Many defenses against adversarial attacks (\eg robust classifiers, randomization, or image purification) use countermeasures put to work only after the attack has been crafted. We adopt a different perspective to introduce $A^5$ (Adversarial Augmentation Against Adversarial Attacks), a novel framework including the first certified preemptive defense against adversarial attacks. The main idea is to craft a defensive perturbation to guarantee that any attack (up to a given magnitude) towards the input in hand will fail. To this aim, we leverage existing automatic perturbation analysis tools for neural networks. We study the conditions to apply $A^5$ effectively, analyze the importance of the robustness of the to-be-defended classifier, and inspect the appearance of the robustified images. We show effective on-the-fly defensive augmentation with a robustifier network that ignores the ground truth label, and demonstrate the benefits of robustifier and classifier co-training. In our tests, $A^5$ consistently beats state of the art certified defenses on MNIST, CIFAR10, FashionMNIST and Tinyimagenet. We also show how to apply $A^5$ to create certifiably robust physical objects. Our code at //github.com/NVlabs/A5 allows experimenting on a wide range of scenarios beyond the man-in-the-middle attack tested here, including the case of physical attacks.
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Deep learning technology has made great achievements in the field of image. In order to defend against malware attacks, researchers have proposed many Windows malware detection models based on deep learning. However, deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial example attacks. Malware can generate adversarial malware with the same malicious function to attack the malware detection model and evade detection of the model. Currently, many adversarial defense studies have been proposed, but existing adversarial defense studies are based on image sample and cannot be directly applied to malware sample. Therefore, this paper proposes an adversarial malware defense method based on adversarial training. This method uses preprocessing to defend simple adversarial examples to reduce the difficulty of adversarial training. Moreover, this method improves the adversarial defense capability of the model through adversarial training. We experimented with three attack methods in two sets of datasets, and the results show that the method in this paper can improve the adversarial defense capability of the model without reducing the accuracy of the model.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) may suffer from significantly degenerated performance when the training and test data are of different underlying distributions. Despite the importance of model generalization to out-of-distribution (OOD) data, the accuracy of state-of-the-art (SOTA) models on OOD data can plummet. Recent work has demonstrated that regular or off-manifold adversarial examples, as a special case of data augmentation, can be used to improve OOD generalization. Inspired by this, we theoretically prove that on-manifold adversarial examples can better benefit OOD generalization. Nevertheless, it is nontrivial to generate on-manifold adversarial examples because the real manifold is generally complex. To address this issue, we proposed a novel method of Augmenting data with Adversarial examples via a Wavelet module (AdvWavAug), an on-manifold adversarial data augmentation technique that is simple to implement. In particular, we project a benign image into a wavelet domain. With the assistance of the sparsity characteristic of wavelet transformation, we can modify an image on the estimated data manifold. We conduct adversarial augmentation based on AdvProp training framework. Extensive experiments on different models and different datasets, including ImageNet and its distorted versions, demonstrate that our method can improve model generalization, especially on OOD data. By integrating AdvWavAug into the training process, we have achieved SOTA results on some recent transformer-based models.
Vulnerability to adversarial attacks is one of the principal hurdles to the adoption of deep learning in safety-critical applications. Despite significant efforts, both practical and theoretical, training deep learning models robust to adversarial attacks is still an open problem. In this paper, we analyse the geometry of adversarial attacks in the large-data, overparameterized limit for Bayesian Neural Networks (BNNs). We show that, in the limit, vulnerability to gradient-based attacks arises as a result of degeneracy in the data distribution, i.e., when the data lies on a lower-dimensional submanifold of the ambient space. As a direct consequence, we demonstrate that in this limit BNN posteriors are robust to gradient-based adversarial attacks. Crucially, we prove that the expected gradient of the loss with respect to the BNN posterior distribution is vanishing, even when each neural network sampled from the posterior is vulnerable to gradient-based attacks. Experimental results on the MNIST, Fashion MNIST, and half moons datasets, representing the finite data regime, with BNNs trained with Hamiltonian Monte Carlo and Variational Inference, support this line of arguments, showing that BNNs can display both high accuracy on clean data and robustness to both gradient-based and gradient-free based adversarial attacks.
Knowledge graphs represent factual knowledge about the world as relationships between concepts and are critical for intelligent decision making in enterprise applications. New knowledge is inferred from the existing facts in the knowledge graphs by encoding the concepts and relations into low-dimensional feature vector representations. The most effective representations for this task, called Knowledge Graph Embeddings (KGE), are learned through neural network architectures. Due to their impressive predictive performance, they are increasingly used in high-impact domains like healthcare, finance and education. However, are the black-box KGE models adversarially robust for use in domains with high stakes? This thesis argues that state-of-the-art KGE models are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, that is, their predictive performance can be degraded by systematically crafted perturbations to the training knowledge graph. To support this argument, two novel data poisoning attacks are proposed that craft input deletions or additions at training time to subvert the learned model's performance at inference time. These adversarial attacks target the task of predicting the missing facts in knowledge graphs using KGE models, and the evaluation shows that the simpler attacks are competitive with or outperform the computationally expensive ones. The thesis contributions not only highlight and provide an opportunity to fix the security vulnerabilities of KGE models, but also help to understand the black-box predictive behaviour of KGE models.
Adversarial attack is a technique for deceiving Machine Learning (ML) models, which provides a way to evaluate the adversarial robustness. In practice, attack algorithms are artificially selected and tuned by human experts to break a ML system. However, manual selection of attackers tends to be sub-optimal, leading to a mistakenly assessment of model security. In this paper, a new procedure called Composite Adversarial Attack (CAA) is proposed for automatically searching the best combination of attack algorithms and their hyper-parameters from a candidate pool of \textbf{32 base attackers}. We design a search space where attack policy is represented as an attacking sequence, i.e., the output of the previous attacker is used as the initialization input for successors. Multi-objective NSGA-II genetic algorithm is adopted for finding the strongest attack policy with minimum complexity. The experimental result shows CAA beats 10 top attackers on 11 diverse defenses with less elapsed time (\textbf{6 $\times$ faster than AutoAttack}), and achieves the new state-of-the-art on $l_{\infty}$, $l_{2}$ and unrestricted adversarial attacks.
