Visual object tracking (VOT) has been widely adopted in mission-critical applications, such as autonomous driving and intelligent surveillance systems. In current practice, third-party resources such as datasets, backbone networks, and training platforms are frequently used to train high-performance VOT models. Whilst these resources bring certain convenience, they also introduce new security threats into VOT models. In this paper, we reveal such a threat where an adversary can easily implant hidden backdoors into VOT models by tempering with the training process. Specifically, we propose a simple yet effective few-shot backdoor attack (FSBA) that optimizes two losses alternately: 1) a \emph{feature loss} defined in the hidden feature space, and 2) the standard \emph{tracking loss}. We show that, once the backdoor is embedded into the target model by our FSBA, it can trick the model to lose track of specific objects even when the \emph{trigger} only appears in one or a few frames. We examine our attack in both digital and physical-world settings and show that it can significantly degrade the performance of state-of-the-art VOT trackers. We also show that our attack is resistant to potential defenses, highlighting the vulnerability of VOT models to potential backdoor attacks.
Data poisoning attacks, in which a malicious adversary aims to influence a model by injecting "poisoned" data into the training process, have attracted significant recent attention. In this work, we take a closer look at existing poisoning attacks and connect them with old and new algorithms for solving sequential Stackelberg games. By choosing an appropriate loss function for the attacker and optimizing with algorithms that exploit second-order information, we design poisoning attacks that are effective on neural networks. We present efficient implementations that exploit modern auto-differentiation packages and allow simultaneous and coordinated generation of tens of thousands of poisoned points, in contrast to existing methods that generate poisoned points one by one. We further perform extensive experiments that empirically explore the effect of data poisoning attacks on deep neural networks.
Deep neural networks have become an integral part of our software infrastructure and are being deployed in many widely-used and safety-critical applications. However, their integration into many systems also brings with it the vulnerability to test time attacks in the form of Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs). UAPs are a class of perturbations that when applied to any input causes model misclassification. Although there is an ongoing effort to defend models against these adversarial attacks, it is often difficult to reconcile the trade-offs in model accuracy and robustness to adversarial attacks. Jacobian regularization has been shown to improve the robustness of models against UAPs, whilst model ensembles have been widely adopted to improve both predictive performance and model robustness. In this work, we propose a novel approach, Jacobian Ensembles-a combination of Jacobian regularization and model ensembles to significantly increase the robustness against UAPs whilst maintaining or improving model accuracy. Our results show that Jacobian Ensembles achieves previously unseen levels of accuracy and robustness, greatly improving over previous methods that tend to skew towards only either accuracy or robustness.
The success of deep learning has enabled advances in multimodal tasks that require non-trivial fusion of multiple input domains. Although multimodal models have shown potential in many problems, their increased complexity makes them more vulnerable to attacks. A Backdoor (or Trojan) attack is a class of security vulnerability wherein an attacker embeds a malicious secret behavior into a network (e.g. targeted misclassification) that is activated when an attacker-specified trigger is added to an input. In this work, we show that multimodal networks are vulnerable to a novel type of attack that we refer to as Dual-Key Multimodal Backdoors. This attack exploits the complex fusion mechanisms used by state-of-the-art networks to embed backdoors that are both effective and stealthy. Instead of using a single trigger, the proposed attack embeds a trigger in each of the input modalities and activates the malicious behavior only when both the triggers are present. We present an extensive study of multimodal backdoors on the Visual Question Answering (VQA) task with multiple architectures and visual feature backbones. A major challenge in embedding backdoors in VQA models is that most models use visual features extracted from a fixed pretrained object detector. This is challenging for the attacker as the detector can distort or ignore the visual trigger entirely, which leads to models where backdoors are over-reliant on the language trigger. We tackle this problem by proposing a visual trigger optimization strategy designed for pretrained object detectors. Through this method, we create Dual-Key Backdoors with over a 98% attack success rate while only poisoning 1% of the training data. Finally, we release TrojVQA, a large collection of clean and trojan VQA models to enable research in defending against multimodal backdoors.
Backdoor attacks insert malicious data into a training set so that, during inference time, it misclassifies inputs that have been patched with a backdoor trigger as the malware specified label. For backdoor attacks to bypass human inspection, it is essential that the injected data appear to be correctly labeled. The attacks with such property are often referred to as "clean-label attacks." Existing clean-label backdoor attacks require knowledge of the entire training set to be effective. Obtaining such knowledge is difficult or impossible because training data are often gathered from multiple sources (e.g., face images from different users). It remains a question whether backdoor attacks still present a real threat. This paper provides an affirmative answer to this question by designing an algorithm to mount clean-label backdoor attacks based only on the knowledge of representative examples from the target class. With poisoning equal to or less than 0.5% of the target-class data and 0.05% of the training set, we can train a model to classify test examples from arbitrary classes into the target class when the examples are patched with a backdoor trigger. Our attack works well across datasets and models, even when the trigger presents in the physical world. We explore the space of defenses and find that, surprisingly, our attack can evade the latest state-of-the-art defenses in their vanilla form, or after a simple twist, we can adapt to the downstream defenses. We study the cause of the intriguing effectiveness and find that because the trigger synthesized by our attack contains features as persistent as the original semantic features of the target class, any attempt to remove such triggers would inevitably hurt the model accuracy first.
