The problem of scheduling unrelated machines has been studied since the inception of algorithmic mechanism design \cite{NR99}. It is a resource allocation problem that entails assigning $m$ tasks to $n$ machines for execution. Machines are regarded as strategic agents who may lie about their execution costs so as to minimize their allocated workload. To address the situation when monetary payment is not an option to compensate the machines' costs, \citeauthor{DBLP:journals/mst/Koutsoupias14} [2014] devised two \textit{truthful} mechanisms, K and P respectively, that achieve an approximation ratio of $\frac{n+1}{2}$ and $n$, for social cost minimization. In addition, no truthful mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than $\frac{n+1}{2}$. Hence, mechanism K is optimal. While approximation ratio provides a strong worst-case guarantee, it also limits us to a comprehensive understanding of mechanism performance on various inputs. This paper investigates these two scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case. We first show that mechanism K achieves a smaller social cost than mechanism P on every input. That is, mechanism K is pointwise better than mechanism P. Next, for each task $j$, when machines' execution costs $t_i^j$ are independent and identically drawn from a task-specific distribution $F^j(t)$, we show that the average-case approximation ratio of mechanism K converges to a constant. This bound is tight for mechanism K. For a better understanding of this distribution dependent constant, on the one hand, we estimate its value by plugging in a few common distributions; on the other, we show that this converging bound improves a known bound \cite{DBLP:conf/aaai/Zhang18} which only captures the single-task setting. Last, we find that the average-case approximation ratio of mechanism P converges to the same constant.
Whilst lattice-based cryptosystems are believed to be resistant to quantum attack, they are often forced to pay for that security with inefficiencies in implementation. This problem is overcome by ring- and module-based schemes such as Ring-LWE or Module-LWE, whose keysize can be reduced by exploiting its algebraic structure, allowing for faster computations. Many rings may be chosen to define such cryptoschemes, but cyclotomic rings, due to their cyclic nature allowing for easy multiplication, are the community standard. However, there is still much uncertainty as to whether this structure may be exploited to an adversary's benefit. In this paper, we show that the decomposition group of a cyclotomic ring of arbitrary conductor can be utilised to significantly decrease the dimension of the ideal (or module) lattice required to solve a given instance of SVP. Moreover, we show that there exist a large number of rational primes for which, if the prime ideal factors of an ideal lie over primes of this form, give rise to an "easy" instance of SVP. It is important to note that the work on ideal SVP does not break Ring-LWE, since its security reduction is from worst case ideal SVP to average case Ring-LWE, and is one way.
This paper introduces a Reinforcement Learning approach to better generalize heuristic dispatching rules on the Job-shop Scheduling Problem (JSP). Current models on the JSP do not focus on generalization, although, as we show in this work, this is key to learning better heuristics on the problem. A well-known technique to improve generalization is to learn on increasingly complex instances using Curriculum Learning (CL). However, as many works in the literature indicate, this technique might suffer from catastrophic forgetting when transferring the learned skills between different problem sizes. To address this issue, we introduce a novel Adversarial Curriculum Learning (ACL) strategy, which dynamically adjusts the difficulty level during the learning process to revisit the worst-performing instances. This work also presents a deep learning model to solve the JSP, which is equivariant w.r.t. the job definition and size-agnostic. Conducted experiments on Taillard's and Demirkol's instances show that the presented approach significantly improves the current state-of-the-art models on the JSP. It reduces the average optimality gap from 19.35\% to 10.46\% on Taillard's instances and from 38.43\% to 18.85\% on Demirkol's instances. Our implementation is available online.
