We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad class of coordination games, including the popular framework known as \textit{global games}. With the goal of studying the extent to which agents engaging in a stochastic coordination game indeed coordinate, we propose a new probabilistic measure of coordination efficiency. Then, we provide an universal information theoretic upper bound on the coordination efficiency as a function of the amount of noise in the observation channels. Finally, we revisit a large class of global games, and we illustrate that their Nash equilibrium policies may be less coordination efficient then certainty equivalent policies, despite of them providing better expected utility. This counter-intuitive result, establishes the existence of a nontrivial trade-offs between coordination efficiency and expected utility in coordination games.
相關內容
In this work we consider a generalization of the well-known multivehicle routing problem: given a network, a set of agents occupying a subset of its nodes, and a set of tasks, we seek a minimum cost sequence of movements subject to the constraint that each task is visited by some agent at least once. The classical version of this problem assumes a central computational server that observes the entire state of the system perfectly and directs individual agents according to a centralized control scheme. In contrast, we assume that there is no centralized server and that each agent is an individual processor with no a priori knowledge of the underlying network (including task and agent locations). Moreover, our agents possess strictly local communication and sensing capabilities (restricted to a fixed radius around their respective locations), aligning more closely with several real-world multiagent applications. These restrictions introduce many challenges that are overcome through local information sharing and direct coordination between agents. We present a fully distributed, online, and scalable reinforcement learning algorithm for this problem whereby agents self-organize into local clusters and independently apply a multiagent rollout scheme locally to each cluster. We demonstrate empirically via extensive simulations that there exists a critical sensing radius beyond which the distributed rollout algorithm begins to improve over a greedy base policy. This critical sensing radius grows proportionally to the $\log^*$ function of the size of the network, and is, therefore, a small constant for any relevant network. Our decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm achieves approximately a factor of two cost improvement over the base policy for a range of radii bounded from below and above by two and three times the critical sensing radius, respectively.
In this paper, we study an optimal online resource reservation problem in a simple communication network. The network is composed of two compute nodes linked by a local communication link. The system operates in discrete time; at each time slot, the administrator reserves resources for servers before the actual job requests are known. A cost is incurred for the reservations made. Then, after the client requests are observed, jobs may be transferred from one server to the other to best accommodate the demands by incurring an additional transport cost. If certain job requests cannot be satisfied, there is a violation that engenders a cost to pay for each of the blocked jobs. The goal is to minimize the overall reservation cost over finite horizons while maintaining the cumulative violation and transport costs under a certain budget limit. To study this problem, we first formalize it as a repeated game against nature where the reservations are drawn randomly according to a sequence of probability distributions that are derived from an online optimization problem over the space of allowable reservations. We then propose an online saddle-point algorithm for which we present an upper bound for the associated K-benchmark regret together with an upper bound for the cumulative constraint violations. Finally, we present numerical experiments where we compare the performance of our algorithm with those of simple deterministic resource allocation policies.
The analysis of human movements has been extensively studied due to its wide variety of practical applications, such as human-robot interaction, human learning applications, or clinical diagnosis. Nevertheless, the state-of-the-art still faces scientific challenges when modeling human movements. To begin, new models must account for the stochasticity of human movement and the physical structure of the human body in order to accurately predict the evolution of full-body motion descriptors over time. Second, while utilizing deep learning algorithms, their explainability in terms of body posture predictions needs to be improved as they lack comprehensible representations of human movement. This paper addresses these challenges by introducing three novel methods for creating explainable representations of human movement. In this study, human body movement is formulated as a state-space model adhering to the structure of the Gesture Operational Model (GOM), whose parameters are estimated through the application of deep learning and statistical algorithms. The trained models are used for the full-body dexterity analysis of expert professionals, in which dynamic associations between body joints are identified, and for generating artificially professional movements.
Conventional federated learning algorithms train a single global model by leveraging all participating clients' data. However, due to heterogeneity in client generative distributions and predictive models, these approaches may not appropriately approximate the predictive process, converge to an optimal state, or generalize to new clients. We study personalization and generalization in stateless cross-device federated learning setups assuming heterogeneity in client data distributions and predictive models. We first propose a hierarchical generative model and formalize it using Bayesian Inference. We then approximate this process using Variational Inference to train our model efficiently. We call this algorithm Federated Variational Inference (FedVI). We use PAC-Bayes analysis to provide generalization bounds for FedVI. We evaluate our model on FEMNIST and CIFAR-100 image classification and show that FedVI beats the state-of-the-art on both tasks.
We introduce DeepNash, an autonomous agent capable of learning to play the imperfect information game Stratego from scratch, up to a human expert level. Stratego is one of the few iconic board games that Artificial Intelligence (AI) has not yet mastered. This popular game has an enormous game tree on the order of $10^{535}$ nodes, i.e., $10^{175}$ times larger than that of Go. It has the additional complexity of requiring decision-making under imperfect information, similar to Texas hold'em poker, which has a significantly smaller game tree (on the order of $10^{164}$ nodes). Decisions in Stratego are made over a large number of discrete actions with no obvious link between action and outcome. Episodes are long, with often hundreds of moves before a player wins, and situations in Stratego can not easily be broken down into manageably-sized sub-problems as in poker. For these reasons, Stratego has been a grand challenge for the field of AI for decades, and existing AI methods barely reach an amateur level of play. DeepNash uses a game-theoretic, model-free deep reinforcement learning method, without search, that learns to master Stratego via self-play. The Regularised Nash Dynamics (R-NaD) algorithm, a key component of DeepNash, converges to an approximate Nash equilibrium, instead of 'cycling' around it, by directly modifying the underlying multi-agent learning dynamics. DeepNash beats existing state-of-the-art AI methods in Stratego and achieved a yearly (2022) and all-time top-3 rank on the Gravon games platform, competing with human expert players.
