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A natural goal in multiagent learning besides finding equilibria is to learn rationalizable behavior, where players learn to avoid iteratively dominated actions. However, even in the basic setting of multiplayer general-sum games, existing algorithms require a number of samples exponential in the number of players to learn rationalizable equilibria under bandit feedback. This paper develops the first line of efficient algorithms for learning rationalizable Coarse Correlated Equilibria (CCE) and Correlated Equilibria (CE) whose sample complexities are polynomial in all problem parameters including the number of players. To achieve this result, we also develop a new efficient algorithm for the simpler task of finding one rationalizable action profile (not necessarily an equilibrium), whose sample complexity substantially improves over the best existing results of Wu et al. (2021). Our algorithms incorporate several novel techniques to guarantee rationalizability and no (swap-)regret simultaneously, including a correlated exploration scheme and adaptive learning rates, which may be of independent interest. We complement our results with a sample complexity lower bound showing the sharpness of our guarantees.

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We introduce a framework for navigating through cluttered environments by connecting multiple cameras together while simultaneously preserving privacy. Occlusions and obstacles in large environments are often challenging situations for navigation agents because the environment is not fully observable from a single camera view. Given multiple camera views of an environment, our approach learns to produce a multiview scene representation that can only be used for navigation, provably preventing one party from inferring anything beyond the output task. On a new navigation dataset that we will publicly release, experiments show that private multiparty representations allow navigation through complex scenes and around obstacles while jointly preserving privacy. Our approach scales to an arbitrary number of camera viewpoints. We believe developing visual representations that preserve privacy is increasingly important for many applications such as navigation.

Many NLP tasks can be regarded as a selection problem from a set of options, such as classification tasks, multi-choice question answering, etc. Textual entailment (TE) has been shown as the state-of-the-art (SOTA) approach to dealing with those selection problems. TE treats input texts as premises (P), options as hypotheses (H), then handles the selection problem by modeling (P, H) pairwise. Two limitations: first, the pairwise modeling is unaware of other options, which is less intuitive since humans often determine the best options by comparing competing candidates; second, the inference process of pairwise TE is time-consuming, especially when the option space is large. To deal with the two issues, this work first proposes a contextualized TE model (Context-TE) by appending other k options as the context of the current (P, H) modeling. Context-TE is able to learn more reliable decision for the H since it considers various context. Second, we speed up Context-TE by coming up with Parallel-TE, which learns the decisions of multiple options simultaneously. Parallel-TE significantly improves the inference speed while keeping comparable performance with Context-TE. Our methods are evaluated on three tasks (ultra-fine entity typing, intent detection and multi-choice QA) that are typical selection problems with different sizes of options. Experiments show our models set new SOTA performance; particularly, Parallel-TE is faster than the pairwise TE by k times in inference. Our code is publicly available at //github.com/jiangshdd/LearningToSelect.

For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler 2005) equilibria -- augment the game with a mediator that has the power to both send and receive messages to and from the players -- and, in particular, to remember the messages. In this paper, we investigate both notions in extensive-form games from a computational lens. We show that optimal equilibria in both notions can be computed in polynomial time, the latter under a natural additional assumption known in the literature. Our proof works by constructing a mediator-augmented game of polynomial size that explicitly represents the mediator's decisions and actions. Our framework allows us to define an entire family of equilibria by varying the mediator's information partition, the players' ability to lie, and the players' ability to deviate. From this perspective, we show that other notions of equilibrium, such as extensive-form correlated equilibrium, correspond to the mediator having imperfect recall. This shows that, at least among all these equilibrium notions, the hardness of computation is driven by the mediator's imperfect recall. As special cases of our general construction, we recover 1) the polynomial-time algorithm of Conitzer & Sandholm (2004) for automated mechanism design in Bayes-Nash equilibria and 2) the correlation DAG algorithm of Zhang et al (2022) for optimal correlation. Our algorithm is especially scalable when the equilibrium notion is what we define as the full-certification equilibrium, where players cannot lie about their information but they can be silent. We back up our theoretical claims with experiments on a suite of standard benchmark games.

The distributed computation of a Nash equilibrium in aggregative games is gaining increased traction in recent years. Of particular interest is the mediator-free scenario where individual players only access or observe the decisions of their neighbors due to practical constraints. Given the competitive rivalry among participating players, protecting the privacy of individual players becomes imperative when sensitive information is involved. We propose a fully distributed equilibrium-computation approach for aggregative games that can achieve both rigorous differential privacy and guaranteed computation accuracy of the Nash equilibrium. This is in sharp contrast to existing differential-privacy solutions for aggregative games that have to either sacrifice the accuracy of equilibrium computation to gain rigorous privacy guarantees, or allow the cumulative privacy budget to grow unbounded, hence losing privacy guarantees, as iteration proceeds. Our approach uses independent noises across players, thus making it effective even when adversaries have access to all shared messages as well as the underlying algorithm structure. The encryption-free nature of the proposed approach, also ensures efficiency in computation and communication. The approach is also applicable in stochastic aggregative games, able to ensure both rigorous differential privacy and guaranteed computation accuracy of the Nash equilibrium when individual players only have stochastic estimates of their pseudo-gradient mappings. Numerical comparisons with existing counterparts confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

In sparse estimation, in which the sum of the loss function and the regularization term is minimized, methods such as the proximal gradient method and the proximal Newton method are applied. The former is slow to converge to a solution, while the latter converges quickly but is inefficient for problems such as group lasso problems. In this paper, we examine how to efficiently find a solution by finding the convergence destination of the proximal gradient method. However, the case in which the Lipschitz constant of the derivative of the loss function is unknown has not been studied theoretically, and only the Newton method has been proposed for the case in which the Lipschitz constant is known. We show that the Newton method converges when the Lipschitz constant is unknown and extend the theory. Furthermore, we propose a new quasi-Newton method that avoids Hessian calculations and improves efficiency, and we prove that it converges quickly, providing a theoretical guarantee. Finally, numerical experiments show that the proposed method can significantly improve the efficiency.