Gradient Descent (GD) is a powerful workhorse of modern machine learning thanks to its scalability and efficiency in high-dimensional spaces. Its ability to find local minimisers is only guaranteed for losses with Lipschitz gradients, where it can be seen as a 'bona-fide' discretisation of an underlying gradient flow. Yet, many ML setups involving overparametrised models do not fall into this problem class, which has motivated research beyond the so-called "Edge of Stability", where the step-size crosses the admissibility threshold inversely proportional to the Lipschitz constant above. Perhaps surprisingly, GD has been empirically observed to still converge regardless of local instability. In this work, we study a local condition for such an unstable convergence around a local minima in a low dimensional setting. We then leverage these insights to establish global convergence of a two-layer single-neuron ReLU student network aligning with the teacher neuron in a large learning rate beyond the Edge of Stability under population loss. Meanwhile, while the difference of norms of the two layers is preserved by gradient flow, we show that GD above the edge of stability induces a balancing effect, leading to the same norms across the layers.
Recent techniques for approximating Nash equilibria in very large games leverage neural networks to learn approximately optimal policies (strategies). One promising line of research uses neural networks to approximate counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) or its modern variants. DREAM, the only current CFR-based neural method that is model free and therefore scalable to very large games, trains a neural network on an estimated regret target that can have extremely high variance due to an importance sampling term inherited from Monte Carlo CFR (MCCFR). In this paper we propose an unbiased model-free method that does not require any importance sampling. Our method, ESCHER, is principled and is guaranteed to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium with high probability in the tabular case. We show that the variance of the estimated regret of a tabular version of ESCHER with an oracle value function is significantly lower than that of outcome sampling MCCFR and tabular DREAM with an oracle value function. We then show that a deep learning version of ESCHER outperforms the prior state of the art -- DREAM and neural fictitious self play (NFSP) -- and the difference becomes dramatic as game size increases.
Machine learning typically presupposes classical probability theory which implies that aggregation is built upon expectation. There are now multiple reasons to motivate looking at richer alternatives to classical probability theory as a mathematical foundation for machine learning. We systematically examine a powerful and rich class of such alternatives, known variously as spectral risk measures, Choquet integrals or Lorentz norms. We present a range of characterization results, and demonstrate what makes this spectral family so special. In doing so we demonstrate a natural stratification of all coherent risk measures in terms of the upper probabilities that they induce by exploiting results from the theory of rearrangement invariant Banach spaces. We empirically demonstrate how this new approach to uncertainty helps tackling practical machine learning problems.
We provide sharp path-dependent generalization and excess risk guarantees for the full-batch Gradient Descent (GD) algorithm on smooth losses (possibly non-Lipschitz, possibly nonconvex), under an interpolation regime. At the heart of our analysis is a new generalization error bound for deterministic symmetric algorithms, which implies that average output stability and a bounded expected optimization error at termination lead to generalization. This result shows that small generalization error occurs along the optimization path, and allows us to bypass Lipschitz or sub-Gaussian assumptions on the loss prevalent in previous works. For nonconvex, Polyak-Lojasiewicz (PL), convex and strongly convex losses, we show the explicit dependence of the generalization error in terms of the accumulated path-dependent optimization error, terminal optimization error, number of samples, and number of iterations. For nonconvex smooth losses, we prove that full-batch GD efficiently generalizes close to any stationary point at termination, under the proper choice of a decreasing step size. Further, if the loss is nonconvex but the objective is PL, we derive quadratically vanishing bounds on the generalization error and the corresponding excess risk, for a choice of a large constant step size. For (resp. strongly-) convex smooth losses, we prove that full-batch GD also generalizes for large constant step sizes, and achieves (resp. quadratically) small excess risk while training fast. In all cases, we close the generalization error gap, by showing matching generalization and optimization error rates. Our full-batch GD generalization error and excess risk bounds are strictly tighter than existing bounds for (stochastic) GD, when the loss is smooth (but possibly non-Lipschitz).