Effective multi-robot teams require the ability to move to goals in complex environments in order to address real-world applications such as search and rescue. Multi-robot teams should be able to operate in a completely decentralized manner, with individual robot team members being capable of acting without explicit communication between neighbors. In this paper, we propose a novel game theoretic model that enables decentralized and communication-free navigation to a goal position. Robots each play their own distributed game by estimating the behavior of their local teammates in order to identify behaviors that move them in the direction of the goal, while also avoiding obstacles and maintaining team cohesion without collisions. We prove theoretically that generated actions approach a Nash equilibrium, which also corresponds to an optimal strategy identified for each robot. We show through extensive simulations that our approach enables decentralized and communication-free navigation by a multi-robot system to a goal position, and is able to avoid obstacles and collisions, maintain connectivity, and respond robustly to sensor noise.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly becoming integrated into military Command and Control (C2) systems as a strategic priority for many defence forces. The successful implementation of AI is promising to herald a significant leap in C2 agility through automation. However, realistic expectations need to be set on what AI can achieve in the foreseeable future. This paper will argue that AI could lead to a fragility trap, whereby the delegation of C2 functions to an AI could increase the fragility of C2, resulting in catastrophic strategic failures. This calls for a new framework for AI in C2 to avoid this trap. We will argue that antifragility along with agility should form the core design principles for AI-enabled C2 systems. This duality is termed Agile, Antifragile, AI-Enabled Command and Control (A3IC2). An A3IC2 system continuously improves its capacity to perform in the face of shocks and surprises through overcompensation from feedback during the C2 decision-making cycle. An A3IC2 system will not only be able to survive within a complex operational environment, it will also thrive, benefiting from the inevitable shocks and volatility of war.
Bid optimization for online advertising from single advertiser's perspective has been thoroughly investigated in both academic research and industrial practice. However, existing work typically assume competitors do not change their bids, i.e., the wining price is fixed, leading to poor performance of the derived solution. Although a few studies use multi-agent reinforcement learning to set up a cooperative game, they still suffer the following drawbacks: (1) They fail to avoid collusion solutions where all the advertisers involved in an auction collude to bid an extremely low price on purpose. (2) Previous works cannot well handle the underlying complex bidding environment, leading to poor model convergence. This problem could be amplified when handling multiple objectives of advertisers which are practical demands but not considered by previous work. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-objective cooperative bid optimization formulation called Multi-Agent Cooperative bidding Games (MACG). MACG sets up a carefully designed multi-objective optimization framework where different objectives of advertisers are incorporated. A global objective to maximize the overall profit of all advertisements is added in order to encourage better cooperation and also to protect self-bidding advertisers. To avoid collusion, we also introduce an extra platform revenue constraint. We analyze the optimal functional form of the bidding formula theoretically and design a policy network accordingly to generate auction-level bids. Then we design an efficient multi-agent evolutionary strategy for model optimization. Offline experiments and online A/B tests conducted on the Taobao platform indicate both single advertiser's objective and global profit have been significantly improved compared to state-of-art methods.
As data are increasingly being stored in different silos and societies becoming more aware of data privacy issues, the traditional centralized training of artificial intelligence (AI) models is facing efficiency and privacy challenges. Recently, federated learning (FL) has emerged as an alternative solution and continue to thrive in this new reality. Existing FL protocol design has been shown to be vulnerable to adversaries within or outside of the system, compromising data privacy and system robustness. Besides training powerful global models, it is of paramount importance to design FL systems that have privacy guarantees and are resistant to different types of adversaries. In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive survey on this topic. Through a concise introduction to the concept of FL, and a unique taxonomy covering: 1) threat models; 2) poisoning attacks and defenses against robustness; 3) inference attacks and defenses against privacy, we provide an accessible review of this important topic. We highlight the intuitions, key techniques as well as fundamental assumptions adopted by various attacks and defenses. Finally, we discuss promising future research directions towards robust and privacy-preserving federated learning.
Many natural language processing tasks solely rely on sparse dependencies between a few tokens in a sentence. Soft attention mechanisms show promising performance in modeling local/global dependencies by soft probabilities between every two tokens, but they are not effective and efficient when applied to long sentences. By contrast, hard attention mechanisms directly select a subset of tokens but are difficult and inefficient to train due to their combinatorial nature. In this paper, we integrate both soft and hard attention into one context fusion model, "reinforced self-attention (ReSA)", for the mutual benefit of each other. In ReSA, a hard attention trims a sequence for a soft self-attention to process, while the soft attention feeds reward signals back to facilitate the training of the hard one. For this purpose, we develop a novel hard attention called "reinforced sequence sampling (RSS)", selecting tokens in parallel and trained via policy gradient. Using two RSS modules, ReSA efficiently extracts the sparse dependencies between each pair of selected tokens. We finally propose an RNN/CNN-free sentence-encoding model, "reinforced self-attention network (ReSAN)", solely based on ReSA. It achieves state-of-the-art performance on both Stanford Natural Language Inference (SNLI) and Sentences Involving Compositional Knowledge (SICK) datasets.
注冊地址： 北京市海淀區羊坊店路18號2幢3層301-191