A central question in multi-agent strategic games deals with learning the underlying utilities driving the agents' behaviour. Motivated by the increasing availability of large data-sets, we develop an unifying data-driven technique to estimate agents' utility functions from their observed behaviour, irrespective of whether the observations correspond to equilibrium configurations or to temporal sequences of action profiles. Under standard assumptions on the parametrization of the utilities, the proposed inference method is computationally efficient and finds all the parameters that rationalize the observed behaviour best. We numerically validate our theoretical findings on the market share estimation problem under advertising competition, using historical data from the Coca-Cola Company and Pepsi Inc. duopoly.
We study parametric inference on a rich class of hazard regression models in the presence of right-censoring. Previous literature has reported some inferential challenges, such as multimodal or flat likelihood surfaces, in this class of models for some particular data sets. We formalize the study of these inferential problems by linking them to the concepts of near-redundancy and practical non-identifiability of parameters. We show that the maximum likelihood estimators of the parameters in this class of models are consistent and asymptotically normal. Thus, the inferential problems in this class of models are related to the finite-sample scenario, where it is difficult to distinguish between the fitted model and a nested non-identifiable (i.e., parameter-redundant) model. We propose a method for detecting near-redundancy, based on distances between probability distributions. We also employ methods used in other areas for detecting practical non-identifiability and near-redundancy, including the inspection of the profile likelihood function and the Hessian method. For cases where inferential problems are detected, we discuss alternatives such as using model selection tools to identify simpler models that do not exhibit these inferential problems, increasing the sample size, or extending the follow-up time. We illustrate the performance of the proposed methods through a simulation study. Our simulation study reveals a link between the presence of near-redundancy and practical non-identifiability. Two illustrative applications using real data, with and without inferential problems, are presented.
The exploration problem is one of the main challenges in deep reinforcement learning (RL). Recent promising works tried to handle the problem with population-based methods, which collect samples with diverse behaviors derived from a population of different exploratory policies. Adaptive policy selection has been adopted for behavior control. However, the behavior selection space is largely limited by the predefined policy population, which further limits behavior diversity. In this paper, we propose a general framework called Learnable Behavioral Control (LBC) to address the limitation, which a) enables a significantly enlarged behavior selection space via formulating a hybrid behavior mapping from all policies; b) constructs a unified learnable process for behavior selection. We introduce LBC into distributed off-policy actor-critic methods and achieve behavior control via optimizing the selection of the behavior mappings with bandit-based meta-controllers. Our agents have achieved 10077.52% mean human normalized score and surpassed 24 human world records within 1B training frames in the Arcade Learning Environment, which demonstrates our significant state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance without degrading the sample efficiency.
We consider off-policy evaluation of dynamic treatment rules under sequential ignorability, given an assumption that the underlying system can be modeled as a partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP). We propose an estimator, partial history importance weighting, and show that it can consistently estimate the stationary mean rewards of a target policy given long enough draws from the behavior policy. We provide an upper bound on its error that decays polynomially in the number of observations (i.e., the number of trajectories times their length), with an exponent that depends on the overlap of the target and behavior policies, and on the mixing time of the underlying system. Furthermore, we show that this rate of convergence is minimax given only our assumptions on mixing and overlap. Our results establish that off-policy evaluation in POMDPs is strictly harder than off-policy evaluation in (fully observed) Markov decision processes, but strictly easier than model-free off-policy evaluation.
Policy optimization methods with function approximation are widely used in multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, it remains elusive how to design such algorithms with statistical guarantees. Leveraging a multi-agent performance difference lemma that characterizes the landscape of multi-agent policy optimization, we find that the localized action value function serves as an ideal descent direction for each local policy. Motivated by the observation, we present a multi-agent PPO algorithm in which the local policy of each agent is updated similarly to vanilla PPO. We prove that with standard regularity conditions on the Markov game and problem-dependent quantities, our algorithm converges to the globally optimal policy at a sublinear rate. We extend our algorithm to the off-policy setting and introduce pessimism to policy evaluation, which aligns with experiments. To our knowledge, this is the first provably convergent multi-agent PPO algorithm in cooperative Markov games.
In this work, we detail a procedure to construct a reduced order model on the basis of frequency-domain data, that preserves the non-strictly passive property and the port-Hamiltonian structure. The proposed scheme is based on Benner et al. (2020) contribution, which has been adapted (i) to handle non-strictly passive model, and (ii) to handle numerical issues observed when applying the Loewner framework on complex configurations. We validate the proposed scheme on a very complex two-dimensional wave equation, for which the discretized version preserves the port-Hamiltoninan form.
