We study a multi-round welfare-maximising mechanism design problem in instances where agents do not know their values. On each round, a mechanism first assigns an allocation each to a set of agents and charges them a price; at the end of the round, the agents provide (stochastic) feedback to the mechanism for the allocation they received. This setting is motivated by applications in cloud markets and online advertising where an agent may know her value for an allocation only after experiencing it. Therefore, the mechanism needs to explore different allocations for each agent so that it can learn their values, while simultaneously attempting to find the socially optimal set of allocations. Our focus is on truthful and individually rational mechanisms which imitate the classical VCG mechanism in the long run. To that end, we first define three notions of regret for the welfare, the individual utilities of each agent and that of the mechanism. We show that these three terms are interdependent via an $\Omega(T^{\frac{2}{3}})$ lower bound for the maximum of these three terms after $T$ rounds of allocations, and describe an algorithm which essentially achieves this rate. Our framework also provides flexibility to control the pricing scheme so as to trade-off between the agent and seller regrets. Next, we define asymptotic variants for the truthfulness and individual rationality requirements and provide asymptotic rates to quantify the degree to which both properties are satisfied by the proposed algorithm.
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The problem of scheduling unrelated machines has been studied since the inception of algorithmic mechanism design \cite{NR99}. It is a resource allocation problem that entails assigning $m$ tasks to $n$ machines for execution. Machines are regarded as strategic agents who may lie about their execution costs so as to minimize their allocated workload. To address the situation when monetary payment is not an option to compensate the machines' costs, \citeauthor{DBLP:journals/mst/Koutsoupias14} [2014] devised two \textit{truthful} mechanisms, K and P respectively, that achieve an approximation ratio of $\frac{n+1}{2}$ and $n$, for social cost minimization. In addition, no truthful mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than $\frac{n+1}{2}$. Hence, mechanism K is optimal. While approximation ratio provides a strong worst-case guarantee, it also limits us to a comprehensive understanding of mechanism performance on various inputs. This paper investigates these two scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case. We first show that mechanism K achieves a smaller social cost than mechanism P on every input. That is, mechanism K is pointwise better than mechanism P. Next, for each task $j$, when machines' execution costs $t_i^j$ are independent and identically drawn from a task-specific distribution $F^j(t)$, we show that the average-case approximation ratio of mechanism K converges to a constant. This bound is tight for mechanism K. For a better understanding of this distribution dependent constant, on the one hand, we estimate its value by plugging in a few common distributions; on the other, we show that this converging bound improves a known bound \cite{DBLP:conf/aaai/Zhang18} which only captures the single-task setting. Last, we find that the average-case approximation ratio of mechanism P converges to the same constant.
We study a new two-time-scale stochastic gradient method for solving optimization problems, where the gradients are computed with the aid of an auxiliary variable under samples generated by time-varying Markov random processes parameterized by the underlying optimization variable. These time-varying samples make gradient directions in our update biased and dependent, which can potentially lead to the divergence of the iterates. In our two-time-scale approach, one scale is to estimate the true gradient from these samples, which is then used to update the estimate of the optimal solution. While these two iterates are implemented simultaneously, the former is updated "faster" (using bigger step sizes) than the latter (using smaller step sizes). Our first contribution is to characterize the finite-time complexity of the proposed two-time-scale stochastic gradient method. In particular, we provide explicit formulas for the convergence rates of this method under different structural assumptions, namely, strong convexity, convexity, the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition, and general non-convexity. We apply our framework to two problems in control and reinforcement learning. First, we look at the standard online actor-critic algorithm over finite state and action spaces and derive a convergence rate of O(k^(-2/5)), which recovers the best known rate derived specifically for this problem. Second, we study an online actor-critic algorithm for the linear-quadratic regulator and show that a convergence rate of O(k^(-2/3)) is achieved. This is the first time such a result is known in the literature. Finally, we support our theoretical analysis with numerical simulations where the convergence rates are visualized.