Building an accurate model of travel behaviour based on individuals' characteristics and built environment attributes is of importance for policy-making and transportation planning. Recent experiments with big data and Machine Learning (ML) algorithms toward a better travel behaviour analysis have mainly overlooked socially disadvantaged groups. Accordingly, in this study, we explore the travel behaviour responses of low-income individuals to transit investments in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area, Canada, using statistical and ML models. We first investigate how the model choice affects the prediction of transit use by the low-income group. This step includes comparing the predictive performance of traditional and ML algorithms and then evaluating a transit investment policy by contrasting the predicted activities and the spatial distribution of transit trips generated by vulnerable households after improving accessibility. We also empirically investigate the proposed transit investment by each algorithm and compare it with the city of Brampton's future transportation plan. While, unsurprisingly, the ML algorithms outperform classical models, there are still doubts about using them due to interpretability concerns. Hence, we adopt recent local and global model-agnostic interpretation tools to interpret how the model arrives at its predictions. Our findings reveal the great potential of ML algorithms for enhanced travel behaviour predictions for low-income strata without considerably sacrificing interpretability.

In recent years, empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) has emerged as a powerful tool for analyzing games in which an exact specification of the utilities is unavailable. Instead, EGTA assumes access to an oracle, i.e., a simulator, which can generate unbiased noisy samples of players' unknown utilities, given a strategy profile. Utilities can thus be empirically estimated by repeatedly querying the simulator. Recently, various progressive sampling (PS) algorithms have been proposed, which aim to produce PAC-style learning guarantees (e.g., approximate Nash equilibria with high probability) using as few simulator queries as possible. One recent work introduces a pruning technique called regret-pruning which further minimizes the number of simulator queries placed in PS algorithms which aim to learn pure Nash equilibria. In this paper, we address a serious limitation of this original regret pruning approach -- it is only able to guarantee that true pure Nash equilibria of the empirical game are approximate equilibria of the true game, and is unable to provide any strong guarantees regarding the efficacy of approximate pure Nash equilibria. This is a significant limitation since in many games, pure Nash equilibria are computationally intractable to find, or even non-existent. We introduce three novel regret pruning variations. The first two variations generalize the original regret pruning approach to yield guarantees for approximate pure Nash equilibria of the empirical game. The third variation goes further to even yield strong guarantees for all approximate mixed Nash equilibria of the empirical game. We use these regret pruning variations to design two novel progressive sampling algorithms, PS-REG+ and PS-REG-M, which experimentally outperform the previous state-of-the-art algorithms for learning pure and mixed equilibria, respectively, of simulation-based games.

Game theory has by now found numerous applications in various fields, including economics, industry, jurisprudence, and artificial intelligence, where each player only cares about its own interest in a noncooperative or cooperative manner, but without obvious malice to other players. However, in many practical applications, such as poker, chess, evader pursuing, drug interdiction, coast guard, cyber-security, and national defense, players often have apparently adversarial stances, that is, selfish actions of each player inevitably or intentionally inflict loss or wreak havoc on other players. Along this line, this paper provides a systematic survey on three main game models widely employed in adversarial games, i.e., zero-sum normal-form and extensive-form games, Stackelberg (security) games, zero-sum differential games, from an array of perspectives, including basic knowledge of game models, (approximate) equilibrium concepts, problem classifications, research frontiers, (approximate) optimal strategy seeking techniques, prevailing algorithms, and practical applications. Finally, promising future research directions are also discussed for relevant adversarial games.

Multimodal learning helps to comprehensively understand the world, by integrating different senses. Accordingly, multiple input modalities are expected to boost model performance, but we actually find that they are not fully exploited even when the multimodal model outperforms its uni-modal counterpart. Specifically, in this paper we point out that existing multimodal discriminative models, in which uniform objective is designed for all modalities, could remain under-optimized uni-modal representations, caused by another dominated modality in some scenarios, e.g., sound in blowing wind event, vision in drawing picture event, etc. To alleviate this optimization imbalance, we propose on-the-fly gradient modulation to adaptively control the optimization of each modality, via monitoring the discrepancy of their contribution towards the learning objective. Further, an extra Gaussian noise that changes dynamically is introduced to avoid possible generalization drop caused by gradient modulation. As a result, we achieve considerable improvement over common fusion methods on different multimodal tasks, and this simple strategy can also boost existing multimodal methods, which illustrates its efficacy and versatility. The source code is available at \url{//github.com/GeWu-Lab/OGM-GE_CVPR2022}.

Graph machine learning has been extensively studied in both academic and industry. However, as the literature on graph learning booms with a vast number of emerging methods and techniques, it becomes increasingly difficult to manually design the optimal machine learning algorithm for different graph-related tasks. To tackle the challenge, automated graph machine learning, which aims at discovering the best hyper-parameter and neural architecture configuration for different graph tasks/data without manual design, is gaining an increasing number of attentions from the research community. In this paper, we extensively discuss automated graph machine approaches, covering hyper-parameter optimization (HPO) and neural architecture search (NAS) for graph machine learning. We briefly overview existing libraries designed for either graph machine learning or automated machine learning respectively, and further in depth introduce AutoGL, our dedicated and the world's first open-source library for automated graph machine learning. Last but not least, we share our insights on future research directions for automated graph machine learning. This paper is the first systematic and comprehensive discussion of approaches, libraries as well as directions for automated graph machine learning.

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