In selection processes such as hiring, promotion, and college admissions, implicit bias toward socially-salient attributes such as race, gender, or sexual orientation of candidates is known to produce persistent inequality and reduce aggregate utility for the decision maker. Interventions such as the Rooney Rule and its generalizations, which require the decision maker to select at least a specified number of individuals from each affected group, have been proposed to mitigate the adverse effects of implicit bias in selection. Recent works have established that such lower-bound constraints can be very effective in improving aggregate utility in the case when each individual belongs to at most one affected group. However, in several settings, individuals may belong to multiple affected groups and, consequently, face more extreme implicit bias due to this intersectionality. We consider independently drawn utilities and show that, in the intersectional case, the aforementioned non-intersectional constraints can only recover part of the total utility achievable in the absence of implicit bias. On the other hand, we show that if one includes appropriate lower-bound constraints on the intersections, almost all the utility achievable in the absence of implicit bias can be recovered. Thus, intersectional constraints can offer a significant advantage over a reductionist dimension-by-dimension non-intersectional approach to reducing inequality.
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Federated learning (FL) aims to minimize the communication complexity of training a model over heterogeneous data distributed across many clients. A common approach is local methods, where clients take multiple optimization steps over local data before communicating with the server (e.g., FedAvg). Local methods can exploit similarity between clients' data. However, in existing analyses, this comes at the cost of slow convergence in terms of the dependence on the number of communication rounds R. On the other hand, global methods, where clients simply return a gradient vector in each round (e.g., SGD), converge faster in terms of R but fail to exploit the similarity between clients even when clients are homogeneous. We propose FedChain, an algorithmic framework that combines the strengths of local methods and global methods to achieve fast convergence in terms of R while leveraging the similarity between clients. Using FedChain, we instantiate algorithms that improve upon previously known rates in the general convex and PL settings, and are near-optimal (via an algorithm-independent lower bound that we show) for problems that satisfy strong convexity. Empirical results support this theoretical gain over existing methods.
Interacting agents receive public information at no cost and flexibly acquire private information at a cost proportional to entropy reduction. When a policymaker provides more public information, agents acquire less private information, thus lowering information costs. Does more public information raise or reduce uncertainty faced by agents? Is it beneficial or detrimental to welfare? To address these questions, we examine the impacts of public information on flexible information acquisition in a linear-quadratic-Gaussian game with arbitrary quadratic material welfare. More public information raises uncertainty if and only if the game exhibits strategic complementarity, which can be harmful to welfare. However, when agents acquire a large amount of information, more provision of public information increases welfare through a substantial reduction in the cost of information. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for welfare to increase with public information and identify optimal public information disclosure, which is either full or partial disclosure depending upon the welfare function and the slope of the best response.
Cryptocurrency has been extensively studied as a decentralized financial technology built on blockchain. However, there is a lack of understanding of user experience with cryptocurrency exchanges, the main means for novice users to interact with cryptocurrency. We conduct a qualitative study to provide a panoramic view of user experience and security perception of exchanges. All 15 Chinese participants mainly use centralized exchanges (CEX) instead of decentralized exchanges (DEX) to trade decentralized cryptocurrency, which is paradoxical. A closer examination reveals that CEXes provide better usability and charge lower transaction fee than DEXes. Country-specific security perceptions are observed. Though DEXes provide better anonymity and privacy protection, and are free of governmental regulation, these are not necessary features for many participants. Based on the findings, we propose design implications to make cryptocurrency trading more decentralized.
The naive importance sampling (IS) estimator generally does not work well in examples involving simultaneous inference on several targets, as the importance weights can take arbitrarily large values, making the estimator highly unstable. In such situations, alternative multiple IS estimators involving samples from multiple proposal distributions are preferred. Just like the naive IS, the success of these multiple IS estimators crucially depends on the choice of the proposal distributions. The selection of these proposal distributions is the focus of this article. We propose three methods: (i) a geometric space filling approach, (ii) a minimax variance approach, and (iii) a maximum entropy approach. The first two methods are applicable to any IS estimator, whereas the third approach is described in the context of Doss's (2010) two-stage IS estimator. For the first method, we propose a suitable measure of 'closeness' based on the symmetric Kullback-Leibler divergence, while the second and third approaches use estimates of asymptotic variances of Doss's (2010) IS estimator and Geyer's (1994) reverse logistic regression estimator, respectively. Thus, when samples from the proposal distributions are obtained by running Markov chains, we provide consistent spectral variance estimators for these asymptotic variances. The proposed methods for selecting proposal densities are illustrated using various detailed examples.
We consider M-estimation problems, where the target value is determined using a minimizer of an expected functional of a Levy process. With discrete observations from the Levy process, we can produce a "quasi-path" by shuffling increments of the Levy process, we call it a quasi-process. Under a suitable sampling scheme, a quasi-process can converge weakly to the true process according to the properties of the stationary and independent increments. Using this resampling technique, we can estimate objective functionals similar to those estimated using the Monte Carlo simulations, and it is available as a contrast function. The M-estimator based on these quasi-processes can be consistent and asymptotically normal.