Given a set $P$ of $n$ points in the plane, the $k$-center problem is to find $k$ congruent disks of minimum possible radius such that their union covers all the points in $P$. The $2$-center problem is a special case of the $k$-center problem that has been extensively studied in the recent past \cite{CAHN,HT,SH}. In this paper, we consider a generalized version of the $2$-center problem called \textit{proximity connected} $2$-center (PCTC) problem. In this problem, we are also given a parameter $\delta\geq 0$ and we have the additional constraint that the distance between the centers of the disks should be at most $\delta$. Note that when $\delta=0$, the PCTC problem is reduced to the $1$-center(minimum enclosing disk) problem and when $\delta$ tends to infinity, it is reduced to the $2$-center problem. The PCTC problem first appeared in the context of wireless networks in 1992 \cite{ACN0}, but obtaining a nontrivial deterministic algorithm for the problem remained open. In this paper, we resolve this open problem by providing a deterministic $O(n^2\log n)$ time algorithm for the problem.
This paper focuses on stochastic saddle point problems with decision-dependent distributions. These are problems whose objective is the expected value of a stochastic payoff function, where random variables are drawn from a distribution induced by a distributional map. For general distributional maps, the problem of finding saddle points is in general computationally burdensome, even if the distribution is known. To enable a tractable solution approach, we introduce the notion of equilibrium points -- which are saddle points for the stationary stochastic minimax problem that they induce -- and provide conditions for their existence and uniqueness. We demonstrate that the distance between the two solution types is bounded provided that the objective has a strongly-convex-strongly-concave payoff and a Lipschitz continuous distributional map. We develop deterministic and stochastic primal-dual algorithms and demonstrate their convergence to the equilibrium point. In particular, by modeling errors emerging from a stochastic gradient estimator as sub-Weibull random variables, we provide error bounds in expectation and in high probability that hold for each iteration. Moreover, we show convergence to a neighborhood almost surely. Finally, we investigate a condition on the distributional map -- which we call opposing mixture dominance -- that ensures that the objective is strongly-convex-strongly-concave. We tailor the convergence results for the primal-dual algorithms to this opposing mixture dominance setup.
We provide a decision theoretic analysis of bandit experiments. The setting corresponds to a dynamic programming problem, but solving this directly is typically infeasible. Working within the framework of diffusion asymptotics, we define suitable notions of asymptotic Bayes and minimax risk for bandit experiments. For normally distributed rewards, the minimal Bayes risk can be characterized as the solution to a nonlinear second-order partial differential equation (PDE). Using a limit of experiments approach, we show that this PDE characterization also holds asymptotically under both parametric and non-parametric distribution of the rewards. The approach further describes the state variables it is asymptotically sufficient to restrict attention to, and therefore suggests a practical strategy for dimension reduction. The upshot is that we can approximate the dynamic programming problem defining the bandit experiment with a PDE which can be efficiently solved using sparse matrix routines. We derive the optimal Bayes and minimax policies from the numerical solutions to these equations. The proposed policies substantially dominate existing methods such as Thompson sampling. The framework also allows for substantial generalizations to the bandit problem such as time discounting and pure exploration motives.
In the storied Colonel Blotto game, two colonels allocate $a$ and $b$ troops, respectively, to $k$ distinct battlefields. A colonel wins a battle if they assign more troops to that particular battle, and each colonel seeks to maximize their total number of victories. Despite the problem's formulation in 1921, the first polynomial-time algorithm to compute Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies for this game was discovered only quite recently. In 2016, \citep{ahmadinejad_dehghani_hajiaghayi_lucier_mahini_seddighin_2019} formulated a breakthrough algorithm to compute NE strategies for the Colonel Blotto game\footnote{To the best of our knowledge, the algorithm from \citep{ahmadinejad_dehghani_hajiaghayi_lucier_mahini_seddighin_2019} has computational complexity $O(k^{14}\max\{a,b\}^{13})$}, receiving substantial media coverage (e.g. \citep{Insider}, \citep{NSF}, \citep{ScienceDaily}). In this work, we present the first known $\epsilon$-approximation algorithm to compute NE strategies in the two-player Colonel Blotto game in runtime $\widetilde{O}(\epsilon^{-4} k^8 \max\{a,b\}^2)$ for arbitrary settings of these parameters. Moreover, this algorithm computes approximate coarse correlated equilibrium strategies in the multiplayer (continuous and discrete) Colonel Blotto game (when there are $\ell > 2$ colonels) with runtime $\widetilde{O}(\ell \epsilon^{-4} k^8 n^2 + \ell^2 \epsilon^{-2} k^3 n (n+k))$, where $n$ is the maximum troop count. Before this work, no polynomial-time algorithm was known to compute exact or approximate equilibrium (in any sense) strategies for multiplayer Colonel Blotto with arbitrary parameters. Our algorithm computes these approximate equilibria by a novel (to the author's knowledge) sampling technique with which we implicitly perform multiplicative weights update over the exponentially many strategies available to each player.
