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In this study, we address the challenge of using energy-based models to produce high-quality, label-specific data in complex structured datasets, such as population genetics, RNA or protein sequences data. Traditional training methods encounter difficulties due to inefficient Markov chain Monte Carlo mixing, which affects the diversity of synthetic data and increases generation times. To address these issues, we use a novel training algorithm that exploits non-equilibrium effects. This approach, applied on the Restricted Boltzmann Machine, improves the model's ability to correctly classify samples and generate high-quality synthetic data in only a few sampling steps. The effectiveness of this method is demonstrated by its successful application to four different types of data: handwritten digits, mutations of human genomes classified by continental origin, functionally characterized sequences of an enzyme protein family, and homologous RNA sequences from specific taxonomies.

Analysis of high-dimensional data, where the number of covariates is larger than the sample size, is a topic of current interest. In such settings, an important goal is to estimate the signal level $\tau^2$ and noise level $\sigma^2$, i.e., to quantify how much variation in the response variable can be explained by the covariates, versus how much of the variation is left unexplained. This thesis considers the estimation of these quantities in a semi-supervised setting, where for many observations only the vector of covariates $X$ is given with no responses $Y$. Our main research question is: how can one use the unlabeled data to better estimate $\tau^2$ and $\sigma^2$? We consider two frameworks: a linear regression model and a linear projection model in which linearity is not assumed. In the first framework, while linear regression is used, no sparsity assumptions on the coefficients are made. In the second framework, the linearity assumption is also relaxed and we aim to estimate the signal and noise levels defined by the linear projection. We first propose a naive estimator which is unbiased and consistent, under some assumptions, in both frameworks. We then show how the naive estimator can be improved by using zero-estimators, where a zero-estimator is a statistic arising from the unlabeled data, whose expected value is zero. In the first framework, we calculate the optimal zero-estimator improvement and discuss ways to approximate the optimal improvement. In the second framework, such optimality does no longer hold and we suggest two zero-estimators that improve the naive estimator although not necessarily optimally. Furthermore, we show that our approach reduces the variance for general initial estimators and we present an algorithm that potentially improves any initial estimator. Lastly, we consider four datasets and study the performance of our suggested methods.

By incorporating regret minimization, double oracle methods have demonstrated rapid convergence to Nash Equilibrium (NE) in normal-form games and extensive-form games, through algorithms such as online double oracle (ODO) and extensive-form double oracle (XDO), respectively. In this study, we further examine the theoretical convergence rate and sample complexity of such regret minimization-based double oracle methods, utilizing a unified framework called Regret-Minimizing Double Oracle. Based on this framework, we extend ODO to extensive-form games and determine its sample complexity. Moreover, we demonstrate that the sample complexity of XDO can be exponential in the number of information sets $|S|$, owing to the exponentially decaying stopping threshold of restricted games. To solve this problem, we propose the Periodic Double Oracle (PDO) method, which has the lowest sample complexity among regret minimization-based double oracle methods, being only polynomial in $|S|$. Empirical evaluations on multiple poker and board games show that PDO achieves significantly faster convergence than previous double oracle algorithms and reaches a competitive level with state-of-the-art regret minimization methods.

The role of cryptocurrencies within the financial systems has been expanding rapidly in recent years among investors and institutions. It is therefore crucial to investigate the phenomena and develop statistical methods able to capture their interrelationships, the links with other global systems, and, at the same time, the serial heterogeneity. For these reasons, this paper introduces hidden Markov regression models for jointly estimating quantiles and expectiles of cryptocurrency returns using regime-switching copulas. The proposed approach allows us to focus on extreme returns and describe their temporal evolution by introducing time-dependent coefficients evolving according to a latent Markov chain. Moreover to model their time-varying dependence structure, we consider elliptical copula functions defined by state-specific parameters. Maximum likelihood estimates are obtained via an Expectation-Maximization algorithm. The empirical analysis investigates the relationship between daily returns of five cryptocurrencies and major world market indices.

We study the regret of reinforcement learning from offline data generated by a fixed behavior policy in an infinite-horizon discounted Markov decision process (MDP). While existing analyses of common approaches, such as fitted $Q$-iteration (FQI), suggest a $O(1/\sqrt{n})$ convergence for regret, empirical behavior exhibits \emph{much} faster convergence. In this paper, we present a finer regret analysis that exactly characterizes this phenomenon by providing fast rates for the regret convergence. First, we show that given any estimate for the optimal quality function $Q^*$, the regret of the policy it defines converges at a rate given by the exponentiation of the $Q^*$-estimate's pointwise convergence rate, thus speeding it up. The level of exponentiation depends on the level of noise in the \emph{decision-making} problem, rather than the estimation problem. We establish such noise levels for linear and tabular MDPs as examples. Second, we provide new analyses of FQI and Bellman residual minimization to establish the correct pointwise convergence guarantees. As specific cases, our results imply $O(1/n)$ regret rates in linear cases and $\exp(-\Omega(n))$ regret rates in tabular cases. We extend our findings to general function approximation by extending our results to regret guarantees based on $L_p$-convergence rates for estimating $Q^*$ rather than pointwise rates, where $L_2$ guarantees for nonparametric $Q^*$-estimation can be ensured under mild conditions.

