Congestion pricing has long been hailed as a means to mitigate traffic congestion; however, its practical adoption has been limited due to the resulting social inequity issue, e.g., low-income users are priced out off certain roads. This issue has spurred interest in the design of equitable mechanisms that aim to refund the collected toll revenues as lump-sum transfers to users. Although revenue refunding has been extensively studied for over three decades, there has been no thorough characterization of how such schemes can be designed to simultaneously achieve system efficiency and equity objectives. In this work, we bridge this gap through the study of \emph{congestion pricing and revenue refunding} (CPRR) schemes in non-atomic congestion games. We first develop CPRR schemes, which in comparison to the untolled case, simultaneously increase system efficiency without worsening wealth inequality, while being \emph{user-favorable}: irrespective of their initial wealth or values-of-time (which may differ across users), users would experience a lower travel cost after the implementation of the proposed scheme. We then characterize the set of optimal user-favorable CPRR schemes that simultaneously maximize system efficiency and minimize wealth inequality. Finally, we provide a concrete methodology for computing optimal CPRR schemes and also highlight additional equilibrium properties of these schemes under different models of user behavior. Overall, our work demonstrates that through appropriate refunding policies we can design user-favorable CPRR schemes that maximize system efficiency while reducing wealth inequality.
相關內容
Individuals lack oversight over systems that process their data. This can lead to discrimination and hidden biases that are hard to uncover. Recent data protection legislation tries to tackle these issues, but it is inadequate. It does not prevent data misusage while stifling sensible use cases for data. We think the conflict between data protection and increasingly data-based systems should be solved differently. When access to data is given, all usages should be made transparent to the data subjects. This enables their data sovereignty, allowing individuals to benefit from sensible data usage while addressing potentially harmful consequences of data misusage. We contribute to this with a technical concept and an empirical evaluation. First, we conceptualize a transparency framework for software design, incorporating research on user trust and experience. Second, we instantiate and empirically evaluate the framework in a focus group study over three months, centering on the user perspective. Our transparency framework enables developing software that incorporates transparency in its design. The evaluation shows that it satisfies usability and trustworthiness requirements. The provided transparency is experienced as beneficial and participants feel empowered by it. This shows that our framework enables Trustworthy Transparency by Design.
Users' physical safety is an increasing concern as the market for intelligent systems continues to grow, where unconstrained systems may recommend users dangerous actions that can lead to serious injury. Covertly unsafe text is an area of particular interest, as such text may arise from everyday scenarios and are challenging to detect as harmful. We propose FARM, a novel framework leveraging external knowledge for trustworthy rationale generation in the context of safety. In particular, FARM foveates on missing knowledge to qualify the information required to reason in specific scenarios and retrieves this information with attribution to trustworthy sources. This knowledge is used to both classify the safety of the original text and generate human-interpretable rationales, shedding light on the risk of systems to specific user groups and helping both stakeholders manage the risks of their systems and policymakers to provide concrete safeguards for consumer safety. Our experiments show that FARM obtains state-of-the-art results on the SafeText dataset, showing absolute improvement in safety classification accuracy by 5.9%.
This work addresses the problem of revenue maximization in a repeated, unlimited supply item-pricing auction while preserving buyer privacy. We present a novel algorithm that provides differential privacy with respect to the buyer's input pair: item selection and bid. Notably, our algorithm is the first to offer a sublinear $O(\sqrt{T}\log{T})$ regret with a privacy guarantee. Our method is based on an exponential weights meta-algorithm, and we mitigate the issue of discontinuities in revenue functions via small random perturbations. As a result of its structural similarity to the exponential mechanism, our method inherently secures differential privacy. We also extend our algorithm to accommodate scenarios where buyers strategically bid over successive rounds. The inherent differential privacy allows us to adapt our algorithm with minimal modification to ensure a sublinear regret in this setting.
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two items is known, and the agent knows the valuation for the current item (but not for the one in the future). The designer seeks to maximize expected revenue, and the auction must be deterministic, truthful, and ex post individually rational. The optimum mechanism involves a protocol whereby the seller elicits the buyer's current valuation, and based on the bid makes two take-it-or-leave-it offers, one for now and one for the future. We show that finding the optimum deterministic mechanism in this situation - arguably the simplest meaningful dynamic mechanism design problem imaginable - is NP-hard. We also prove several positive results, among them a polynomial linear programming-based algorithm for the optimum randomized auction (even for many bidders and periods), and we show strong separations in revenue between non-adaptive, adaptive, and randomized auctions, even when the valuations in the two periods are uncorrelated. Finally, for the same problem in an environment in which contracts cannot be enforced, and thus perfection of equilibrium is necessary, we show that the optimum randomized mechanism requires multiple rounds of cheap talk-like interactions.