In the interdependent values (IDV) model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], agents have private signals that capture their information about different social alternatives, and the valuation of every agent is a function of all agent signals. While interdependence has been mainly studied for auctions, it is extremely relevant for a large variety of social choice settings, including the canonical setting of public projects. The IDV model is very challenging relative to standard independent private values, and welfare guarantees have been achieved through two alternative conditions known as {\em single-crossing} and {\em submodularity over signals (SOS)}. In either case, the existing theory falls short of solving the public projects setting. Our contribution is twofold: (i) We give a workable characterization of truthfulness for IDV public projects for the largest class of valuations for which such a characterization exists, and term this class \emph{decomposable valuations}; (ii) We provide possibility and impossibility results for welfare approximation in public projects with SOS valuations. Our main impossibility result is that, in contrast to auctions, no universally truthful mechanism performs better for public projects with SOS valuations than choosing a project at random. Our main positive result applies to {\em excludable} public projects with SOS, for which we establish a constant factor approximation similar to auctions. Our results suggest that exclusion may be a key tool for achieving welfare guarantees in the IDV model.
We study the performance of a phase-noise impaired double reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS)-aided multiuser (MU) multiple-input single-output (MISO) system under spatial correlation at both RISs and base-station (BS). The downlink achievable rate is derived in closed-form under maximum ratio transmission (MRT) precoding. In addition, we obtain the optimal phase-shift design at both RISs in closed-form for the considered channel and phase-noise models. Numerical results validate the analytical expressions, and highlight the effects of different system parameters on the achievable rate. Our analysis shows that phase-noise can severely degrade the performance when users do not have direct links to both RISs, and can only be served via the double-reflection link. Also, we show that high spatial correlation at RISs is essential for high achievable rates.
Enforcing fairness in private federated learning via the modified method of differential multipliers
Federated learning with differential privacy, or private federated learning, provides a strategy to train machine learning models while respecting users' privacy. However, differential privacy can disproportionately degrade the performance of the models on under-represented groups, as these parts of the distribution are difficult to learn in the presence of noise. Existing approaches for enforcing fairness in machine learning models have considered the centralized setting, in which the algorithm has access to the users' data. This paper introduces an algorithm to enforce group fairness in private federated learning, where users' data does not leave their devices. First, the paper extends the modified method of differential multipliers to empirical risk minimization with fairness constraints, thus providing an algorithm to enforce fairness in the central setting. Then, this algorithm is extended to the private federated learning setting. The proposed algorithm, \texttt{FPFL}, is tested on a federated version of the Adult dataset and an "unfair" version of the FEMNIST dataset. The experiments on these datasets show how private federated learning accentuates unfairness in the trained models, and how FPFL is able to mitigate such unfairness.
Learning accurate classifiers for novel categories from very few examples, known as few-shot image classification, is a challenging task in statistical machine learning and computer vision. The performance in few-shot classification suffers from the bias in the estimation of classifier parameters; however, an effective underlying bias reduction technique that could alleviate this issue in training few-shot classifiers has been overlooked. In this work, we demonstrate the effectiveness of Firth bias reduction in few-shot classification. Theoretically, Firth bias reduction removes the $O(N^{-1})$ first order term from the small-sample bias of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator. Here we show that the general Firth bias reduction technique simplifies to encouraging uniform class assignment probabilities for multinomial logistic classification, and almost has the same effect in cosine classifiers. We derive an easy-to-implement optimization objective for Firth penalized multinomial logistic and cosine classifiers, which is equivalent to penalizing the cross-entropy loss with a KL-divergence between the uniform label distribution and the predictions. Then, we empirically evaluate that it is consistently effective across the board for few-shot image classification, regardless of (1) the feature representations from different backbones, (2) the number of samples per class, and (3) the number of classes. Finally, we show the robustness of Firth bias reduction, in the case of imbalanced data distribution. Our implementation is available at //github.com/ehsansaleh/firth_bias_reduction
In variable selection, a selection rule that prescribes the permissible sets of selected variables (called a "selection dictionary") is desirable due to the inherent structural constraints among the candidate variables. The methods that can incorporate such restrictions can improve model interpretability and prediction accuracy. Penalized regression can integrate selection rules by assigning the coefficients to different groups and then applying penalties to the groups. However, no general framework has been proposed to formalize selection rules and their applications. In this work, we establish a framework for structured variable selection that can incorporate universal structural constraints. We develop a mathematical language for constructing arbitrary selection rules, where the selection dictionary is formally defined. We show that all selection rules can be represented as a combination of operations on constructs, which can be used to identify the related selection dictionary. One may then apply some criteria to select the best model. We show that the theoretical framework can help to identify the grouping structure in existing penalized regression methods. In addition, we formulate structured variable selection into mixed-integer optimization problems which can be solved by existing software. Finally, we discuss the significance of the framework in the context of statistics.
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