Multi-camera vehicle tracking is one of the most complicated tasks in Computer Vision as it involves distinct tasks including Vehicle Detection, Tracking, and Re-identification. Despite the challenges, multi-camera vehicle tracking has immense potential in transportation applications including speed, volume, origin-destination (O-D), and routing data generation. Several recent works have addressed the multi-camera tracking problem. However, most of the effort has gone towards improving accuracy on high-quality benchmark datasets while disregarding lower camera resolutions, compression artifacts and the overwhelming amount of computational power and time needed to carry out this task on its edge and thus making it prohibitive for large-scale and real-time deployment. Therefore, in this work we shed light on practical issues that should be addressed for the design of a multi-camera tracking system to provide actionable and timely insights. Moreover, we propose a real-time city-scale multi-camera vehicle tracking system that compares favorably to computationally intensive alternatives and handles real-world, low-resolution CCTV instead of idealized and curated video streams. To show its effectiveness, in addition to integration into the Regional Integrated Transportation Information System (RITIS), we participated in the 2021 NVIDIA AI City multi-camera tracking challenge and our method is ranked among the top five performers on the public leaderboard.
Object detection and tracking in videos represent essential and computationally demanding building blocks for current and future visual perception systems. In order to reduce the efficiency gap between available methods and computational requirements of real-world applications, we propose to re-think one of the most successful methods for image object detection, Faster R-CNN, and extend it to the video domain. Specifically, we extend the detection framework to learn instance-level embeddings which prove beneficial for data association and re-identification purposes. Focusing on the computational aspects of detection and tracking, our proposed method reaches a very high computational efficiency necessary for relevant applications, while still managing to compete with recent and state-of-the-art methods as shown in the experiments we conduct on standard object tracking benchmarks
In many visual systems, visual tracking often bases on RGB image sequences, in which some targets are invalid in low-light conditions, and tracking performance is thus affected significantly. Introducing other modalities such as depth and infrared data is an effective way to handle imaging limitations of individual sources, but multi-modal imaging platforms usually require elaborate designs and cannot be applied in many real-world applications at present. Near-infrared (NIR) imaging becomes an essential part of many surveillance cameras, whose imaging is switchable between RGB and NIR based on the light intensity. These two modalities are heterogeneous with very different visual properties and thus bring big challenges for visual tracking. However, existing works have not studied this challenging problem. In this work, we address the cross-modal object tracking problem and contribute a new video dataset, including 654 cross-modal image sequences with over 481K frames in total, and the average video length is more than 735 frames. To promote the research and development of cross-modal object tracking, we propose a new algorithm, which learns the modality-aware target representation to mitigate the appearance gap between RGB and NIR modalities in the tracking process. It is plug-and-play and could thus be flexibly embedded into different tracking frameworks. Extensive experiments on the dataset are conducted, and we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in two representative tracking frameworks against 17 state-of-the-art tracking methods. We will release the dataset for free academic usage, dataset download link and code will be released soon.
Correlation acts as a critical role in the tracking field, especially in recent popular Siamese-based trackers. The correlation operation is a simple fusion manner to consider the similarity between the template and the search region. However, the correlation operation itself is a local linear matching process, leading to lose semantic information and fall into local optimum easily, which may be the bottleneck of designing high-accuracy tracking algorithms. Is there any better feature fusion method than correlation? To address this issue, inspired by Transformer, this work presents a novel attention-based feature fusion network, which effectively combines the template and search region features solely using attention. Specifically, the proposed method includes an ego-context augment module based on self-attention and a cross-feature augment module based on cross-attention. Finally, we present a Transformer tracking (named TransT) method based on the Siamese-like feature extraction backbone, the designed attention-based fusion mechanism, and the classification and regression head. Experiments show that our TransT achieves very promising results on six challenging datasets, especially on large-scale LaSOT, TrackingNet, and GOT-10k benchmarks. Our tracker runs at approximatively 50 fps on GPU. Code and models are available at //github.com/chenxin-dlut/TransT.
We present a novel counterfactual framework for both Zero-Shot Learning (ZSL) and Open-Set Recognition (OSR), whose common challenge is generalizing to the unseen-classes by only training on the seen-classes. Our idea stems from the observation that the generated samples for unseen-classes are often out of the true distribution, which causes severe recognition rate imbalance between the seen-class (high) and unseen-class (low). We show that the key reason is that the generation is not Counterfactual Faithful, and thus we propose a faithful one, whose generation is from the sample-specific counterfactual question: What would the sample look like, if we set its class attribute to a certain class, while keeping its sample attribute unchanged? Thanks to the faithfulness, we can apply the Consistency Rule to perform unseen/seen binary classification, by asking: Would its counterfactual still look like itself? If ``yes'', the sample is from a certain class, and ``no'' otherwise. Through extensive experiments on ZSL and OSR, we demonstrate that our framework effectively mitigates the seen/unseen imbalance and hence significantly improves the overall performance. Note that this framework is orthogonal to existing methods, thus, it can serve as a new baseline to evaluate how ZSL/OSR models generalize. Codes are available at //github.com/yue-zhongqi/gcm-cf.
Backdoor attack intends to embed hidden backdoor into deep neural networks (DNNs), such that the attacked model performs well on benign samples, whereas its prediction will be maliciously changed if the hidden backdoor is activated by the attacker-defined trigger. Backdoor attack could happen when the training process is not fully controlled by the user, such as training on third-party datasets or adopting third-party models, which poses a new and realistic threat. Although backdoor learning is an emerging and rapidly growing research area, its systematic review, however, remains blank. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive survey of this realm. We summarize and categorize existing backdoor attacks and defenses based on their characteristics, and provide a unified framework for analyzing poisoning-based backdoor attacks. Besides, we also analyze the relation between backdoor attacks and the relevant fields ($i.e.,$ adversarial attack and data poisoning), and summarize the benchmark datasets. Finally, we briefly outline certain future research directions relying upon reviewed works.