The widespread adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in smart cities, intelligent healthcare systems, and various real-world applications have resulted in the generation of vast amounts of data, often analyzed using different Machine Learning (ML) models. Federated learning (FL) has been acknowledged as a privacy-preserving machine learning technology, where multiple parties cooperatively train ML models without exchanging raw data. However, the current FL architecture does not allow for an audit of the training process due to the various data-protection policies implemented by each FL participant. Furthermore, there is no global model verifiability available in the current architecture. This paper proposes a smart contract-based policy control for securing the Federated Learning (FL) management system. First, we develop and deploy a smart contract-based local training policy control on the FL participants' side. This policy control is used to verify the training process, ensuring that the evaluation process follows the same rules for all FL participants. We then enforce a smart contract-based aggregation policy to manage the global model aggregation process. Upon completion, the aggregated model and policy are stored on blockchain-based storage. Subsequently, we distribute the aggregated global model and the smart contract to all FL participants. Our proposed method uses smart policy control to manage access and verify the integrity of machine learning models. We conducted multiple experiments with various machine learning architectures and datasets to evaluate our proposed framework, such as MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Persons with visual impairments have often been a soft target for cybercriminals, and they are more susceptible to cyber attacks in the digital environment. The attacks, as mentioned above, are because they are visually/aurally exposed to the other sighted users. Visually impaired computer users suffer from secrecy and privacy issues on digital platforms. This paper proposes a mechanism termed BEEMA(Braille adapted Enhanced PIN Entry Mechanism using Arrow keys) to help people with visual impairments. We have studied various security attacks on visually impaired users and proposed a mechanism named BEEMA that provides a rigid braille-adapted text input for people with visual impairments. This mechanism allows users to enter a PIN number on any website that requires a PIN number. The proposed model is implemented as a browser plugin which can be accessed easily. We have conducted sessions with visually impaired users to study the mechanism's performance. The proposed BEEMA model has shown encouraging results in the user study. Resilience of BEEMA against various attacks is also explored in this paper.
Value decomposition methods have gained popularity in the field of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, almost all existing methods follow the principle of Individual Global Max (IGM) or its variants, which limits their problem-solving capabilities. To address this, we propose a dual self-awareness value decomposition framework, inspired by the notion of dual self-awareness in psychology, that entirely rejects the IGM premise. Each agent consists of an ego policy for action selection and an alter ego value function to solve the credit assignment problem. The value function factorization can ignore the IGM assumption by utilizing an explicit search procedure. On the basis of the above, we also suggest a novel anti-ego exploration mechanism to avoid the algorithm becoming stuck in a local optimum. As the first fully IGM-free value decomposition method, our proposed framework achieves desirable performance in various cooperative tasks.
Decision-making algorithms are being used in important decisions, such as who should be enrolled in health care programs and be hired. Even though these systems are currently deployed in high-stakes scenarios, many of them cannot explain their decisions. This limitation has prompted the Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) initiative, which aims to make algorithms explainable to comply with legal requirements, promote trust, and maintain accountability. This paper questions whether and to what extent explainability can help solve the responsibility issues posed by autonomous AI systems. We suggest that XAI systems that provide post-hoc explanations could be seen as blameworthy agents, obscuring the responsibility of developers in the decision-making process. Furthermore, we argue that XAI could result in incorrect attributions of responsibility to vulnerable stakeholders, such as those who are subjected to algorithmic decisions (i.e., patients), due to a misguided perception that they have control over explainable algorithms. This conflict between explainability and accountability can be exacerbated if designers choose to use algorithms and patients as moral and legal scapegoats. We conclude with a set of recommendations for how to approach this tension in the socio-technical process of algorithmic decision-making and a defense of hard regulation to prevent designers from escaping responsibility.
Since the cyberspace consolidated as fifth warfare dimension, the different actors of the defense sector began an arms race toward achieving cyber superiority, on which research, academic and industrial stakeholders contribute from a dual vision, mostly linked to a large and heterogeneous heritage of developments and adoption of civilian cybersecurity capabilities. In this context, augmenting the conscious of the context and warfare environment, risks and impacts of cyber threats on kinetic actuations became a critical rule-changer that military decision-makers are considering. A major challenge on acquiring mission-centric Cyber Situational Awareness (CSA) is the dynamic inference and assessment of the vertical propagations from situations that occurred at the mission supportive Information and Communications Technologies (ICT), up to their relevance at military tactical, operational and strategical views. In order to contribute on acquiring CSA, this paper addresses a major gap in the cyber defence state-of-the-art: the dynamic identification of Key Cyber Terrains (KCT) on a mission-centric context. Accordingly, the proposed KCT identification approach explores the dependency degrees among tasks and assets defined by commanders as part of the assessment criteria. These are correlated with the discoveries on the operational network and the asset vulnerabilities identified thorough the supported mission development. The proposal is presented as a reference model that reveals key aspects for mission-centric KCT analysis and supports its enforcement and further enforcement by including an illustrative application case.
Bid optimization for online advertising from single advertiser's perspective has been thoroughly investigated in both academic research and industrial practice. However, existing work typically assume competitors do not change their bids, i.e., the wining price is fixed, leading to poor performance of the derived solution. Although a few studies use multi-agent reinforcement learning to set up a cooperative game, they still suffer the following drawbacks: (1) They fail to avoid collusion solutions where all the advertisers involved in an auction collude to bid an extremely low price on purpose. (2) Previous works cannot well handle the underlying complex bidding environment, leading to poor model convergence. This problem could be amplified when handling multiple objectives of advertisers which are practical demands but not considered by previous work. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-objective cooperative bid optimization formulation called Multi-Agent Cooperative bidding Games (MACG). MACG sets up a carefully designed multi-objective optimization framework where different objectives of advertisers are incorporated. A global objective to maximize the overall profit of all advertisements is added in order to encourage better cooperation and also to protect self-bidding advertisers. To avoid collusion, we also introduce an extra platform revenue constraint. We analyze the optimal functional form of the bidding formula theoretically and design a policy network accordingly to generate auction-level bids. Then we design an efficient multi-agent evolutionary strategy for model optimization. Offline experiments and online A/B tests conducted on the Taobao platform indicate both single advertiser's objective and global profit have been significantly improved compared to state-of-art methods.
小貼士
登錄享
注冊地址： 北京市海淀區羊坊店路18號2幢3層301-191