Much of the literature on optimal design of bandit algorithms is based on minimization of expected regret. It is well known that designs that are optimal over certain exponential families can achieve expected regret that grows logarithmically in the number of arm plays, at a rate governed by the Lai-Robbins lower bound. In this paper, we show that when one uses such optimized designs, the regret distribution of the associated algorithms necessarily has a very heavy tail, specifically, that of a truncated Cauchy distribution. Furthermore, for $p>1$, the $p$'th moment of the regret distribution grows much faster than poly-logarithmically, in particular as a power of the total number of arm plays. We show that optimized UCB bandit designs are also fragile in an additional sense, namely when the problem is even slightly mis-specified, the regret can grow much faster than the conventional theory suggests. Our arguments are based on standard change-of-measure ideas, and indicate that the most likely way that regret becomes larger than expected is when the optimal arm returns below-average rewards in the first few arm plays, thereby causing the algorithm to believe that the arm is sub-optimal. To alleviate the fragility issues exposed, we show that UCB algorithms can be modified so as to ensure a desired degree of robustness to mis-specification. In doing so, we also provide a sharp trade-off between the amount of UCB exploration and the tail exponent of the resulting regret distribution.
Designing and implementing explainable systems is seen as the next step towards increasing user trust in, acceptance of and reliance on Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. While explaining choices made by black-box algorithms such as machine learning and deep learning has occupied most of the limelight, systems that attempt to explain decisions (even simple ones) in the context of social choice are steadily catching up. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey of explainability in mechanism design, a domain characterized by economically motivated agents and often having no single choice that maximizes all individual utility functions. We discuss the main properties and goals of explainability in mechanism design, distinguishing them from those of Explainable AI in general. This discussion is followed by a thorough review of challenges one may face when when working on Explainable Mechanism Design and propose a few solution concepts to those.
In selection processes such as hiring, promotion, and college admissions, implicit bias toward socially-salient attributes such as race, gender, or sexual orientation of candidates is known to produce persistent inequality and reduce aggregate utility for the decision maker. Interventions such as the Rooney Rule and its generalizations, which require the decision maker to select at least a specified number of individuals from each affected group, have been proposed to mitigate the adverse effects of implicit bias in selection. Recent works have established that such lower-bound constraints can be very effective in improving aggregate utility in the case when each individual belongs to at most one affected group. However, in several settings, individuals may belong to multiple affected groups and, consequently, face more extreme implicit bias due to this intersectionality. We consider independently drawn utilities and show that, in the intersectional case, the aforementioned non-intersectional constraints can only recover part of the total utility achievable in the absence of implicit bias. On the other hand, we show that if one includes appropriate lower-bound constraints on the intersections, almost all the utility achievable in the absence of implicit bias can be recovered. Thus, intersectional constraints can offer a significant advantage over a reductionist dimension-by-dimension non-intersectional approach to reducing inequality.
Recent studies have shown that heavy tails can emerge in stochastic optimization and that the heaviness of the tails has links to the generalization error. While these studies have shed light on interesting aspects of the generalization behavior in modern settings, they relied on strong topological and statistical regularity assumptions, which are hard to verify in practice. Furthermore, it has been empirically illustrated that the relation between heavy tails and generalization might not always be monotonic in practice, contrary to the conclusions of existing theory. In this study, we establish novel links between the tail behavior and generalization properties of stochastic gradient descent (SGD), through the lens of algorithmic stability. We consider a quadratic optimization problem and use a heavy-tailed stochastic differential equation as a proxy for modeling the heavy-tailed behavior emerging in SGD. We then prove uniform stability bounds, which reveal the following outcomes: (i) Without making any exotic assumptions, we show that SGD will not be stable if the stability is measured with the squared-loss $x\mapsto x^2$, whereas it in turn becomes stable if the stability is instead measured with a surrogate loss $x\mapsto |x|^p$ with some $p<2$. (ii) Depending on the variance of the data, there exists a \emph{`threshold of heavy-tailedness'} such that the generalization error decreases as the tails become heavier, as long as the tails are lighter than this threshold. This suggests that the relation between heavy tails and generalization is not globally monotonic. (iii) We prove matching lower-bounds on uniform stability, implying that our bounds are tight in terms of the heaviness of the tails. We support our theory with synthetic and real neural network experiments.