We give a simple proof of the well-known result that the marginal strategies of a coarse correlated equilibrium form a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. A corollary of this fact is that no-external-regret learning algorithms that converge to the set of coarse correlated equilibria will also converge to Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. We show an approximate version: that $\epsilon$-coarse correlated equilibria imply $2\epsilon$-Nash equilibria.
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Real-world games, which concern imperfect information, multiple players, and simultaneous moves, are less frequently discussed in the existing literature of game theory. While reinforcement learning (RL) provides a general framework to extend the game theoretical algorithms, the assumptions that guarantee their convergence towards Nash equilibria may no longer hold in real-world games. Starting from the definition of the Nash distribution, we construct a continuous-time dynamic named imperfect-information exponential-decay score-based learning (IESL) to find approximate Nash equilibria in games with the above-mentioned features. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that IESL yields equilibrium-approaching policies in imperfect information simultaneous games with the basic assumption of concavity. Experimental results show that IESL manages to find approximate Nash equilibria in four canonical poker scenarios and significantly outperforms three other representative algorithms in 3-player Leduc poker, manifesting its equilibrium-finding ability even in practical sequential games. Furthermore, related to the concept of game hypomonotonicity, a trade-off between the convergence of the IESL dynamic and the ultimate NashConv of the convergent policies is observed from the perspectives of both theory and experiment.
Whenever a binary classifier is used to provide decision support, it typically provides both a label prediction and a confidence value. Then, the decision maker is supposed to use the confidence value to calibrate how much to trust the prediction. In this context, it has been often argued that the confidence value should correspond to a well calibrated estimate of the probability that the predicted label matches the ground truth label. However, multiple lines of empirical evidence suggest that decision makers have difficulties at developing a good sense on when to trust a prediction using these confidence values. In this paper, our goal is first to understand why and then investigate how to construct more useful confidence values. We first argue that, for a broad class of utility functions, there exist data distributions for which a rational decision maker is, in general, unlikely to discover the optimal decision policy using the above confidence values -- an optimal decision maker would need to sometimes place more (less) trust on predictions with lower (higher) confidence values. However, we then show that, if the confidence values satisfy a natural alignment property with respect to the decision maker's confidence on her own predictions, there always exists an optimal decision policy under which the level of trust the decision maker would need to place on predictions is monotone on the confidence values, facilitating its discoverability. Further, we show that multicalibration with respect to the decision maker's confidence on her own predictions is a sufficient condition for alignment. Experiments on four different AI-assisted decision making tasks where a classifier provides decision support to real human experts validate our theoretical results and suggest that alignment may lead to better decisions.
In online reinforcement learning (RL), instead of employing standard structural assumptions on Markov decision processes (MDPs), using a certain coverage condition (original from offline RL) is enough to ensure sample-efficient guarantees (Xie et al. 2023). In this work, we focus on this new direction by digging more possible and general coverage conditions, and study the potential and the utility of them in efficient online RL. We identify more concepts, including the $L^p$ variant of concentrability, the density ratio realizability, and trade-off on the partial/rest coverage condition, that can be also beneficial to sample-efficient online RL, achieving improved regret bound. Furthermore, if exploratory offline data are used, under our coverage conditions, both statistically and computationally efficient guarantees can be achieved for online RL. Besides, even though the MDP structure is given, e.g., linear MDP, we elucidate that, good coverage conditions are still beneficial to obtain faster regret bound beyond $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ and even a logarithmic order regret. These results provide a good justification for the usage of general coverage conditions in efficient online RL.
Large integer factorization is a prominent research challenge, particularly in the context of quantum computing. The classical computation of prime factors for an integer entails exponential time complexity. Quantum computing offers the potential for significantly faster computational processes compared to classical processors. We proposed a new quantum algorithm, Shallow Depth Factoring (SDF), to factor an integer. SDF consists of three steps. First, it converts a factoring problem to an optimization problem without an objective function. Then, we use a Quantum Feasibility Labeling (QFL) to label every possible solution according to whether it is feasible or infeasible for the optimization problem. Finally, the Variational Quantum Search (VQS) is used to find all feasible solutions. The SDF algorithm utilizes shallow-depth quantum circuits for efficient factorization, with the circuit depth scaling linearly as the integer to be factorized increases. Through minimizing the number of gates in the circuit, the algorithm enhances feasibility and reduces vulnerability to errors.
We consider a number of questions related to tradeoffs between reward and regret in repeated gameplay between two agents. To facilitate this, we introduce a notion of {\it generalized equilibrium} which allows for asymmetric regret constraints, and yields polytopes of feasible values for each agent and pair of regret constraints, where we show that any such equilibrium is reachable by a pair of algorithms which maintain their regret guarantees against arbitrary opponents. As a central example, we highlight the case one agent is no-swap and the other's regret is unconstrained. We show that this captures an extension of {\it Stackelberg} equilibria with a matching optimal value, and that there exists a wide class of games where a player can significantly increase their utility by deviating from a no-swap-regret algorithm against a no-swap learner (in fact, almost any game without pure Nash equilibria is of this form). Additionally, we make use of generalized equilibria to consider tradeoffs in terms of the opponent's algorithm choice. We give a tight characterization for the maximal reward obtainable against {\it some} no-regret learner, yet we also show a class of games in which this is bounded away from the value obtainable against the class of common ``mean-based'' no-regret algorithms. Finally, we consider the question of learning reward-optimal strategies via repeated play with a no-regret agent when the game is initially unknown. Again we show tradeoffs depending on the opponent's learning algorithm: the Stackelberg strategy is learnable in exponential time with any no-regret agent (and in polynomial time with any no-{\it adaptive}-regret agent) for any game where it is learnable via queries, and there are games where it is learnable in polynomial time against any no-swap-regret agent but requires exponential time against a mean-based no-regret agent.