The stochastic gradient Langevin Dynamics is one of the most fundamental algorithms to solve sampling problems and non-convex optimization appearing in several machine learning applications. Especially, its variance reduced versions have nowadays gained particular attention. In this paper, we study two variants of this kind, namely, the Stochastic Variance Reduced Gradient Langevin Dynamics and the Stochastic Recursive Gradient Langevin Dynamics. We prove their convergence to the objective distribution in terms of KL-divergence under the sole assumptions of smoothness and Log-Sobolev inequality which are weaker conditions than those used in prior works for these algorithms. With the batch size and the inner loop length set to $\sqrt{n}$, the gradient complexity to achieve an $\epsilon$-precision is $\tilde{O}((n+dn^{1/2}\epsilon^{-1})\gamma^2 L^2\alpha^{-2})$, which is an improvement from any previous analyses. We also show some essential applications of our result to non-convex optimization.
Vector Perturbation Precoding (VPP) can speed up downlink data transmissions in Large and Massive Multi-User MIMO systems but is known to be NP-hard. While there are several algorithms in the literature for VPP under total power constraint, they are not applicable for VPP under per-antenna power constraint. This paper proposes a novel, parallel tree search algorithm for VPP under per-antenna power constraint, called \emph{\textbf{TreeStep}}, to find good quality solutions to the VPP problem with practical computational complexity. We show that our method can provide huge performance gain over simple linear precoding like Regularised Zero Forcing. We evaluate TreeStep for several large MIMO~($16\times16$ and $24\times24$) and massive MIMO~($16\times32$ and $24\times 48$) and demonstrate that TreeStep outperforms the popular polynomial-time VPP algorithm, the Fixed Complexity Sphere Encoder, by achieving the extremely low BER of $10^{-6}$ at a much lower SNR.
Mechanism design is a central research branch in microeconomics. An effective mechanism can significantly improve performance and efficiency of social decisions under desired objectives, such as to maximize social welfare or to maximize revenue for agents. However, mechanism design is challenging for many common models including the public project problem model which we study in this thesis. A typical public project problem is a group of agents crowdfunding a public project (e.g., building a bridge). The mechanism will decide the payment and allocation for each agent (e.g., how much the agent pays, and whether the agent can use it) according to their valuations. The mechanism can be applied to various economic scenarios, including those related to cyber security. There are different constraints and optimized objectives for different public project scenarios (sub-problems), making it unrealistic to design a universal mechanism that fits all scenarios, and designing mechanisms for different settings manually is a taxing job. Therefore, we explore automated mechanism design (AMD) of public project problems under different constraints. In this thesis, we focus on the public project problem, which includes many sub-problems (excludable/non-excludable, divisible/indivisible, binary/non-binary). We study the classical public project model and extend this model to other related areas such as the zero-day exploit markets. For different sub-problems of the public project problem, we adopt different novel machine learning techniques to design optimal or near-optimal mechanisms via automated mechanism design. We evaluate our mechanisms by theoretical analysis or experimentally comparing our mechanisms against existing mechanisms. The experiments and theoretical results show that our mechanisms are better than state-of-the-art automated or manual mechanisms.
We prove linear convergence of gradient descent to a global minimum for the training of deep residual networks with constant layer width and smooth activation function. We further show that the trained weights, as a function of the layer index, admits a scaling limit which is H\"older continuous as the depth of the network tends to infinity. The proofs are based on non-asymptotic estimates of the loss function and of norms of the network weights along the gradient descent path. We illustrate the relevance of our theoretical results to practical settings using detailed numerical experiments on supervised learning problems.
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