Pseudo-games are a natural and well-known generalization of normal-form games, in which the actions taken by each player affect not only the other players' payoffs, as in games, but also the other players' strategy sets. The solution concept par excellence for pseudo-games is the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE), i.e., a strategy profile at which each player's strategy is feasible and no player can improve their payoffs by unilaterally deviating to another strategy in the strategy set determined by the other players' strategies. The computation of GNE in pseudo-games has long been a problem of interest, due to applications in a wide variety of fields, from environmental protection to logistics to telecommunications. Although computing GNE is PPAD-hard in general, it is still of interest to try to compute them in restricted classes of pseudo-games. One approach is to search for a strategy profile that minimizes exploitability, i.e., the sum of the regrets across all players. As exploitability is nondifferentiable in general, developing efficient first-order methods that minimize it might not seem possible at first glance. We observe, however, that the exploitability-minimization problem can be recast as a min-max optimization problem, and thereby obtain polynomial-time first-order methods to compute a refinement of GNE, namely the variational equilibria (VE), in convex-concave cumulative regret pseudo-games with jointly convex constraints. More generally, we also show that our methods find the stationary points of the exploitability in polynomial time in Lipschitz-smooth pseudo-games with jointly convex constraints. Finally, we demonstrate in experiments that our methods not only outperform known algorithms, but that even in pseudo-games where they are not guaranteed to converge to a GNE, they may do so nonetheless, with proper initialization.
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This paper makes 3 contributions. First, it generalizes the Lindeberg\textendash Feller and Lyapunov Central Limit Theorems to Hilbert Spaces by way of $L^2$. Second, it generalizes these results to spaces in which sample failure and missingness can occur. Finally, it shows that satisfaction of the Lindeberg\textendash Feller and Lyapunov Conditions in such spaces implies the satisfaction of the conditions in the completely observed space, and how this guarantees the consistency of inferences from the partial functional data. These latter two results are especially important given the increasing attention to statistical inference with partially observed functional data. This paper goes beyond previous research by providing simple boundedness conditions which guarantee that \textit{all} inferences, as opposed to some proper subset of them, will be consistently estimated. This is shown primarily by aggregating conditional expectations with respect to the space of missingness patterns. This paper appears to be the first to apply this technique.
The emerging modular vehicle (MV) technology possesses the ability to physically connect/disconnect with each other and thus travel in platoon for less energy consumption. Moreover, a platoon of MVs can be regarded as a new bus-like platform with expanded on-board carrying capacity and provide larger service throughput according to the demand density. This innovation concept might solve the mismatch problems between the fixed vehicle capacity and the temporal-spatial variations of demand in current transportation system. To obtain the optimal assignments and routes for the operation of MVs, a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model is formulated to minimize the weighted total cost of vehicle travel cost and passenger service time. The temporal and spatial synchronization of vehicle platoons and passenger en-route transfers are determined and optimized by the MILP model while constructing the paths. Heuristic algorithms based on large neighborhood search are developed to solve the modular dial-a-ride problem (MDARP) for practical scenarios. A set of small-scale synthetic numerical experiments are tested to evaluate the optimality gap and computation time between our proposed MILP model and heuristic algorithms. Large-scale experiments are conducted on the Anaheim network with 378 candidate join/split nodes to further explore the potentials and identify the ideal operation scenarios of MVs. The results show that the innovative MV technology can save up to 52.0% in vehicle travel cost, 35.6% in passenger service time, and 29.4% in total cost against existing on-demand mobility services. Results suggest that MVs best benefit from platooning by serving enclave pairs as a hub-and-spoke service.
For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler 2005) equilibria -- augment the game with a mediator that has the power to both send and receive messages to and from the players -- and, in particular, to remember the messages. In this paper, we investigate both notions in extensive-form games from a computational lens. We show that optimal equilibria in both notions can be computed in polynomial time, the latter under a natural additional assumption known in the literature. Our proof works by constructing a mediator-augmented game of polynomial size that explicitly represents the mediator's decisions and actions. Our framework allows us to define an entire family of equilibria by varying the mediator's information partition, the players' ability to lie, and the players' ability to deviate. From this perspective, we show that other notions of equilibrium, such as extensive-form correlated equilibrium, correspond to the mediator having imperfect recall. This shows that, at least among all these equilibrium notions, the hardness of computation is driven by the mediator's imperfect recall. As special cases of our general construction, we recover 1) the polynomial-time algorithm of Conitzer & Sandholm (2004) for automated mechanism design in Bayes-Nash equilibria and 2) the correlation DAG algorithm of Zhang et al (2022) for optimal correlation. Our algorithm is especially scalable when the equilibrium notion is what we define as the full-certification equilibrium, where players cannot lie about their information but they can be silent. We back up our theoretical claims with experiments on a suite of standard benchmark games.