Deep Learning algorithms have achieved the state-of-the-art performance for Image Classification and have been used even in security-critical applications, such as biometric recognition systems and self-driving cars. However, recent works have shown those algorithms, which can even surpass the human capabilities, are vulnerable to adversarial examples. In Computer Vision, adversarial examples are images containing subtle perturbations generated by malicious optimization algorithms in order to fool classifiers. As an attempt to mitigate these vulnerabilities, numerous countermeasures have been constantly proposed in literature. Nevertheless, devising an efficient defense mechanism has proven to be a difficult task, since many approaches have already shown to be ineffective to adaptive attackers. Thus, this self-containing paper aims to provide all readerships with a review of the latest research progress on Adversarial Machine Learning in Image Classification, however with a defender's perspective. Here, novel taxonomies for categorizing adversarial attacks and defenses are introduced and discussions about the existence of adversarial examples are provided. Further, in contrast to exisiting surveys, it is also given relevant guidance that should be taken into consideration by researchers when devising and evaluating defenses. Finally, based on the reviewed literature, it is discussed some promising paths for future research.
Deep learning models on graphs have achieved remarkable performance in various graph analysis tasks, e.g., node classification, link prediction and graph clustering. However, they expose uncertainty and unreliability against the well-designed inputs, i.e., adversarial examples. Accordingly, various studies have emerged for both attack and defense addressed in different graph analysis tasks, leading to the arms race in graph adversarial learning. For instance, the attacker has poisoning and evasion attack, and the defense group correspondingly has preprocessing- and adversarial- based methods. Despite the booming works, there still lacks a unified problem definition and a comprehensive review. To bridge this gap, we investigate and summarize the existing works on graph adversarial learning tasks systemically. Specifically, we survey and unify the existing works w.r.t. attack and defense in graph analysis tasks, and give proper definitions and taxonomies at the same time. Besides, we emphasize the importance of related evaluation metrics, and investigate and summarize them comprehensively. Hopefully, our works can serve as a reference for the relevant researchers, thus providing assistance for their studies. More details of our works are available at //github.com/gitgiter/Graph-Adversarial-Learning.
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) have been extensively studied in the past few years. Arguably the revolutionary techniques are in the area of computer vision such as plausible image generation, image to image translation, facial attribute manipulation and similar domains. Despite the significant success achieved in computer vision field, applying GANs over real-world problems still have three main challenges: (1) High quality image generation; (2) Diverse image generation; and (3) Stable training. Considering numerous GAN-related research in the literature, we provide a study on the architecture-variants and loss-variants, which are proposed to handle these three challenges from two perspectives. We propose loss and architecture-variants for classifying most popular GANs, and discuss the potential improvements with focusing on these two aspects. While several reviews for GANs have been presented, there is no work focusing on the review of GAN-variants based on handling challenges mentioned above. In this paper, we review and critically discuss 7 architecture-variant GANs and 9 loss-variant GANs for remedying those three challenges. The objective of this review is to provide an insight on the footprint that current GANs research focuses on the performance improvement. Code related to GAN-variants studied in this work is summarized on //github.com/sheqi/GAN_Review.
We introduce an effective model to overcome the problem of mode collapse when training Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN). Firstly, we propose a new generator objective that finds it better to tackle mode collapse. And, we apply an independent Autoencoders (AE) to constrain the generator and consider its reconstructed samples as "real" samples to slow down the convergence of discriminator that enables to reduce the gradient vanishing problem and stabilize the model. Secondly, from mappings between latent and data spaces provided by AE, we further regularize AE by the relative distance between the latent and data samples to explicitly prevent the generator falling into mode collapse setting. This idea comes when we find a new way to visualize the mode collapse on MNIST dataset. To the best of our knowledge, our method is the first to propose and apply successfully the relative distance of latent and data samples for stabilizing GAN. Thirdly, our proposed model, namely Generative Adversarial Autoencoder Networks (GAAN), is stable and has suffered from neither gradient vanishing nor mode collapse issues, as empirically demonstrated on synthetic, MNIST, MNIST-1K, CelebA and CIFAR-10 datasets. Experimental results show that our method can approximate well multi-modal distribution and achieve better results than state-of-the-art methods on these benchmark datasets. Our model implementation is published here: //github.com/tntrung/gaan
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples resulting from adding small-magnitude perturbations to inputs. Such adversarial examples can mislead DNNs to produce adversary-selected results. Different attack strategies have been proposed to generate adversarial examples, but how to produce them with high perceptual quality and more efficiently requires more research efforts. In this paper, we propose AdvGAN to generate adversarial examples with generative adversarial networks (GANs), which can learn and approximate the distribution of original instances. For AdvGAN, once the generator is trained, it can generate adversarial perturbations efficiently for any instance, so as to potentially accelerate adversarial training as defenses. We apply AdvGAN in both semi-whitebox and black-box attack settings. In semi-whitebox attacks, there is no need to access the original target model after the generator is trained, in contrast to traditional white-box attacks. In black-box attacks, we dynamically train a distilled model for the black-box model and optimize the generator accordingly. Adversarial examples generated by AdvGAN on different target models have high attack success rate under state-of-the-art defenses compared to other attacks. Our attack has placed the first with 92.76% accuracy on a public MNIST black-box attack challenge.
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