Deep reinforcement learning (RL) has shown immense potential for learning to control systems through data alone. However, one challenge deep RL faces is that the full state of the system is often not observable. When this is the case, the policy needs to leverage the history of observations to infer the current state. At the same time, differences between the training and testing environments makes it critical for the policy not to overfit to the sequence of observations it sees at training time. As such, there is an important balancing act between having the history encoder be flexible enough to extract relevant information, yet be robust to changes in the environment. To strike this balance, we look to the PID controller for inspiration. We assert the PID controller's success shows that only summing and differencing are needed to accumulate information over time for many control tasks. Following this principle, we propose two architectures for encoding history: one that directly uses PID features and another that extends these core ideas and can be used in arbitrary control tasks. When compared with prior approaches, our encoders produce policies that are often more robust and achieve better performance on a variety of tracking tasks. Going beyond tracking tasks, our policies achieve 1.7x better performance on average over previous state-of-the-art methods on a suite of high dimensional control tasks.

We consider the problem of incentivising desirable behaviours in multi-agent systems by way of taxation schemes. Our study employs the concurrent games model: in this model, each agent is primarily motivated to seek the satisfaction of a goal, expressed as a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formula; secondarily, agents seek to minimise costs, where costs are imposed based on the actions taken by agents in different states of the game. In this setting, we consider an external principal who can influence agents' preferences by imposing taxes (additional costs) on the actions chosen by agents in different states. The principal imposes taxation schemes to motivate agents to choose a course of action that will lead to the satisfaction of their goal, also expressed as an LTL formula. However, taxation schemes are limited in their ability to influence agents' preferences: an agent will always prefer to satisfy its goal rather than otherwise, no matter what the costs. The fundamental question that we study is whether the principal can impose a taxation scheme such that, in the resulting game, the principal's goal is satisfied in at least one or all runs of the game that could arise by agents choosing to follow game-theoretic equilibrium strategies. We consider two different types of taxation schemes: in a static scheme, the same tax is imposed on a state-action profile pair in all circumstances, while in a dynamic scheme, the principal can choose to vary taxes depending on the circumstances. We investigate the main game-theoretic properties of this model as well as the computational complexity of the relevant decision problems.

Game theory has by now found numerous applications in various fields, including economics, industry, jurisprudence, and artificial intelligence, where each player only cares about its own interest in a noncooperative or cooperative manner, but without obvious malice to other players. However, in many practical applications, such as poker, chess, evader pursuing, drug interdiction, coast guard, cyber-security, and national defense, players often have apparently adversarial stances, that is, selfish actions of each player inevitably or intentionally inflict loss or wreak havoc on other players. Along this line, this paper provides a systematic survey on three main game models widely employed in adversarial games, i.e., zero-sum normal-form and extensive-form games, Stackelberg (security) games, zero-sum differential games, from an array of perspectives, including basic knowledge of game models, (approximate) equilibrium concepts, problem classifications, research frontiers, (approximate) optimal strategy seeking techniques, prevailing algorithms, and practical applications. Finally, promising future research directions are also discussed for relevant adversarial games.

Promoting behavioural diversity is critical for solving games with non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). Yet, there is a lack of rigorous treatment for defining diversity and constructing diversity-aware learning dynamics. In this work, we offer a geometric interpretation of behavioural diversity in games and introduce a novel diversity metric based on \emph{determinantal point processes} (DPP). By incorporating the diversity metric into best-response dynamics, we develop \emph{diverse fictitious play} and \emph{diverse policy-space response oracle} for solving normal-form games and open-ended games. We prove the uniqueness of the diverse best response and the convergence of our algorithms on two-player games. Importantly, we show that maximising the DPP-based diversity metric guarantees to enlarge the \emph{gamescape} -- convex polytopes spanned by agents' mixtures of strategies. To validate our diversity-aware solvers, we test on tens of games that show strong non-transitivity. Results suggest that our methods achieve much lower exploitability than state-of-the-art solvers by finding effective and diverse strategies.

Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) are a popular form of graphical model that, for certain classes of games, have been shown to offer key complexity and explainability advantages over traditional extensive form game (EFG) representations. In this paper, we extend previous work on MAIDs by introducing the concept of a MAID subgame, as well as subgame perfect and trembling hand perfect equilibrium refinements. We then prove several equivalence results between MAIDs and EFGs. Finally, we describe an open source implementation for reasoning about MAIDs and computing their equilibria.