In this paper, we establish efficient and uncoupled learning dynamics so that, when employed by all players in multiplayer perfect-recall imperfect-information extensive-form games, the trigger regret of each player grows as $O(\log T)$ after $T$ repetitions of play. This improves exponentially over the prior best known trigger-regret bound of $O(T^{1/4})$, and settles a recent open question by Bai et al. (2022). As an immediate consequence, we guarantee convergence to the set of extensive-form correlated equilibria and coarse correlated equilibria at a near-optimal rate of $\frac{\log T}{T}$. Building on prior work, at the heart of our construction lies a more general result regarding fixed points deriving from rational functions with polynomial degree, a property that we establish for the fixed points of (coarse) trigger deviation functions. Moreover, our construction leverages a refined regret circuit for the convex hull, which -- unlike prior guarantees -- preserves the RVU property introduced by Syrgkanis et al. (NIPS, 2015); this observation has an independent interest in establishing near-optimal regret under learning dynamics based on a CFR-type decomposition of the regret.
Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in game theory, such as congestion games, but go well-beyond to environments wherein the cooperation of one team -- in the absence of explicit communication -- is obstructed by competing entities; the latter setting remains poorly understood despite its numerous applications. Since the seminal work of Von Stengel and Koller (GEB `97), different solution concepts have received attention from an algorithmic standpoint. Yet, the complexity of the standard Nash equilibrium has remained open. In this paper, we settle this question by showing that computing a Nash equilibrium in adversarial team games belongs to the class continuous local search (CLS), thereby establishing CLS-completeness by virtue of the recent CLS-hardness result of Rubinstein and Babichenko (STOC `21) in potential games. To do so, we leverage linear programming duality to prove that any $\epsilon$-approximate stationary strategy for the team can be extended in polynomial time to an $O(\epsilon)$-approximate Nash equilibrium, where the $O(\cdot)$ notation suppresses polynomial factors in the description of the game. As a consequence, we show that the Moreau envelop of a suitable best response function acts as a potential under certain natural gradient-based dynamics.
We study robust linear regression in high-dimension, when both the dimension $d$ and the number of data points $n$ diverge with a fixed ratio $\alpha=n/d$, and study a data model that includes outliers. We provide exact asymptotics for the performances of the empirical risk minimisation (ERM) using $\ell_2$-regularised $\ell_2$, $\ell_1$, and Huber loss, which are the standard approach to such problems. We focus on two metrics for the performance: the generalisation error to similar datasets with outliers, and the estimation error of the original, unpolluted function. Our results are compared with the information theoretic Bayes-optimal estimation bound. For the generalization error, we find that optimally-regularised ERM is asymptotically consistent in the large sample complexity limit if one perform a simple calibration, and compute the rates of convergence. For the estimation error however, we show that due to a norm calibration mismatch, the consistency of the estimator requires an oracle estimate of the optimal norm, or the presence of a cross-validation set not corrupted by the outliers. We examine in detail how performance depends on the loss function and on the degree of outlier corruption in the training set and identify a region of parameters where the optimal performance of the Huber loss is identical to that of the $\ell_2$ loss, offering insights into the use cases of different loss functions.
We analyse a general class of bilevel problems, in which the upper-level problem consists in the minimization of a smooth objective function and the lower-level problem is to find the fixed point of a smooth contraction map. This type of problems include instances of meta-learning, equilibrium models, hyperparameter optimization and data poisoning adversarial attacks. Several recent works have proposed algorithms which warm-start the lower-level problem, i.e. they use the previous lower-level approximate solution as a staring point for the lower-level solver. This warm-start procedure allows one to improve the sample complexity in both the stochastic and deterministic settings, achieving in some cases the order-wise optimal sample complexity. However, there are situations, e.g., meta learning and equilibrium models, in which the warm-start procedure is not well-suited or ineffective. In this work we show that without warm-start, it is still possible to achieve order-wise (near) optimal sample complexity. In particular, we propose a simple method which uses (stochastic) fixed point iterations at the lower-level and projected inexact gradient descent at the upper-level, that reaches an $\epsilon$-stationary point using $O(\epsilon^{-2})$ and $\tilde{O}(\epsilon^{-1})$ samples for the stochastic and the deterministic setting, respectively. Finally, compared to methods using warm-start, our approach yields a simpler analysis that does not need to study the coupled interactions between the upper-level and lower-level iterates.
Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) are a popular form of graphical model that, for certain classes of games, have been shown to offer key complexity and explainability advantages over traditional extensive form game (EFG) representations. In this paper, we extend previous work on MAIDs by introducing the concept of a MAID subgame, as well as subgame perfect and trembling hand perfect equilibrium refinements. We then prove several equivalence results between MAIDs and EFGs. Finally, we describe an open source implementation for reasoning about MAIDs and computing their equilibria.
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