In recent years, empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) has emerged as a powerful tool for analyzing games in which an exact specification of the utilities is unavailable. Instead, EGTA assumes access to an oracle, i.e., a simulator, which can generate unbiased noisy samples of players' unknown utilities, given a strategy profile. Utilities can thus be empirically estimated by repeatedly querying the simulator. Recently, various progressive sampling (PS) algorithms have been proposed, which aim to produce PAC-style learning guarantees (e.g., approximate Nash equilibria with high probability) using as few simulator queries as possible. One recent work introduces a pruning technique called regret-pruning which further minimizes the number of simulator queries placed in PS algorithms which aim to learn pure Nash equilibria. In this paper, we address a serious limitation of this original regret pruning approach -- it is only able to guarantee that true pure Nash equilibria of the empirical game are approximate equilibria of the true game, and is unable to provide any strong guarantees regarding the efficacy of approximate pure Nash equilibria. This is a significant limitation since in many games, pure Nash equilibria are computationally intractable to find, or even non-existent. We introduce three novel regret pruning variations. The first two variations generalize the original regret pruning approach to yield guarantees for approximate pure Nash equilibria of the empirical game. The third variation goes further to even yield strong guarantees for all approximate mixed Nash equilibria of the empirical game. We use these regret pruning variations to design two novel progressive sampling algorithms, PS-REG+ and PS-REG-M, which experimentally outperform the previous state-of-the-art algorithms for learning pure and mixed equilibria, respectively, of simulation-based games.
Sublinear time algorithms for approximating maximum matching size have long been studied. Much of the progress over the last two decades on this problem has been on the algorithmic side. For instance, an algorithm of Behnezhad [FOCS'21] obtains a 1/2-approximation in $\tilde{O}(n)$ time for $n$-vertex graphs. A more recent algorithm by Behnezhad, Roghani, Rubinstein, and Saberi [SODA'23] obtains a slightly-better-than-1/2 approximation in $O(n^{1+\epsilon})$ time. On the lower bound side, Parnas and Ron [TCS'07] showed 15 years ago that obtaining any constant approximation of maximum matching size requires $\Omega(n)$ time. Proving any super-linear in $n$ lower bound, even for $(1-\epsilon)$-approximations, has remained elusive since then. In this paper, we prove the first super-linear in $n$ lower bound for this problem. We show that at least $n^{1.2 - o(1)}$ queries in the adjacency list model are needed for obtaining a $(\frac{2}{3} + \Omega(1))$-approximation of maximum matching size. This holds even if the graph is bipartite and is promised to have a matching of size $\Theta(n)$. Our lower bound argument builds on techniques such as correlation decay that to our knowledge have not been used before in proving sublinear time lower bounds. We complement our lower bound by presenting two algorithms that run in strongly sublinear time of $n^{2-\Omega(1)}$. The first algorithm achieves a $(\frac{2}{3}-\epsilon)$-approximation; this significantly improves prior close-to-1/2 approximations. Our second algorithm obtains an even better approximation factor of $(\frac{2}{3}+\Omega(1))$ for bipartite graphs. This breaks the prevalent $2/3$-approximation barrier and importantly shows that our $n^{1.2-o(1)}$ time lower bound for $(\frac{2}{3}+\Omega(1))$-approximations cannot be improved all the way to $n^{2-o(1)}$.
