifically, image noise generation to meet the emerging trend and 2) introducing foundational models as surrogate models. Harnessing the concept of non-robust features, we elaborate on two guiding principles for surrogate model selection to explain why the foundational model is an optimal choice for this role. However, paradoxically, we observe that these foundational models underperform. Analyzing this unexpected behavior within the feature space, we attribute the lackluster performance of foundational models (e.g., CLIP) to their significant representational capacity and, conversely, their lack of discriminative prowess. To mitigate this issue, we propose the use of a margin-based loss strategy for the fine-tuning of foundational models on target images. The experimental results verify that our approach, which employs the basic Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) attack algorithm, outstrips the performance of other, more convoluted algorithms. We conclude by advocating for the research community to consider surrogate models as crucial determinants in the effectiveness of adversarial attacks in no-box settings. The implications of our work bear relevance for improving the efficacy of such adversarial attacks and the overall robustness of AI systems.
Knowledge graphs represent factual knowledge about the world as relationships between concepts and are critical for intelligent decision making in enterprise applications. New knowledge is inferred from the existing facts in the knowledge graphs by encoding the concepts and relations into low-dimensional feature vector representations. The most effective representations for this task, called Knowledge Graph Embeddings (KGE), are learned through neural network architectures. Due to their impressive predictive performance, they are increasingly used in high-impact domains like healthcare, finance and education. However, are the black-box KGE models adversarially robust for use in domains with high stakes? This thesis argues that state-of-the-art KGE models are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, that is, their predictive performance can be degraded by systematically crafted perturbations to the training knowledge graph. To support this argument, two novel data poisoning attacks are proposed that craft input deletions or additions at training time to subvert the learned model's performance at inference time. These adversarial attacks target the task of predicting the missing facts in knowledge graphs using KGE models, and the evaluation shows that the simpler attacks are competitive with or outperform the computationally expensive ones. The thesis contributions not only highlight and provide an opportunity to fix the security vulnerabilities of KGE models, but also help to understand the black-box predictive behaviour of KGE models.
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) have been extensively studied in the past few years. Arguably the revolutionary techniques are in the area of computer vision such as plausible image generation, image to image translation, facial attribute manipulation and similar domains. Despite the significant success achieved in computer vision field, applying GANs over real-world problems still have three main challenges: (1) High quality image generation; (2) Diverse image generation; and (3) Stable training. Considering numerous GAN-related research in the literature, we provide a study on the architecture-variants and loss-variants, which are proposed to handle these three challenges from two perspectives. We propose loss and architecture-variants for classifying most popular GANs, and discuss the potential improvements with focusing on these two aspects. While several reviews for GANs have been presented, there is no work focusing on the review of GAN-variants based on handling challenges mentioned above. In this paper, we review and critically discuss 7 architecture-variant GANs and 9 loss-variant GANs for remedying those three challenges. The objective of this review is to provide an insight on the footprint that current GANs research focuses on the performance improvement. Code related to GAN-variants studied in this work is summarized on //github.com/sheqi/GAN_Review.
Adversarial attacks to image classification systems present challenges to convolutional networks and opportunities for understanding them. This study suggests that adversarial perturbations on images lead to noise in the features constructed by these networks. Motivated by this observation, we develop new network architectures that increase adversarial robustness by performing feature denoising. Specifically, our networks contain blocks that denoise the features using non-local means or other filters; the entire networks are trained end-to-end. When combined with adversarial training, our feature denoising networks substantially improve the state-of-the-art in adversarial robustness in both white-box and black-box attack settings. On ImageNet, under 10-iteration PGD white-box attacks where prior art has 27.9% accuracy, our method achieves 55.7%; even under extreme 2000-iteration PGD white-box attacks, our method secures 42.6% accuracy. A network based on our method was ranked first in Competition on Adversarial Attacks and Defenses (CAAD) 2018 --- it achieved 50.6% classification accuracy on a secret, ImageNet-like test dataset against 48 unknown attackers, surpassing the runner-up approach by ~10%. Code and models will be made publicly available.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have recently achieved impressive results for many real-world applications, and many GAN variants have emerged with improvements in sample quality and training stability. However, they have not been well visualized or understood. How does a GAN represent our visual world internally? What causes the artifacts in GAN results? How do architectural choices affect GAN learning? Answering such questions could enable us to develop new insights and better models. In this work, we present an analytic framework to visualize and understand GANs at the unit-, object-, and scene-level. We first identify a group of interpretable units that are closely related to object concepts using a segmentation-based network dissection method. Then, we quantify the causal effect of interpretable units by measuring the ability of interventions to control objects in the output. We examine the contextual relationship between these units and their surroundings by inserting the discovered object concepts into new images. We show several practical applications enabled by our framework, from comparing internal representations across different layers, models, and datasets, to improving GANs by locating and removing artifact-causing units, to interactively manipulating objects in a scene. We provide open source interpretation tools to help researchers and practitioners better understand their GAN models.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples resulting from adding small-magnitude perturbations to inputs. Such adversarial examples can mislead DNNs to produce adversary-selected results. Different attack strategies have been proposed to generate adversarial examples, but how to produce them with high perceptual quality and more efficiently requires more research efforts. In this paper, we propose AdvGAN to generate adversarial examples with generative adversarial networks (GANs), which can learn and approximate the distribution of original instances. For AdvGAN, once the generator is trained, it can generate adversarial perturbations efficiently for any instance, so as to potentially accelerate adversarial training as defenses. We apply AdvGAN in both semi-whitebox and black-box attack settings. In semi-whitebox attacks, there is no need to access the original target model after the generator is trained, in contrast to traditional white-box attacks. In black-box attacks, we dynamically train a distilled model for the black-box model and optimize the generator accordingly. Adversarial examples generated by AdvGAN on different target models have high attack success rate under state-of-the-art defenses compared to other attacks. Our attack has placed the first with 92.76% accuracy on a public MNIST black-box attack challenge.