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This paper focuses on parameter estimation and introduces a new method for lower bounding the Bayesian risk. The method allows for the use of virtually \emph{any} information measure, including R\'enyi's $\alpha$, $\varphi$-Divergences, and Sibson's $\alpha$-Mutual Information. The approach considers divergences as functionals of measures and exploits the duality between spaces of measures and spaces of functions. In particular, we show that one can lower bound the risk with any information measure by upper bounding its dual via Markov's inequality. We are thus able to provide estimator-independent impossibility results thanks to the Data-Processing Inequalities that divergences satisfy. The results are then applied to settings of interest involving both discrete and continuous parameters, including the ``Hide-and-Seek'' problem, and compared to the state-of-the-art techniques. An important observation is that the behaviour of the lower bound in the number of samples is influenced by the choice of the information measure. We leverage this by introducing a new divergence inspired by the ``Hockey-Stick'' Divergence, which is demonstrated empirically to provide the largest lower-bound across all considered settings. If the observations are subject to privatisation, stronger impossibility results can be obtained via Strong Data-Processing Inequalities. The paper also discusses some generalisations and alternative directions.

This paper focuses on parameter estimation and introduces a new method for lower bounding the Bayesian risk. The method allows for the use of virtually \emph{any} information measure, including R\'enyi's $\alpha$, $\varphi$-Divergences, and Sibson's $\alpha$-Mutual Information. The approach considers divergences as functionals of measures and exploits the duality between spaces of measures and spaces of functions. In particular, we show that one can lower bound the risk with any information measure by upper bounding its dual via Markov's inequality. We are thus able to provide estimator-independent impossibility results thanks to the Data-Processing Inequalities that divergences satisfy. The results are then applied to settings of interest involving both discrete and continuous parameters, including the ``Hide-and-Seek'' problem, and compared to the state-of-the-art techniques. An important observation is that the behaviour of the lower bound in the number of samples is influenced by the choice of the information measure. We leverage this by introducing a new divergence inspired by the ``Hockey-Stick'' Divergence, which is demonstrated empirically to provide the largest lower-bound across all considered settings. If the observations are subject to privatisation, stronger impossibility results can be obtained via Strong Data-Processing Inequalities. The paper also discusses some generalisations and alternative directions.

This paper addresses the problem of constrained multi-objective optimization over black-box objective functions with practitioner-specified preferences over the objectives when a large fraction of the input space is infeasible (i.e., violates constraints). This problem arises in many engineering design problems including analog circuits and electric power system design. Our overall goal is to approximate the optimal Pareto set over the small fraction of feasible input designs. The key challenges include the huge size of the design space, multiple objectives and large number of constraints, and the small fraction of feasible input designs which can be identified only after performing expensive simulations. We propose a novel and efficient preference-aware constrained multi-objective Bayesian optimization approach referred to as PAC-MOO to address these challenges. The key idea is to learn surrogate models for both output objectives and constraints, and select the candidate input for evaluation in each iteration that maximizes the information gained about the optimal constrained Pareto front while factoring in the preferences over objectives. Our experiments on two real-world analog circuit design optimization problems demonstrate the efficacy of PAC-MOO over prior methods.

This paper focuses on parameter estimation and introduces a new method for lower bounding the Bayesian risk. The method allows for the use of virtually \emph{any} information measure, including R\'enyi's $\alpha$, $\varphi$-Divergences, and Sibson's $\alpha$-Mutual Information. The approach considers divergences as functionals of measures and exploits the duality between spaces of measures and spaces of functions. In particular, we show that one can lower bound the risk with any information measure by upper bounding its dual via Markov's inequality. We are thus able to provide estimator-independent impossibility results thanks to the Data-Processing Inequalities that divergences satisfy. The results are then applied to settings of interest involving both discrete and continuous parameters, including the ``Hide-and-Seek'' problem, and compared to the state-of-the-art techniques. An important observation is that the behaviour of the lower bound in the number of samples is influenced by the choice of the information measure. We leverage this by introducing a new divergence inspired by the ``Hockey-Stick'' Divergence, which is demonstrated empirically to provide the largest lower-bound across all considered settings. If the observations are subject to privatisation, stronger impossibility results can be obtained via Strong Data-Processing Inequalities. The paper also discusses some generalisations and alternative directions.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent transition probabilities. Moreover, players can receive only realizations of their payoffs, not the actual functions, and cannot observe each other's states/actions. For this class of games, we first show that finding a stationary Nash equilibrium (NE) policy without any assumption on the reward functions is interactable. However, for general reward functions, we develop polynomial-time learning algorithms based on dual averaging and dual mirror descent, which converge in terms of the averaged Nikaido-Isoda distance to the set of $\epsilon$-NE policies almost surely or in expectation. In particular, under extra assumptions on the reward functions such as social concavity, we derive polynomial upper bounds on the number of iterates to achieve an $\epsilon$-NE policy with high probability. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms in learning $\epsilon$-NE policies using numerical experiments for energy management in smart grids.