Motivated by a number of real-world applications from domains like healthcare and sustainable transportation, in this paper we study a scenario of repeated principal-agent games within a multi-armed bandit (MAB) framework, where: the principal gives a different incentive for each bandit arm, the agent picks a bandit arm to maximize its own expected reward plus incentive, and the principal observes which arm is chosen and receives a reward (different than that of the agent) for the chosen arm. Designing policies for the principal is challenging because the principal cannot directly observe the reward that the agent receives for their chosen actions, and so the principal cannot directly learn the expected reward using existing estimation techniques. As a result, the problem of designing policies for this scenario, as well as similar ones, remains mostly unexplored. In this paper, we construct a policy that achieves a low regret (i.e., square-root regret up to a log factor) in this scenario for the case where the agent has perfect-knowledge about its own expected rewards for each bandit arm. We design our policy by first constructing an estimator for the agent's expected reward for each bandit arm. Since our estimator uses as data the sequence of incentives offered and subsequently chosen arms, the principal's estimation can be regarded as an analogy of online inverse optimization in MAB's. Next we construct a policy that we prove achieves a low regret by deriving finite-sample concentration bounds for our estimator. We conclude with numerical simulations demonstrating the applicability of our policy to real-life setting from collaborative transportation planning.
Treatment effect estimation under unconfoundedness is a fundamental task in causal inference. In response to the challenge of analyzing high-dimensional datasets collected in substantive fields such as epidemiology, genetics, economics, and social sciences, many methods for treatment effect estimation with high-dimensional nuisance parameters (the outcome regression and the propensity score) have been developed in recent years. However, it is still unclear what is the necessary and sufficient sparsity condition on the nuisance parameters for the treatment effect to be $\sqrt{n}$-estimable. In this paper, we propose a new Double-Calibration strategy that corrects the estimation bias of the nuisance parameter estimates computed by regularized high-dimensional techniques and demonstrate that the corresponding Doubly-Calibrated estimator achieves $1 / \sqrt{n}$-rate as long as one of the nuisance parameters is sparse with sparsity below $\sqrt{n} / \log p$, where $p$ denotes the ambient dimension of the covariates, whereas the other nuisance parameter can be arbitrarily complex and completely misspecified. The Double-Calibration strategy can also be applied to settings other than treatment effect estimation, e.g. regression coefficient estimation in the presence of diverging number of controls in a semiparametric partially linear model.
We study the problem of diffusion-based network learning of a nonlinear phenomenon, $m$, from local agents' measurements collected in a noisy environment. For a decentralized network and information spreading merely between directly neighboring nodes, we propose a non-parametric learning algorithm, that avoids raw data exchange and requires only mild \textit{a priori} knowledge about $m$. Non-asymptotic estimation error bounds are derived for the proposed method. Its potential applications are illustrated through simulation experiments.
Bid optimization for online advertising from single advertiser's perspective has been thoroughly investigated in both academic research and industrial practice. However, existing work typically assume competitors do not change their bids, i.e., the wining price is fixed, leading to poor performance of the derived solution. Although a few studies use multi-agent reinforcement learning to set up a cooperative game, they still suffer the following drawbacks: (1) They fail to avoid collusion solutions where all the advertisers involved in an auction collude to bid an extremely low price on purpose. (2) Previous works cannot well handle the underlying complex bidding environment, leading to poor model convergence. This problem could be amplified when handling multiple objectives of advertisers which are practical demands but not considered by previous work. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-objective cooperative bid optimization formulation called Multi-Agent Cooperative bidding Games (MACG). MACG sets up a carefully designed multi-objective optimization framework where different objectives of advertisers are incorporated. A global objective to maximize the overall profit of all advertisements is added in order to encourage better cooperation and also to protect self-bidding advertisers. To avoid collusion, we also introduce an extra platform revenue constraint. We analyze the optimal functional form of the bidding formula theoretically and design a policy network accordingly to generate auction-level bids. Then we design an efficient multi-agent evolutionary strategy for model optimization. Offline experiments and online A/B tests conducted on the Taobao platform indicate both single advertiser's objective and global profit have been significantly improved compared to state-of-art methods.
Promoting behavioural diversity is critical for solving games with non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). Yet, there is a lack of rigorous treatment for defining diversity and constructing diversity-aware learning dynamics. In this work, we offer a geometric interpretation of behavioural diversity in games and introduce a novel diversity metric based on \emph{determinantal point processes} (DPP). By incorporating the diversity metric into best-response dynamics, we develop \emph{diverse fictitious play} and \emph{diverse policy-space response oracle} for solving normal-form games and open-ended games. We prove the uniqueness of the diverse best response and the convergence of our algorithms on two-player games. Importantly, we show that maximising the DPP-based diversity metric guarantees to enlarge the \emph{gamescape} -- convex polytopes spanned by agents' mixtures of strategies. To validate our diversity-aware solvers, we test on tens of games that show strong non-transitivity. Results suggest that our methods achieve much lower exploitability than state-of-the-art solvers by finding effective and diverse strategies.