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Uncertainty estimation is critical for numerous applications of deep neural networks and draws growing attention from researchers. Here, we demonstrate an uncertainty quantification approach for deep neural networks used in inverse problems based on cycle consistency. We build forward-backward cycles using the physical forward model available and a trained deep neural network solving the inverse problem at hand, and accordingly derive uncertainty estimators through regression analysis on the consistency of these forward-backward cycles. We theoretically analyze cycle consistency metrics and derive their relationship with respect to uncertainty, bias, and robustness of the neural network inference. To demonstrate the effectiveness of these cycle consistency-based uncertainty estimators, we classified corrupted and out-of-distribution input image data using some of the widely used image deblurring and super-resolution neural networks as testbeds. The blind testing of our method outperformed other models in identifying unseen input data corruption and distribution shifts. This work provides a simple-to-implement and rapid uncertainty quantification method that can be universally applied to various neural networks used for solving inverse problems.

State-of-the-art deep neural networks have proven to be highly powerful in a broad range of tasks, including semantic image segmentation. However, these networks are vulnerable against adversarial attacks, i.e., non-perceptible perturbations added to the input image causing incorrect predictions, which is hazardous in safety-critical applications like automated driving. Adversarial examples and defense strategies are well studied for the image classification task, while there has been limited research in the context of semantic segmentation. First works however show that the segmentation outcome can be severely distorted by adversarial attacks. In this work, we introduce an uncertainty-based method for the detection of adversarial attacks in semantic segmentation. We observe that uncertainty as for example captured by the entropy of the output distribution behaves differently on clean and perturbed images using this property to distinguish between the two cases. Our method works in a light-weight and post-processing manner, i.e., we do not modify the model or need knowledge of the process used for generating adversarial examples. In a thorough empirical analysis, we demonstrate the ability of our approach to detect perturbed images across multiple types of adversarial attacks.

The availability and accessibility of diffusion models (DMs) have significantly increased in recent years, making them a popular tool for analyzing and predicting the spread of information, behaviors, or phenomena through a population. Particularly, text-to-image diffusion models (e.g., DALLE 2 and Latent Diffusion Models (LDMs) have gained significant attention in recent years for their ability to generate high-quality images and perform various image synthesis tasks. Despite their widespread adoption in many fields, DMs are often susceptible to various intellectual property violations. These can include not only copyright infringement but also more subtle forms of misappropriation, such as unauthorized use or modification of the model. Therefore, DM owners must be aware of these potential risks and take appropriate steps to protect their models. In this work, we are the first to protect the intellectual property of DMs. We propose a simple but effective watermarking scheme that injects the watermark into the DMs and can be verified by the pre-defined prompts. In particular, we propose two different watermarking methods, namely NAIVEWM and FIXEDWM. The NAIVEWM method injects the watermark into the LDMs and activates it using a prompt containing the watermark. On the other hand, the FIXEDWM is considered more advanced and stealthy compared to the NAIVEWM, as it can only activate the watermark when using a prompt containing a trigger in a fixed position. We conducted a rigorous evaluation of both approaches, demonstrating their effectiveness in watermark injection and verification with minimal impact on the LDM's functionality.

In overhead image segmentation tasks, including additional spectral bands beyond the traditional RGB channels can improve model performance. However, it is still unclear how incorporating this additional data impacts model robustness to adversarial attacks and natural perturbations. For adversarial robustness, the additional information could improve the model's ability to distinguish malicious inputs, or simply provide new attack avenues and vulnerabilities. For natural perturbations, the additional information could better inform model decisions and weaken perturbation effects or have no significant influence at all. In this work, we seek to characterize the performance and robustness of a multispectral (RGB and near infrared) image segmentation model subjected to adversarial attacks and natural perturbations. While existing adversarial and natural robustness research has focused primarily on digital perturbations, we prioritize on creating realistic perturbations designed with physical world conditions in mind. For adversarial robustness, we focus on data poisoning attacks whereas for natural robustness, we focus on extending ImageNet-C common corruptions for fog and snow that coherently and self-consistently perturbs the input data. Overall, we find both RGB and multispectral models are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks regardless of input or fusion architectures and that while physically realizable natural perturbations still degrade model performance, the impact differs based on fusion architecture and input data.

The vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial perturbations has been widely perceived in the computer vision community. From a security perspective, it poses a critical risk for modern vision systems, e.g., the popular Deep Learning as a Service (DLaaS) frameworks. For protecting off-the-shelf deep models while not modifying them, current algorithms typically detect adversarial patterns through discriminative decomposition of natural-artificial data. However, these decompositions are biased towards frequency or spatial discriminability, thus failing to capture subtle adversarial patterns comprehensively. More seriously, they are typically invertible, meaning successful defense-aware (secondary) adversarial attack (i.e., evading the detector as well as fooling the model) is practical under the assumption that the adversary is fully aware of the detector (i.e., the Kerckhoffs's principle). Motivated by such facts, we propose an accurate and secure adversarial example detector, relying on a spatial-frequency discriminative decomposition with secret keys. It expands the above works on two aspects: 1) the introduced Krawtchouk basis provides better spatial-frequency discriminability and thereby is more suitable for capturing adversarial patterns than the common trigonometric or wavelet basis; 2) the extensive parameters for decomposition are generated by a pseudo-random function with secret keys, hence blocking the defense-aware adversarial attack. Theoretical and numerical analysis demonstrates the increased accuracy and security of our detector w.r.t. a number of state-of-the-art algorithms.