In high-dimensional time-series analysis, it is essential to have a set of key factors (namely, the style factors) that explain the change of the observed variable. For example, volatility modeling in finance relies on a set of risk factors, and climate change studies in climatology rely on a set of causal factors. The ideal low-dimensional style factors should balance significance (with high explanatory power) and stability (consistent, no significant fluctuations). However, previous supervised and unsupervised feature extraction methods can hardly address the tradeoff. In this paper, we propose Style Miner, a reinforcement learning method to generate style factors. We first formulate the problem as a Constrained Markov Decision Process with explanatory power as the return and stability as the constraint. Then, we design fine-grained immediate rewards and costs and use a Lagrangian heuristic to balance them adaptively. Experiments on real-world financial data sets show that Style Miner outperforms existing learning-based methods by a large margin and achieves a relatively 10% gain in R-squared explanatory power compared to the industry-renowned factors proposed by human experts.

The study of market equilibria is central to economic theory, particularly in efficiently allocating scarce resources. However, the computation of equilibrium prices at which the supply of goods matches their demand typically relies on having access to complete information on private attributes of agents, e.g., suppliers' cost functions, which are often unavailable in practice. Motivated by this practical consideration, we consider the problem of setting equilibrium prices in the incomplete information setting wherein a market operator seeks to satisfy the customer demand for a commodity by purchasing the required amount from competing suppliers with privately known cost functions unknown to the market operator. In this incomplete information setting, we consider the online learning problem of learning equilibrium prices over time while jointly optimizing three performance metrics -- unmet demand, cost regret, and payment regret -- pertinent in the context of equilibrium pricing over a horizon of $T$ periods. We first consider the setting when suppliers' cost functions are fixed and develop algorithms that achieve a regret of $O(\log \log T)$ when the customer demand is constant over time, or $O(\sqrt{T} \log \log T)$ when the demand is variable over time. Next, we consider the setting when the suppliers' cost functions can vary over time and illustrate that no online algorithm can achieve sublinear regret on all three metrics when the market operator has no information about how the cost functions change over time. Thus, we consider an augmented setting wherein the operator has access to hints/contexts that, without revealing the complete specification of the cost functions, reflect the variation in the cost functions over time and propose an algorithm with sublinear regret in this augmented setting.

We consider the problem of autonomous navigation using limited information from a remote sensor network. Because the remote sensors are power and bandwidth limited, we use event-triggered (ET) estimation to manage communication costs. We introduce a fast and efficient sampling-based planner which computes motion plans coupled with ET communication strategies that minimize communication costs, while satisfying constraints on the probability of reaching the goal region and the point-wise probability of collision. We derive a novel method for offline propagation of the expected state distribution, and corresponding bounds on this distribution. These bounds are used to evaluate the chance constraints in the algorithm. Case studies establish the validity of our approach, demonstrating fast computation of optimal plans.

Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) are a popular form of graphical model that, for certain classes of games, have been shown to offer key complexity and explainability advantages over traditional extensive form game (EFG) representations. In this paper, we extend previous work on MAIDs by introducing the concept of a MAID subgame, as well as subgame perfect and trembling hand perfect equilibrium refinements. We then prove several equivalence results between MAIDs and EFGs. Finally, we describe an open source implementation for reasoning about MAIDs and computing their equilibria.