Mobility systems often suffer from a high price of anarchy due to the uncontrolled behavior of selfish users. This may result in societal costs that are significantly higher compared to what could be achieved by a centralized system-optimal controller. Monetary tolling schemes can effectively align the behavior of selfish users with the system-optimum. Yet, they inevitably discriminate the population in terms of income. Artificial currencies were recently presented as an effective alternative that can achieve the same performance, whilst guaranteeing fairness among the population. However, those studies were based on behavioral models that may differ from practical implementations. This paper presents a data-driven approach to automatically adapt artificial-currency tolls within repetitive-game settings. We first consider a parallel-arc setting whereby users commute on a daily basis from a unique origin to a unique destination, choosing a route in exchange of an artificial-currency price or reward while accounting for the impact of the choices of the other users on travel discomfort. Second, we devise a model-based reinforcement learning controller that autonomously learns the optimal pricing policy by interacting with the proposed framework considering the closeness of the observed aggregate flows to a desired system-optimal distribution as a reward function. Our numerical results show that the proposed data-driven pricing scheme can effectively align the users' flows with the system optimum, significantly reducing the societal costs with respect to the uncontrolled flows (by about 15% and 25% depending on the scenario), and respond to environmental changes in a robust and efficient manner.
Game theory has by now found numerous applications in various fields, including economics, industry, jurisprudence, and artificial intelligence, where each player only cares about its own interest in a noncooperative or cooperative manner, but without obvious malice to other players. However, in many practical applications, such as poker, chess, evader pursuing, drug interdiction, coast guard, cyber-security, and national defense, players often have apparently adversarial stances, that is, selfish actions of each player inevitably or intentionally inflict loss or wreak havoc on other players. Along this line, this paper provides a systematic survey on three main game models widely employed in adversarial games, i.e., zero-sum normal-form and extensive-form games, Stackelberg (security) games, zero-sum differential games, from an array of perspectives, including basic knowledge of game models, (approximate) equilibrium concepts, problem classifications, research frontiers, (approximate) optimal strategy seeking techniques, prevailing algorithms, and practical applications. Finally, promising future research directions are also discussed for relevant adversarial games.
Transformers have achieved superior performances in many tasks in natural language processing and computer vision, which also intrigues great interests in the time series community. Among multiple advantages of transformers, the ability to capture long-range dependencies and interactions is especially attractive for time series modeling, leading to exciting progress in various time series applications. In this paper, we systematically review transformer schemes for time series modeling by highlighting their strengths as well as limitations through a new taxonomy to summarize existing time series transformers in two perspectives. From the perspective of network modifications, we summarize the adaptations of module level and architecture level of the time series transformers. From the perspective of applications, we categorize time series transformers based on common tasks including forecasting, anomaly detection, and classification. Empirically, we perform robust analysis, model size analysis, and seasonal-trend decomposition analysis to study how Transformers perform in time series. Finally, we discuss and suggest future directions to provide useful research guidance. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work to comprehensively and systematically summarize the recent advances of Transformers for modeling time series data. We hope this survey will ignite further research interests in time series Transformers.
Games and simulators can be a valuable platform to execute complex multi-agent, multiplayer, imperfect information scenarios with significant parallels to military applications: multiple participants manage resources and make decisions that command assets to secure specific areas of a map or neutralize opposing forces. These characteristics have attracted the artificial intelligence (AI) community by supporting development of algorithms with complex benchmarks and the capability to rapidly iterate over new ideas. The success of artificial intelligence algorithms in real-time strategy games such as StarCraft II have also attracted the attention of the military research community aiming to explore similar techniques in military counterpart scenarios. Aiming to bridge the connection between games and military applications, this work discusses past and current efforts on how games and simulators, together with the artificial intelligence algorithms, have been adapted to simulate certain aspects of military missions and how they might impact the future battlefield. This paper also investigates how advances in virtual reality and visual augmentation systems open new possibilities in human interfaces with gaming platforms and their military parallels.
Deep learning is usually described as an experiment-driven field under continuous criticizes of lacking theoretical foundations. This problem has been partially fixed by a large volume of literature which has so far not been well organized. This paper reviews and organizes the recent advances in deep learning theory. The literature is categorized in six groups: (1) complexity and capacity-based approaches for analyzing the generalizability of deep learning; (2) stochastic differential equations and their dynamic systems for modelling stochastic gradient descent and its variants, which characterize the optimization and generalization of deep learning, partially inspired by Bayesian inference; (3) the geometrical structures of the loss landscape that drives the trajectories of the dynamic systems; (4) the roles of over-parameterization of deep neural networks from both positive and negative perspectives; (5) theoretical foundations of several special structures in network architectures; and (6) the increasingly intensive concerns in ethics and security and their relationships with generalizability.
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