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It is well known that the Euler method for approximating the solutions of a random ordinary differential equation $\mathrm{d}X_t/\mathrm{d}t = f(t, X_t, Y_t)$ driven by a stochastic process $\{Y_t\}_t$ with $\theta$-H\"older sample paths is estimated to be of strong order $\theta$ with respect to the time step, provided $f=f(t, x, y)$ is sufficiently regular and with suitable bounds. Here, it is proved that, in many typical cases, further conditions on the noise can be exploited so that the strong convergence is actually of order 1, regardless of the H\"older regularity of the sample paths. This applies for instance to additive or multiplicative It\^o process noises (such as Wiener, Ornstein-Uhlenbeck, and geometric Brownian motion processes); to point-process noises (such as Poisson point processes and Hawkes self-exciting processes, which even have jump-type discontinuities); and to transport-type processes with sample paths of bounded variation. The result is based on a novel approach, estimating the global error as an iterated integral over both large and small mesh scales, and switching the order of integration to move the critical regularity to the large scale. The work is complemented with numerical simulations illustrating the strong order 1 convergence in those cases, and with an example with fractional Brownian motion noise with Hurst parameter $0 < H < 1/2$ for which the order of convergence is $H + 1/2$, hence lower than the attained order 1 in the examples above, but still higher than the order $H$ of convergence expected from previous works.

Text-based games are a popular testbed for language-based reinforcement learning (RL). In previous work, deep Q-learning is commonly used as the learning agent. Q-learning algorithms are challenging to apply to complex real-world domains due to, for example, their instability in training. Therefore, in this paper, we adapt the soft-actor-critic (SAC) algorithm to the text-based environment. To deal with sparse extrinsic rewards from the environment, we combine it with a potential-based reward shaping technique to provide more informative (dense) reward signals to the RL agent. We apply our method to play difficult text-based games. The SAC method achieves higher scores than the Q-learning methods on many games with only half the number of training steps. This shows that it is well-suited for text-based games. Moreover, we show that the reward shaping technique helps the agent to learn the policy faster and achieve higher scores. In particular, we consider a dynamically learned value function as a potential function for shaping the learner's original sparse reward signals.

In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with the single sender case. However, if the objectives of the information providers are different from that of the estimator, this might result in interesting strategic interactions and outcomes. In this work, we consider a hierarchical signaling game between multiple senders (information designers) and a single receiver (decision maker) each having their own, possibly misaligned, objectives. The senders lead the game by committing to individual information disclosure policies simultaneously, within the framework of a non-cooperative Nash game among themselves. This is followed by the receiver's action decision. With Gaussian information structure and quadratic objectives (which depend on underlying state and receiver's action) for all the players, we show that in general the equilibrium is not unique. We hence identify a set of equilibria and further show that linear noiseless policies can achieve a minimal element of this set. Additionally, we show that competition among the senders is beneficial to the receiver, as compared with cooperation among the senders. Further, we extend our analysis to a dynamic signaling game of finite horizon with Markovian information evolution. We show that linear memoryless policies can achieve equilibrium in this dynamic game. We also consider an extension to a game with multiple receivers having coupled objectives. We provide algorithms to compute the equilibrium strategies in all these cases. Finally, via extensive simulations, we analyze the effects of multiple senders in varying degrees of alignment among their objectives.

We propose to use L\'evy {\alpha}-stable distributions for constructing priors for Bayesian inverse problems. The construction is based on Markov fields with stable-distributed increments. Special cases include the Cauchy and Gaussian distributions, with stability indices {\alpha} = 1, and {\alpha} = 2, respectively. Our target is to show that these priors provide a rich class of priors for modelling rough features. The main technical issue is that the {\alpha}-stable probability density functions do not have closed-form expressions in general, and this limits their applicability. For practical purposes, we need to approximate probability density functions through numerical integration or series expansions. Current available approximation methods are either too time-consuming or do not function within the range of stability and radius arguments needed in Bayesian inversion. To address the issue, we propose a new hybrid approximation method for symmetric univariate and bivariate {\alpha}-stable distributions, which is both fast to evaluate, and accurate enough from a practical viewpoint. Then we use approximation method in the numerical implementation of {\alpha}-stable random field priors. We demonstrate the applicability of the constructed priors on selected Bayesian inverse problems which include the deconvolution problem, and the inversion of a function governed by an elliptic partial differential equation. We also demonstrate hierarchical {\alpha}-stable priors in the one-dimensional deconvolution problem. We employ maximum-a-posterior-based estimation at all the numerical examples. To that end, we exploit the limited-memory BFGS and its bounded variant for the estimator.

In this paper, we consider the problem of joint parameter estimation for drift and diffusion coefficients of a stochastic McKean-Vlasov equation and for the associated system of interacting particles. The analysis is provided in a general framework, as both coefficients depend on the solution of the process and on the law of the solution itself. Starting from discrete observations of the interacting particle system over a fixed interval $[0, T]$, we propose a contrast function based on a pseudo likelihood approach. We show that the associated estimator is consistent when the discretization step ($\Delta_n$) and the number of particles ($N$) satisfy $\Delta_n \rightarrow 0$ and $N \rightarrow \infty$, and asymptotically normal when additionally the condition $\Delta_n N \rightarrow 0$ holds.