The unauthorized use of personal data for commercial purposes and the clandestine acquisition of private data for training machine learning models continue to raise concerns. In response to these issues, researchers have proposed availability attacks that aim to render data unexploitable. However, many current attack methods are rendered ineffective by adversarial training. In this paper, we re-examine the concept of unlearnable examples and discern that the existing robust error-minimizing noise presents an inaccurate optimization objective. Building on these observations, we introduce a novel optimization paradigm that yields improved protection results with reduced computational time requirements. We have conducted extensive experiments to substantiate the soundness of our approach. Moreover, our method establishes a robust foundation for future research in this area.

Adversarial attack is a technique for deceiving Machine Learning (ML) models, which provides a way to evaluate the adversarial robustness. In practice, attack algorithms are artificially selected and tuned by human experts to break a ML system. However, manual selection of attackers tends to be sub-optimal, leading to a mistakenly assessment of model security. In this paper, a new procedure called Composite Adversarial Attack (CAA) is proposed for automatically searching the best combination of attack algorithms and their hyper-parameters from a candidate pool of \textbf{32 base attackers}. We design a search space where attack policy is represented as an attacking sequence, i.e., the output of the previous attacker is used as the initialization input for successors. Multi-objective NSGA-II genetic algorithm is adopted for finding the strongest attack policy with minimum complexity. The experimental result shows CAA beats 10 top attackers on 11 diverse defenses with less elapsed time (\textbf{6 $\times$ faster than AutoAttack}), and achieves the new state-of-the-art on $l_{\infty}$, $l_{2}$ and unrestricted adversarial attacks.

As data are increasingly being stored in different silos and societies becoming more aware of data privacy issues, the traditional centralized training of artificial intelligence (AI) models is facing efficiency and privacy challenges. Recently, federated learning (FL) has emerged as an alternative solution and continue to thrive in this new reality. Existing FL protocol design has been shown to be vulnerable to adversaries within or outside of the system, compromising data privacy and system robustness. Besides training powerful global models, it is of paramount importance to design FL systems that have privacy guarantees and are resistant to different types of adversaries. In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive survey on this topic. Through a concise introduction to the concept of FL, and a unique taxonomy covering: 1) threat models; 2) poisoning attacks and defenses against robustness; 3) inference attacks and defenses against privacy, we provide an accessible review of this important topic. We highlight the intuitions, key techniques as well as fundamental assumptions adopted by various attacks and defenses. Finally, we discuss promising future research directions towards robust and privacy-preserving federated learning.

While existing work in robust deep learning has focused on small pixel-level $\ell_p$ norm-based perturbations, this may not account for perturbations encountered in several real world settings. In many such cases although test data might not be available, broad specifications about the types of perturbations (such as an unknown degree of rotation) may be known. We consider a setup where robustness is expected over an unseen test domain that is not i.i.d. but deviates from the training domain. While this deviation may not be exactly known, its broad characterization is specified a priori, in terms of attributes. We propose an adversarial training approach which learns to generate new samples so as to maximize exposure of the classifier to the attributes-space, without having access to the data from the test domain. Our adversarial training solves a min-max optimization problem, with the inner maximization generating adversarial perturbations, and the outer minimization finding model parameters by optimizing the loss on adversarial perturbations generated from the inner maximization. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach on three types of naturally occurring perturbations -- object-related shifts, geometric transformations, and common image corruptions. Our approach enables deep neural networks to be robust against a wide range of naturally occurring perturbations. We demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed approach by showing the robustness gains of deep neural networks trained using our adversarial training on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and a new variant of the CLEVR dataset.

Deep learning models on graphs have achieved remarkable performance in various graph analysis tasks, e.g., node classification, link prediction and graph clustering. However, they expose uncertainty and unreliability against the well-designed inputs, i.e., adversarial examples. Accordingly, various studies have emerged for both attack and defense addressed in different graph analysis tasks, leading to the arms race in graph adversarial learning. For instance, the attacker has poisoning and evasion attack, and the defense group correspondingly has preprocessing- and adversarial- based methods. Despite the booming works, there still lacks a unified problem definition and a comprehensive review. To bridge this gap, we investigate and summarize the existing works on graph adversarial learning tasks systemically. Specifically, we survey and unify the existing works w.r.t. attack and defense in graph analysis tasks, and give proper definitions and taxonomies at the same time. Besides, we emphasize the importance of related evaluation metrics, and investigate and summarize them comprehensively. Hopefully, our works can serve as a reference for the relevant researchers, thus providing assistance for their studies. More details of our works are available at //github.com/gitgiter/Graph-Adversarial-Learning.