The distributed computation of a Nash equilibrium in aggregative games is gaining increased traction in recent years. Of particular interest is the mediator-free scenario where individual players only access or observe the decisions of their neighbors due to practical constraints. Given the competitive rivalry among participating players, protecting the privacy of individual players becomes imperative when sensitive information is involved. We propose a fully distributed equilibrium-computation approach for aggregative games that can achieve both rigorous differential privacy and guaranteed computation accuracy of the Nash equilibrium. This is in sharp contrast to existing differential-privacy solutions for aggregative games that have to either sacrifice the accuracy of equilibrium computation to gain rigorous privacy guarantees, or allow the cumulative privacy budget to grow unbounded, hence losing privacy guarantees, as iteration proceeds. Our approach uses independent noises across players, thus making it effective even when adversaries have access to all shared messages as well as the underlying algorithm structure. The encryption-free nature of the proposed approach, also ensures efficiency in computation and communication. The approach is also applicable in stochastic aggregative games, able to ensure both rigorous differential privacy and guaranteed computation accuracy of the Nash equilibrium when individual players only have stochastic estimates of their pseudo-gradient mappings. Numerical comparisons with existing counterparts confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

The congestion game is a powerful model that encompasses a range of engineering systems such as traffic networks and resource allocation. It describes the behavior of a group of agents who share a common set of $F$ facilities and take actions as subsets with $k$ facilities. In this work, we study the online formulation of congestion games, where agents participate in the game repeatedly and observe feedback with randomness. We propose CongestEXP, a decentralized algorithm that applies the classic exponential weights method. By maintaining weights on the facility level, the regret bound of CongestEXP avoids the exponential dependence on the size of possible facility sets, i.e., $\binom{F}{k} \approx F^k$, and scales only linearly with $F$. Specifically, we show that CongestEXP attains a regret upper bound of $O(kF\sqrt{T})$ for every individual player, where $T$ is the time horizon. On the other hand, exploiting the exponential growth of weights enables CongestEXP to achieve a fast convergence rate. If a strict Nash equilibrium exists, we show that CongestEXP can converge to the strict Nash policy almost exponentially fast in $O(F\exp(-t^{1-\alpha}))$, where $t$ is the number of iterations and $\alpha \in (1/2, 1)$.

Games and simulators can be a valuable platform to execute complex multi-agent, multiplayer, imperfect information scenarios with significant parallels to military applications: multiple participants manage resources and make decisions that command assets to secure specific areas of a map or neutralize opposing forces. These characteristics have attracted the artificial intelligence (AI) community by supporting development of algorithms with complex benchmarks and the capability to rapidly iterate over new ideas. The success of artificial intelligence algorithms in real-time strategy games such as StarCraft II have also attracted the attention of the military research community aiming to explore similar techniques in military counterpart scenarios. Aiming to bridge the connection between games and military applications, this work discusses past and current efforts on how games and simulators, together with the artificial intelligence algorithms, have been adapted to simulate certain aspects of military missions and how they might impact the future battlefield. This paper also investigates how advances in virtual reality and visual augmentation systems open new possibilities in human interfaces with gaming platforms and their military parallels.

Promoting behavioural diversity is critical for solving games with non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). Yet, there is a lack of rigorous treatment for defining diversity and constructing diversity-aware learning dynamics. In this work, we offer a geometric interpretation of behavioural diversity in games and introduce a novel diversity metric based on \emph{determinantal point processes} (DPP). By incorporating the diversity metric into best-response dynamics, we develop \emph{diverse fictitious play} and \emph{diverse policy-space response oracle} for solving normal-form games and open-ended games. We prove the uniqueness of the diverse best response and the convergence of our algorithms on two-player games. Importantly, we show that maximising the DPP-based diversity metric guarantees to enlarge the \emph{gamescape} -- convex polytopes spanned by agents' mixtures of strategies. To validate our diversity-aware solvers, we test on tens of games that show strong non-transitivity. Results suggest that our methods achieve much lower exploitability than state-of-the-art solvers by finding effective and diverse strategies.

With the rapid increase of large-scale, real-world datasets, it becomes critical to address the problem of long-tailed data distribution (i.e., a few classes account for most of the data, while most classes are under-represented). Existing solutions typically adopt class re-balancing strategies such as re-sampling and re-weighting based on the number of observations for each class. In this work, we argue that as the number of samples increases, the additional benefit of a newly added data point will diminish. We introduce a novel theoretical framework to measure data overlap by associating with each sample a small neighboring region rather than a single point. The effective number of samples is defined as the volume of samples and can be calculated by a simple formula $(1-\beta^{n})/(1-\beta)$, where $n$ is the number of samples and $\beta \in [0,1)$ is a hyperparameter. We design a re-weighting scheme that uses the effective number of samples for each class to re-balance the loss, thereby yielding a class-balanced loss. Comprehensive experiments are conducted on artificially induced long-tailed CIFAR datasets and large-scale datasets including ImageNet and iNaturalist. Our results show that when trained with the proposed class-balanced loss, the network is able to achieve significant performance gains on long-tailed datasets.